Portland State University

PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

1-1-1975

Is there a case for in-kind income transfers?: an
analysis of the low-income housing and food stamp
programs
Judy Barmack
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Barmack, Judy, "Is there a case for in-kind income transfers?: an analysis of the low-income housing and
food stamp programs" (1975). Dissertations and Theses. Paper 73.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.73

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations
and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

IS THERE A CASE FOR IN-KIND INCOME TRANSFERS?
AN ANALYSIS OF THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING AND FOOD
STAMP PROGRAMS

By
Judith A. Barmack

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty
of Urban Studies in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Portland state University
1975

Copyright

®

1975 by Judith A. Barmack

TO THE OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH:
The members of the Committee approve the dissertation of
Judith A. Barmack

Morton Paglin,

John A. Hanson

...

/

Studies

f.lay 30, 1975

. .

./~ .r~:"

AN ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION OF Judith A.

Ba~ack

for the Doctor

of Philosophy in Urban Studies presented May 30, 1975.
Title:

Is There a Case for In-Kind Income Transfers?
An Analysis of the Low-Income Housing and Food
Stamp Programs

~Morton

Paglin,

John. A. Hanson

The primary objective of this

~esearch

and efficiency of in-kind income transfers.

Chai~:

/

was to assess the equity
The analytical framework

employed incorporated key concepts of the utility interdependence paradigm from economic welfare theory.

This paradigm views income trans-

fers as social goods and suggests that social as well as private benefits may be derived from the redistribution of income.

This study

attempted to assess some of the empirical implications of the utility
interdependence argument through the investigation of the low-income
housing and Food Stamp programs in Multnomah County, Oregon for FY
1973.
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Data were drawn from agency files, published statistics and documents, interviews with program administrators, and a survey of the records of 498 Non-Public Assistance Food stamp households.

The private

and social benefits and costs of the programs were estimated.
program r

,~ticipation

The

rates and the socio-economic characteristics of

recipient households were ascertained.

Particular attention was de-

voted to an evaluaLion of the efficacy of in-kind transfers in inducing

substitu~ion

effects or producing social benefits through the al-

teration of the consumption patterns of the target population.

In ad.-

dition to an economic analysis of in-kind transfers, the political environment of welfare legislation was detailed.
The results of this research suggest that in-kind income transfers are an inefficient and inequitable method of redistributing income.
All programs investigated were characterized by high administrative
costs.

The administrative share of the public program budget ranged

from 20% in the Food Stamp Program to over 50% in

P~)lic

Housing.

All

programs were found to be inequitable in that households with similar
socio-economic characteristics did not receive similar benefits.
Housing programs discriminate among the equally needy by restricting
supply.

In -the Food Stamp Program, a complex income determination

formula, which is used to calculate program benefits, results in a considerable variation in the subsidies provided to households of equivalent size and income.
The low-income housing and Food Stamp programs were also found to
be ineffective in producing those social benefits which are specifically
related to changes in the consumption patterns of the target population

3

as a whole.

While housing programs were found to induce substitution

effects by furnishing large subsidies to a small number of households,
only 5% of the eligible received benefits.

Programs which leave the

vast majority of the poorly housed untouched were judged unlikely to
significantly diminish the external diseconomies presumed to be associated with the housing expenditure patterns of the entire population
of eligible.

In contrast, the Food stamp Program provides less gene-

rous subsidies to all eligible applicants.

Food stamp subsidies

were found to be insufficient to generate substitution effects;

the

food consumption patterns demanded of recipient households were not
different from the food expenditure patterns of comparable households
with income entirely in cash.
While the distribution of benefits in the housing and Food stamp
programs strongly favors the poor, large numbers of non-poor are officially eligible for assistance.
households in the country were

It was estimated that 37% of the
eligible for low-income housing and ap-

proximately 46% were eligible for food stamps.

While the tight sup-

ply of housing transfers limits the growth of program participation, an
enormous expansion of participation in the open-ended Food Stamp Program
is possible.
The economic analysis of in-kind transfer programs emphasized
their deficiencies as redistributive mechanisms.

However, the poli-

tical potency of in-kind programs was found to be considerable.

Poli-

cy-makers appear to be responsive to pressures to perpetuate and expand
established programs, rather
tions

~which

tha~

they are based.

to empirically validate the assumpIn view of the political popularity of

4

in-kind transfers and the public antipathy to transfers of cash, it
is probable that transfers in-kind will command an increasing share of
the welfare budget.
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CHAPTER I
THE AMERICAN WAY OF WELFARE

Introduction
The American welfare system pleases neither the taxpayer nor
the intended beneficiaries of public income transfers.

Taxpayers

grumble about cost escalation, inefficiency, and fraud while those
eligible for benefits complain of inequities, inadequate payment
levels and stigmatization.

The swift escalation of expenditures

and glaring malfunctions in several public needs-tested income
transfer programs have stimulated considerable debate about the
"welfare crisis".

While the term welfare is most commonly asso-

ciateQ with the cash Public Assistance programs, the welfare system,
consists of a plethora of programs, many of which provide benefits

in the form of specific goods and services.

These "in-kind" programs

like low-income housing, medicaid and food stamps, have groWTl dramatically since the mid-1960·s.

Table I charts the increases in ex-

penditures for four of the most rapidly expanding public transfer
programs and reveals that the rate of growth in medicaid and food
stamps has far exceeded that of Aid for Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), the most popular target of public criticism.
Table I also indicates how rapidly small-scale experimental programs, like food stamps, c c:_ come to command a significant share of
the public budget.

Table II reveals that by Fiscal Year (FY) 1973,

the budget for needs-tested transfer programs was $30.7 billion
and demonstrates that in-kind transfer programs had ballooned so ra-

TABLE I

EXPENDITURES IN PUBLIC NEEDS-TESTED INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS, SELECTED YEARS+
(expenditures in thousands of dollars)

PROGRAM

1966

FISCAL YEAR
1969

1972

1973

PERCENT INCREASE
1966-1973

70,500

251,000

1,916,900

2,606,600

3597

Public Housing

256,673

391,611

889,114

1,101,810

329

Hedicaid

369,600

4,165,765

8,137,653

9,110,552

2365

1,735,000

3,091,803

6,553,599

6,954,554

301

Food Stamps

AFDC cash payments
to beneficiaries

lDerived from The Budget of the ~ Government, Appendix, F.Y. 1968, pp. 133, 488, and 523;
F.Y. 1971, pp. 146, 437, and 482; FY 1974, pp. 208, 442, and 499; FY 1975, pp. 203-205, 440-442,
494, and 808,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 1970, 1973, and 1974).
Includes federal, state and local expenditures.

N

TABLE II
EXPENDITURES AND PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC NEEDS-TESTED INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS, F. Y. 1973 1
(expenditures in thousands of dollars)

EXPENDITURES
FEDERAL

STATE AND LOCAL

6,954,554

*

*

10,979,630

3,365,732

*

*

3,158,781

923,910

*

*

TOTAL

PROGRAM

NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS

CASH PROGRAMS
Public Assistance
AFDC
Adult Categories

2

State and Local
Administration
Total Public
Assistance
veterans and Survivors
Pensions
TrOTAL CASH

11,244,498

6,341,264

2,574,498

2,574,498

g,818,694

8,915,762

4,902,932

2,143,260

1,607,445

535,815

6,700,000

9,110,552

4,997,686

4,112,866

25,527,000

4~962":9322

0

2,322,579

IN-KIND PROGRAMS
Social Services
Medicaid

3

w

TABLE II
(continued)
Food stamps4

2,649,863

2,495,600

154,263

12,150,680

"" 5
Ch 1."ld Nutr1.t1.on

1,345,700

1,345,700

*

25,000,000

1,101,810

1,101,810

o

1,047,000

Rent Supplement

108,143

108,143

o

118,184

Section 235

278,416

27B,416

o

411,670

Section 236

171,902

171,902

o

191,261

16,909,646

12,106,702

4,802,944

30,728,349

21,022,464

9,705,876

(58)

(49)

"
Hous1.ng
Programs 6

Public Housing

TOTAL

IN-KIND

TOTAL CASH AND

IN-KrNi)-(In-kind as a percent of
total cash and in-kind)

(55)

1Derived from The Budget of the £. §.:... Government, Appendix, FY 1975, (Washington, D.C.:
vernment Printing Office, 1974), pp. 203-205,440-442, 292, and 80B.

U.S. Go-

2Inc1udes Aid to the Par·tia11y and Totally Disabled (APTD), ;Hd to the Blind (AB), Old Age Assistance OM, and Emergency Assistanclil.
3Federa1 and state and local shares are e.',timated based on the required 75/25 match.

~

TABLE II

(Continued)
4

Estimate for state and local expenditures was obtained by projecting from Oregon da-ta.
5Includes School Lunch, Scho':)l Breakfast and Special Milk programs.
6pigures in the Number of Recipients column represent the number of dwelling units for
housing programs.

*Unavailable.

lJ1

6

pidly that by FY 1973 they dominated cash transfers in the welfare
budget.
Cri·ticism of welfare programs have not been confined to the acceleration of costs.
system is in

~1

Equ.ally crl.!..;ial are judgements that the welfare

:"tate of administrative chaos and that a perverse struc-

ture of incentives had iuadvertently been created.

The dynamics of

the welfare crisis were clearly outlined in hearings regarding the administration of welfare before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of
the Joint Economic Committee in the Spring of 1972.

Witnesses ranged

from John G. Veneman, Under Secretary of HEW, to other prominent federal
officials, to state welfare administrators, to local welfare supervisors, to caseworkers in Atlap.ta, New York and Detroit.

Those testi-

fying were unanimous in their condemnation of the present system;

not

a single witness suggested that welfare programs were functioning adequately.

Most would agree with veneman that the problems with welfare

were so fundamental that minor modifications would fail to solve them.
Veneman informed the committee that
Many, if not most, of the problems your investigation
will uncover are the direct result of a failing system
with overwhelming structural weaknesses that cannot be
solved under existing law. l
1

u.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal
Policy, Problems in Administration of public Welfare Programs: Hearings Before the Subcommittee ~ Fiscal Policy, (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government printing Office, 1972), p. 67.

7

ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES
Diffusion of Responsibility and Variations in Standards
Responsibility for public welfare programs is diffused horizontally within a single level of government and vertically between levels of government in the federal system.

Local welfare agencies are

compelled to administer a mUltiplicity of programs whose eligibility
criteria and operating procedures are uncoordinated at best and have
conflicting objectives and requirements at worst.

Programs targeted

for the poor fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor
(manpower programs), the Department of Agriculture (food stamps and
child nutrition programs), the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (public assistance and medicaid), and the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (housing programs) •

Each of these federal de-

partments have their bureaucratic arms at the state and local levels.
To further complicate matters, welfare legislation is fed through a
variety of Congressional committees.

In the House, welfare legisla-

tion may land in Ways and Means, Veterans Affairs, Agriculture, Education.and Labor, or Banking and Currency.

The senate counterparts are

Finance, Veterans Affairs, Labor and Public Welfare, Agriculture and
Forestry, and Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

2

state governments have a similar array of welfare bureaucracies
and legislative committees.

While some transfer programs like food

2U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommi'ttee on Fiscal
Policy, Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No.2, Handbook of Public In~ Transfer Programs, (Washington;-D.C.: u.s. Government printing-Office, 1972), pp. 5-7.

8

stamps have national standards, many like AFDC and medicaid relegate
be;'lefit and eligibility determination to the states.

This has resul-

ted in a very substantial interstate variation in the benefits available to recipients with essentially the same income and family characFor example, in January, 1974, the average monthly AFDC

teristics.

payment per recipient ranged from $14.36 in Mississippi to $91.83 in
Wisconsin.
autonomous

3

On the local level, welfare is administered by 1,153
't
un~

s. 4

In sum, welfare legislation originates at many

distinct points in the federal system.

There are few incentives for

the responsible agencies and committees to coordinate their efforts.
As a result of the system as a whole has conflicting parts which create
administrative headaches and inequities in the treatment of recipients.
Local officials and federal administrators all complain that they
lack sufficient power to bring order to the system.

Those responsible

for administering welfare programs on the local level complain that federal regulations exhibit a lack of understanding of local conditions
and that the complexity and conflicts inherent in the system stem from
the separation of responsibility for day-to-day program operations
from rulemaking.

Local officials testified that many programs are

virtually unadwinisterable in their present form.

Federal officials

3

u.s. Congress, House of Representatives, Subconuni"ttee of the
Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Labor and Health, Education and Welfare Appropriations for 1975, Part 6, Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1974), pp. 25-26.
4U•S• Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal
Policy, Problems ••• , ~ cit., p. 68.
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in turn, bemoan their lack of control over local agencies and claim
that they leave few realistic sanctions to employ against recalcitrant local administrators. S
Complexity, Error and Fraud
Sharon Galm, staff legal counsel for the Subcommittee on Fiscal
Policy, after conducting an extensive analysis of welfare administration, sunmtarized,"Because of the nature of present eligibility and
budget criteria, accurate application procedures are not feasible, and
feasible procedures are not accurate." 6

The extreme complexity of

eligibility and payment formulas imposes a high cost on both caseworkers and applicants.

While Galm was primarily concerned with the

functioning of the AFDC program, many in-kind transfer programs are
also characterized by extremely complex formulas.
Complexity stems from several sources.

Some is a function of

the diffusion of responsibility for rulemaking between and within levels of government as discussed above.

Some complexity is the product

of the determination to keep welfare costs down by screening the "unworthy" poor out of the system.

The categorical aid system

~stablished

in the Public Assistance programs testifies to the salience of recipient character.istics other than income.

For example, the AFDC program

6Sharon Galm, Studies in Public welfar~,paper No. S(Part 1), ~
Welfare Administration: Welfare ~ Administrative Nightmare,
prepared for the U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Fiscal Policy, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,

~~n

1972), p.l.
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is aimed at poor mothers with dependent children, not at the equally
poor intact family or single individual.
Another, quite different impulse has also contributed to complexity.

This is the effort to humanize the system by taking into ac-

count the individual circumstances of applicants.

Most welfare pro-

grams reflect an effort to consider individual cases on their own merits in the adoption of involved income and assets determination procedures.

However, the specific procedures adopted are not uniform

across programs:

legitimate "hardship" deductions from gross income

under Food stamps may not be allowed under AFDC or public housing and
vice versa.

Handler and Hollingsworth note that the proliferation of

rules intended to personalize the system leaves the caseworker with
considerable discretion in the determination as to precisely who is
eligible and what they will receive.

While this discretion may as

frequently benefit the client as harm him, it does mitigate against the
equal treatment of equals.

Inevitable inequities creep into the

system. 7
The plethora of rules and regulations increases administrative
costs as the time required per case is a function of complexity.
Local welfare agencies are supposed to follow directives which may fill a bookshelf 4 feet wide •••
To process one welfare applicant in Atlan-ta requires
as many as 27 different forms; Detroit food stamp

7Joe1 F. Handler and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, The "Deserving
Poor": A study of Welfare Administ:r.ation, Institute for Research on
Poverty !<tonograph Series, (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971).
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workers are responsible for using about 4Q different
forms. 8
Efforts to streamline procedures have been unsuccessful because of the
failure of all the relevant parties to cooperate.
The basic structure of the system contributes to a high-rate of
error in the determination of eligibility and payment levels.

That

errors abound in the AFDC program has been verified by GAO and

H~l

investigations.

In April-September, 1973, nationally, errors were in

41.1% of AFDC cases.

Of these, 10.2% of the cases involved payments

to ineligibles, 22.8% concerned overpayments and 8.1% involved underpayments.
payments.

The cost of these errors amounted to 14.6% of total program
9

It is probably that large administrative errors are also

characteristic of other complex transfer programs, but the principle
target of investigation to date has been AFDC.
In contrast to administrative error, a very small percentage of
cases are investigated for fraud and an even smaller number are referred to law enforcement agencies.

The amount of undetected fraud is an

unknown quantity as welfare agencies are generally too overburdened to
pursue more than a few token cases.

Many caseworkers testified before

the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy that they felt severly constrained
in dealing with claims that they suspected to be
8

Sharon Galm,

~

fraudule~t.

A combi-

cit., p. 5.

9U•S . Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, ~ cit., p. 29.
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nation of Supreme Court rulings and the increased militancy of welfare
recipients has made it necessary to undertake expensive and lengthy
Even if fraud is proven, the probability

litigation to prove fraud.

of collecting from households with few financial resources is small.
Most potential fraud cases are buried because caseworkers have other
priorities and officials have concluded that there is little to be
gained by pressing charges.

10

Staff Shortages and High Turnover
public welfare agencies are chronically understaffed and suffer
from high rates of turnover.

Heavy caseloads are common and frequent

schedule updates add to the burdens of welfare workers.

Increases in

benefit and/or eligibility levels, which are made periodically to keep
pace with the cost of living, require reviews of the entire caseload.
The need for such reviews has accelerated recently as benefit levels
have been altered more frequently as the rate of inflation has increased.

Rule changes unrelated to benefit levels or definitions of the

eligible population also appear habitually.

In many cases, these

reflect deep Congressional dissatisfaction with the operation of the
welfare system which has spurred tinkering with its structure in an
effort to make it work.

Another source of administrative burden is

the irregular income characteristic of the welfare population.

Changes

in income require recalculations of benefits just as do changes in

10 u.S. Congress, Jo~n
. t Econo~c
. Comml... tt ee, Su b
·
.
conunl..ttee
on Fl..scal
Policy, Problems •.• , ~ cit., pp. 191-193.
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benefit schedules or other rules.

11

The workers being asked to assume this administrative load are
typically young, inexperienced, and poorly trained.

Most casework-

ers are young college graduates who do not intend to remain in welfare
work for very long.
Training is minimal and primarily of the on-the12
job variety.
considering the complexity of what needs to be learned and retraining of all staff required by changes in policies and
procedures it is not surprising that there is a high rate of administrative error.
PERVERSE INCENTIVES
Barriers

!£

the Participation of the Eligible:
Participation and Transaction Costs

High

In addition to the purposeful discrimination among the poor inherent in the categorical aid system, the welfare structure inadvertently and inequitably favors the mobile, aggressive and persistent
eligible over the immobile, the meek and the tired, but equally eligible poor.

The testimony before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of

Bobbie Poussaint, Director, Community Social Services Program, Department of Social Services, New York City Human Resources Administration
enumerates the high participation costs imposed on some intended beneficiaries.
11

Sharon GalIn,

~ ~

l2 Ibid ., pp. 32-34.
Joel F. Handler and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth,
49-51.

~

cit., pp.
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We found that it requires a high degree of sophistication
and courage on the part of recipients and constnners to enable
them to obtain benefits to which they are entitled.
Many such persons have difficulty in even obtaining information regarding which benefits are available and what they
must do in order to obtain them.
Many have extreme difficulty
in negotiating the system after learning about available benefits.
For example, many of the aged poor find it impossible to take
advantage of t~e food stamp program because of the extensive and
expensive traveling involved in order to become eligible for
this program.
Many persons have difficulty utilizing medical
services under Medicaid for a variety of reasons, primarily,
due to the location of vendors and the difficulties encountered in getting to these vendors.
Many heads of households, particularly one-parent families
encounter a lack of synchronized effort between child care
programs, vocati :-~:ll tr.,,!.ining programs, and the income maintenance programs.
Frequently, they are interested in training and employment; however they become discouraged when
either of the aforementioned components becomes dysfunctional.
The result is a loss 6f interest and increased hostility. 13
These high participation costs help explain why many welfare programs,
with no legal limit to the number of recipients, enroll only a fraction of those eligible.
Work Disincentives:

High Marginal Tax Rates and Notches

While Congress has consistently voiced strong support for work
incentives for welfare recipients, the actual impact of some individual programs and many program packages is precisely the opposite of
Congressional intent.

Policies for individual programs are typically

considered in isolation from other programs serving the same population.

This failure to simultaneously consider groups of programs has

13u.s. Congress, JOlon
. t Economloc
.
.
'
'1
COIIIIDlottee,
sub
commlottee
on Flosca
Policy, Problems ••• , op~cit., pp. 143-144.
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For example, increases in Social Secu-

led to some bizarre results.

rity benefits may lead to an income loss rather than a gain for intended beneficiaries when such increases lead to reductions in benefits under other programs such as food stamps and/or medicaid.
Lerman shows that marginal tax rates for individual programs
typically range from 24-35%;
65-76 cents -to

t.~e

each extra dollar earned is worth only

recipient because of benefit reductions associated

with earnings increases. 14

Hausman indicates that combinations of

programs have much higher rates.

An

AFDC mother of three benefiting

from food subsidies, medicaid and public housing faces a marginal tax
rate of up to 76% on earnings; each additional dollar is worth only
15
24 cents.
storey notes that a hOl1sehold receiving AFDC, food
stamps, and public housing faces a marginal tax rate of 85% on earn16
ings.
Aaron concurs that marginal tax rates in excess of 67% are
common for program

_"I-'

•

CO'I~~nat~ons.

17

14Robert I. Lerman, "Incentive Effects in Public Income Transfer
Programs, "Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No.4, Income Transfer
Programs: ~ They ~ the ~, prepared for the U. S. Congress, Joint
Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 1-78.
l5Leonard J. Hausman, "Cumulative Tax Rates in Alternative Income
Maintenance Systems," Ibid., pp. 111, 113.
16 James R. Storey, Studies in public Welfare, Paper No.1, Public
Income Transfer Programs: The Incidence of Multiple Benefits and the
Issues Raised Ex. their Receipt, prepared for the U.S. Congress, Joint
Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 8.
17Henry J. Aaron, Why is Welfare ~ Hard to Reform?, (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 33-35.
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At some earnings levels the marginal rate of taxation exceeds
100% and a "notch" occurs.

A notch is a point at which the income

of a household is actually reduced by increases in earnings because
losses in program benefits are greater than increments in earnings.
Notches are common when eligibility for one program is linked to
another or when program benefits fail to vary with income once eligibility has been ascertained.

For example, a one dollar increase in

earnings may make a household inelgible for medicaid
worth $1000 in benefits.

~lhich

may be

In this case, the family loses $999 as a

result of a small improvement in earnings.

Or households which be-

come ineligible for AFDC may suddenly lose benefits from a range of
other programs if eligibility for the non-AFDC

progrru~s

is contingent

upon eligiblity for AFDC.
While rational analysis of the ab?ve tax structure might lead
,

many a program participant to avoid work, Aaron notes that the complexity of the system may inhibit the preception of the high tax rates
which prevail.

"A system with high, but obscure, marginal tax rates

may deter work less than a system with lower, but clearly visible, tax
rates."

18

In addition, the link between the perception of various ra-

tes and actual behavior is unclear.

However, it may be concluded that

Congressional attention to individual programs rather than to the combined impact of program packages has created a formal structure which does
not strongly reward work effort.
18

Ibid., pp. 37-38.

This outcome is in direct contradic-

17

tion to the publically

e)~ressed

Work Disincentives:

priorities of most Congressmen.

High Potential Benefit Levels

Benefit levels under the present system may
earnings at the minimum wage.

~xceed

full-time

While the typical welfare recipient

is probably not so fortunate, individuals in states with generous benefits or individuals able to benefit from several programs may enjoy
incomes well above those of many workers.

A staff study for the Sub-

committee on Fiscal Policy analyzed the benefits available from combinations of welfare programs in 100 counties for different family
pes.

ty~'

These benefit combinations were compared with earnings from

full-time employment at the minimum and median wage levels in those
counties.

Table III depicts the results of the study for a male-

headed family of four in Multnomah County, Oregon (Portland), in Suffolk County, Massachusetts (Boston), a high benefit county, and in
Bolivar County, Mississippi, a low benefit rural county.
Table III demonstrates that welfare benefits in high benefit
counties like Multnomah and Suffolk may exceed earnings at the minimum
wage, and may even exceed the median county income for males in suffolk County.

In the 100 counties surveyed, only three southern

counties had benefit schedules which unambiguously rewarded work effort across all family types.

Table III also illustrates the large

interstate variations in the treatment of households of identical income and st.ructure.

TABLE III

ANNUAL BENEFITS FOR HOUSEHOLD WITH

(1)
COUNTY .lillD WORK
STATUS OF HEAD
Mu~tnomah,

EARNINGS

&~LOYABLE

HEAD, BY WOIDe STATUS (Ai OF JULY, 1972), HUSBAND, WIFE AND
TWO CHILDREN, SELECTED COUNTIES

(2)
UNEMP.

INSUR.

LuI)

(3)
TOTAL
TAXES

(4)
AFDC-U

(5)

GENERAL
ASSIST.

(6)
NET CASH
INCOME

Oregon

No ,..ork, U.I. benefits
No work or U.I. benefits
Works 40 hrs. @ $2.00
Earns male median income

0
0
4000
7968

1092
0
0

0
0
4000
6946

1350
0
0

0
0
4000
3643

832
0
0

0

0
0
208
1168

1458
2916
0
0

366
0
0
0

2916
2916
2792
6800

1712
4075
0
0

721
0
0
0

3807
4099
3816
6077

0

0
0
0
0

832
0
3792
3454

Suffolk, Massachusetts
No work, U.I. benefits
No work or U.I. benefits
Works 40 hrs. @ $2.00
Earns male median income

0

2
24CR
2
24CR
184
869

Bolivar, Mississippi
No \'lork, U. I. benefi ts
No work or U.I. benefits
Works 40 hrs. @ $2.00
Earns male median income

0

0
0
208
189

0
0

0

~

(Xl

TABLE II!
(continued)

( 7)
FOOD STAMPS OR
COMMODITIES

(8)
SCHOOL
LUNCHES

900
900
708
0

63
63
63
0

595
595
S95

54
54
54

o

o

1284
1344
492
636

54
54
54
54

(9)
WORK
EXPENSES
0
0
684

684

o

(10)
NET CASll, FOOD AND
PUBLIC HOUSING
5057
505:7
5604
7114

(11)
DISCRETIONARY
INCOME (10-9)

5057

5561

5057
4920
6430

5561
5388
7555

6345
6692
5799
6131

2304
1484
3881
3674

o

5701
5972

684
684

6077

5701
5972
5269
5393

2170
1398
4338
4144

2170
1398
3654
3460

o
o
684
68,1

5953

(12)

GROSS TAXlI.BI..E
EQUIVALENT

I Derived from Studies in Eublic vlelfare, Paper No. 15, vlelfare in the 70's: A National study of
Benefits Available in 100 Local Areas, A staff study for the U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committ·ee,
Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, (vlashingtoI:, D.C.: U.S. Government printing Office,1974), Tahles 43,53,and
~6.

~CR indicates a tax credit.

.....
~
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It should be noted that Table III indicates the hypothetical
benefits available in different local areas, rather than the actual
benefit payments.

A crucial question is the extent to which multiple

program participation prevails among the eligible.

In 1973, the Sub-

committee on Fiscal Policy conducted a study of the actual incidence
of welfare benefits in six of the sites \<1hich the Census Bureau has
designated as "low income."

Of the 1,758 households surveyed, 40%

received no benefits, 60% received benefits from 1 or more programs,
40% received benefits from 2 or more programs, 26% received benefits
from 3 or more programs, 17% received benefits from 4 or more programs,
11% received benefits from 5 or more programs, and 7% received benefits from 6 or more programs.

19

While the nationwide incidence of actual benefits received may
not be generalized from this sample, the results of the

subco~nittee's

study suggest that few households receive all of the benefits to which
they are entitled.

The potentially high benefit levels shown for

Mu1tnomah and Suffolk Counties in Table III are a result of the cumulative effects of six programs.

In the low income areas studied by

the subcommittee, only 7% of those sampled were actually receiving this
large number of transfers.

In sum, while potential benefits in some

states are very high, actual benefits are not, on the average.

Two

factors are undoubtedly important in explaining why the eligible fail

19studies in Public Welfare, Additional Material for Paper No.6:
How Public Welfare Benefits are Distributed in LO~-Income Areas, A
Staff study for the u.s. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1973), p. 95.
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to participate in particular programs.

One is that the supply of

some public transfers like public housing is severely limited.

Other

factors, discussed above, are the high information and transaction
costs imposed on the eligible by complex, uncoordinated programs.
FamHy Break-Up
The economic incentive for a family to break-up varies with
family size, family earnings, arid the number and structure of welfare
benefits available in particular local areas.

Family splitting in-

centives are especially marked in states where AFDC payments are restricted to female-headed households.

While about 50% of the states

permit cash payments to families with unemployed male heads, Public
Assistance benefits are unavailable to households headed by employed
males.

Thus the "working poor" intact family is excluded from cash

benefit programs, although such households are eligible for many in" d programs. 20
k ~n

As is the case with the work issue, the overt ob-

jectives of public policy are diametrically opposed to the incentives
created by the actual structure of programs.
EXPLANATION FOR CHAOS?

WELFARE POLITICS

While there is widespread agreement on the desirability of welfare reform, consensus disintegrates when particular proposals for
20Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No. 15, Welfare in the 70's
National Study of Benefits Available in 100 Local Areas, A staff
study for the U.s. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Fiscal Policy, (vlashington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1974), p. 39.

~
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In a lengthy analysis of the failure on the

change are introduced.

Nixon Administration's proposed Family Assistance Plan, Moynihan discusses the quite opposite attitudes of those who are equally appalled
21

by the existing system.

While some denounce the current system as

ungenerous and demeaning to recipients, others find it outrageously
expensive and "soft" on the poor.

Those generally labeled "conser-

vative" demand work requirements, fraud investigations, tough eligibility teste,

and modest benefits.

"Liberals" request higher bene-

fit levels, liberalized eligibility requirements, eligibility determination by self-declaration rather than investigation, respect for
the privacy of program participants, and flexible work-requirements,
if any.
This range of opinion is reflected in Congress where substantive
compromises are essential to avoid paralysis.

The process of nego-

tiation between parties in such fundament.::tl disagreement leads to
programs which are flawed from their inception.

The blurring of ob-

jectives and the contradictory provisions required to obtain consensus
create enumerable administrative difficulties.

Once begun, programs

develop their own momentum and are rarely subject to rigorous evaluation.

Pressure to maintain existing benefits are very strong from

the "public" attached to on-going programs.

A program's "public" in-

cludes not only its direct beneficiaries, but its bureaucracy and sym-

21naniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of ~ Guaranteed Income: The
Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan, (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

23
pathetic pressure groups as well.

David A. stockman, who is Execu-

tive Director of the Republican Conference in the U.s. House of Representatives, contends that Congressmen become coopted by the programs
they are ostensibly charged with evaluating.

The political advantages

of having benefits to distribute "back home" transform' Congressmen
into lobbyists for ever greater social welfare budgets.

Even Congress-

men initially opposed to a particular program, tend to scramble for
benefits for their districts and encourage program expansion once the
22
program is established.
In SUnl',. the political environment of welfare inhibits the rationalization of public transfer programs despite
the strong consensus that exists that major reform is essential.
22
David A. stockman, "The Social Pork Barrel,"
terest, XXXIX, (Spring, 1975), pp. 3-30.

The Public In-

CHAPTER II

WELFARE THEORY AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF UTILITY INTERDEPENDENCE
Introduction
The political and administrative pressures mitigating against
the equitable and efficient operation of the welfare system have been
detailed in ChRpter I.

This chapter will outline some of the major

controversial theoretical issues regarding redistribution that have
plagued welfare economists.

Standards for measuring the efficacy

of public policies with redistributive objectives have generally been
phrased in terms of elusive abstractions such as "equity", "the public interest," and "social justice" which are rarely operationalized.
The rigorous evaluation of public welfare programs has lagged behind
the evaluation of other governmental endeavors, in part, because of
the uncertainty over appropriate objectives in the area of redistribution.

How much should be transferred to whom, from whom, under

what conditions, and in what form, are the fundamental questions that
welfare theory must add:cess.

Welfare theory has not provided un-

ambiguous normative responses to these questions, nor has it offered
a well-developed positive theory to explain the observed amount and
form of redistribution. 1
IHarold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers, "Utility Interdependence and Income Transfers through Charity," in Kenneth E. Boulding,
Martin Pfaff and Anita Pfaff, editors, Transfers in ~ Urbanized
Economy: ~eories and Effects of the Grants Economy, (Belmont:
Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 63-77.
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FROM THE SOCIAL "WELFARE "FUNCTI.ON TO UTILITY INTERDEPENDENCE
Economists have traditionally viewed allocation and distribution
as conceptually distinct functions of the public sector. 2

Alloca-

tional decisions were characterized as fundamentally technical, while
distributional choices were seen as normative.

Thus

equity determinations were divorced from one another.

efficie~cy

and

The widely

accepted benchmark for measuring the efficiency of allocational options is the Paretian rule.

A change in economic conditions is jud-

ged "Pareto Optimal" (efficient\good) if, and only if, the welfare of
some individual is improved without the welfare of anyone else being
diminished.

Despite the efforts to separate efficiency criteria

from ethical issues, the Paretian rule is not value-free.

It posits

that everyone count and that, therefore, no one ought to be made worse
off.

other value premises would lead to other rules.

The efficien-

cyjequity dichotomy has also been weakened by the growing acknowledgment that public policies which ostensibly have only allocational repercussions frequently alter the distribution of resources between individuals or groups as well.
Transfers which redistribute resources from some members of society to others have traditionally been viewed as confiscatory;
man's gain necessitated another man's loss.

one

The utility functions of

individuals were specified as independent of one another in line with
2Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave~ Public Finance in
Theory and practice, (New York: Mc Graw-Hil1, Inc., 1973), pp. 6-14.
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the classical characterization of ueconomic man II as selfish in his
motivation and behavior.

While the self-interested actions of in-

dividuals in the market were presunted to have socially beneficial results, the utility of individual A did not enter into the utility function of individual B or vice versa.

Therefore, transfers could not

be fitted into the Paretian schema since the donor would presumably be
made "worse off" by his donation.
To explain transfers, and to guide redistributional decisions,
welfare economists resorted to a social welfare function.
welfare function specifies

The social

the weights which should be given to the

welfare derived by various individuals -- it identifies society's
"winners" and "losers".

As such, the social welfare function demands

interpersonal comparisons of utility and requires a collective rather
than an individualistic conceptualization of society.3

Determination

of the "best" social welfare function remains beyond the boundaries of
micro-economic theory which is based on consumer sovereignty.

Self-

interested trade in the competitive market is presumed to benefit all;
the specification of trade-offs between the welfare of individuals is
alien to this tradition and cannot satisfy the Paretian criterion.

As

a result, most economists have treated the social welfare function as
exogenous in their analyses of efficiency in the provision of public
goods.

The specification of the social welfare function was viewed as

essentially a philosophical or political matter rather than an econo-

3Francis m. Bator, uThe Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization,"
The American Economic Review, XLVII, (March, 1957), pp. 22-59.
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mic issue.
Some elegant models of voting behavior and political parties
have been developed by Arrow, Downs, and Buchanan and Tullock in an
effort to solve the problem of aggregating individual preferences into
a social welfare

.

funct~on.

4

However, the opportunities for strate-

gic behavior (the masking of preferences), the costs of political
participation and the ambiguity or intransitivity of results in large
group multi-issue representative political systems have precluded a
definitive solution to the problem of moving from the individual to
the collective.

In the end, political analysts have generally re-

sorted to a logrolling model to describe the public policy-making process in formally

da~ocratic

nations.

While conflicts between indi-

viduals or groups may make it impossible to reach consensus on specific
issues, considered in isolation, vote trading permits agreernent on
packages of issues.

vote trading allows variations in the intensity

of preferences on particular issues to be reflected in the political
process.
system

However, precisely what is maximized through the political

r~~ains un~lear.

The search for more

~ffecti ve

>'lays of aggre-

gating demand con-tinues.
Welfare theory fowldered for many years in an effort to reconcile
the collectivist requirements of a social welfare flAnction with t.he
4Kenneth J. Arrow, pocial Cheice and Individual Values, 2nd ed.,
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 19631.
James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent,
(Ann Arbor: The universityofMichiganPress,-1963).
Anthony DOwns,~_ Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York:
Harper and Row, 1957).
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individualistic basis of the rest of economic theory.
Rodgers

~de

a major effort to break the bottleneck.

Hochman and
In

exploring

the possibilities of utility interdependence, they attempted to integra·te redistribution into micro-theory and erase the divisions between allocation and distribution, efficier.cyand equity.5

They de-

monstrate how the Paretian schema may require redistribution if indi.vidual utility functions are benevolently interdependent.

In con-

trast to the Robin Hood view of transfers which has dominated economics, Hochman and Rodgers indicate that redistribution may not be a
zero-sum game.

In a two-person economy, redistribution may improve

everyone's position if two individuals, we.a+thy Mutt and indigent Jeff
(to use the authors' examples) derive satisfaction from both their own
income and each others' income.

(2)

In other words,

= fJ(Y ,Y )

M J

where UM and YM are Mutt's utility index and income, and U and Y
J
J
are the corresponding values for

~ff.

In this model the income of

f.lutt is treated as an ext.ernality for Jeff and vice versa.

As such,

the specification of trade-offs between the welfare of individuals
(the social welfare function) becomes unnecessary.

Mutt will volun-

tarily agree to transfer to Jeff up to the point where the marginal
increase in f.1utt' s utility derived from an increase in Jeff's income

5Harold M.Hoclunan andJamesD.Rodgers, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution,1I The American EconomicRevie~l, LIXr [September, 1969), pp.
542-557.
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equals the narginal increase in Mutt's utility derived from increases
in his mm income.
As with other social goods, when consideration turns from the
two-person to the n-person case, government action is required to
circumvent the IIfree rider ll problem and compel transfers.

Presumably

Mutt's utility would increase if Jeff's transfer originated in some
other wealthy Mutt's pocket, rather than in his own.

Therefore, it

would be to Mutt's advantage to conceal his preferences for transfers
and to IIfree ride. 1I

In addition, if there are many poor Jeffs, Mutt

will undoubtedly recognize the futility of significantly improving the
welfare of the poor through his contribution alone.

Thus the Mutts

would rationally elect to compel themselves to make redistributive
transfers through

~~eir

government.

Hochman and Rodgers' assumption of benevolent utility interdepender~ce

has some empirical support from the existence of private charity

(about $12 billion per year).6

It is reasonable to assume that there

is a declining marginal utiljty of income and that at some high consumption level, increments in another's income may be willingly substituted for increments in one's own consumption.

In an inter-urban in-

vestigation, Hochman and Rodgers found sig'nificant positive correlations
between charitable contributions in a city with the city's income and
the city's ir,come dispers~otl'~ 7
6Richard Musgrave, "Pareto Optimal Redistribut.ion: Com:nent/IlThe
Americ~ Economic:: Ravi.ew, LX, (December, 1~701, pp. 991-993.
7Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers, "Utility Interdependence
and Income Transfers through Charity," ~ cit.
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GOODS-SPECIFIC UTILITY INTERDEPENDENCE:

THE CASE OF '.MERIT GOODS

Hochman and Rodgers initially considered only cash transfers,
but in a later comment, they indicated that their analysis could appropriately be applied to merit goods. 8

Merit

goods 'are public goods

unlike "pure" social goods, in that they entail neither joint consumption nor exclusion difficulties.

They are goods which could be pro-

vided by the market, but, if left to the market, are undersupplied or
underconsumed because

soci~l

benefits exceed private benefits.

For

example, an individual may elect not to invest in education but the society has an interest in compelling him to do so.

In an effort to

internalize these sorts of externalities, particular goods and services
(i.e. food, education, medical care) may enler the public sector
through subsidy, regulation and/or public provision.
Merit goods are something of an anomaly in economic theory, although in real life they are an extremely popular form of transfer.
Musgrave notes that micro-theory based on assumptions of consumer

50-

vereignty has a difficult time incorporating the merit good concept
since the explicit purpose of a merit good is to interfere with consu9

mer choice.

Economists have attempted to cope with merit goods in

several ways. Merit g09ds' may be considered as the imposition'of elite

8Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution: Reply,',' ~ American Economic Review, LX (December, 1970),
pp. 997-1002.
9Richard A. Musgrave, "Provision for Social Goods," in public
Economics, ~ cit., pp. 124-144.
Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgravei~cit., p. 81.

31

preferences concerning the appropriate consumption patterns on the
rest of the world or merit goods may be justified as a protection for
the individual who may not be informed about the consequences of his
actions.

In these cases, individual welfare and consumption prefer-

ences are not identical. IO

In addition, certain population sub-groups

such as the senile or insane may be judged incompetent to make their
own decisions.

These kinds of explanations for merit goods are es-

sentially paternalistic and remain outside of micro-theory with its
individualistic assumptions.
If merit goods are viewed in the context of utility interdependence, then they may be incorporated into traditional economic analysis
in which the efficient allocation of goods is related to individual
choice.

Buchanan concludes that individualistic norms are consistent

with transfers in-kind (merit goods) and that general cash transfers
are not politically viable.
The evidence seems to indicate that general redistribution
of purchasing power, or even general change in the relative
levels of well-being is not widely desired.
Instead members
of the public want and express through their behavior patterns,
relief for specific spending patterns.
This expression of individual preferences can be brought
within the general analysis of externalities.
The mere fact
that some members of the community are poor does not, in and
of itself, normally impose an external diseconomy on many of
the remaining members.
What does impose such an internal
diseconomy is the way that certain persons behave when they
are poor.
It is not the low income of the family down the
street that bothers most of us; it is the fact that the
family lives in a dilapidated house and dresses its children
in rags that imposes on our sensibilities.
And we are
willing to pay something to remove this external effect; it

10Abram Bergson, "On Social Welfare Once More", in'Essays in Normative Economics, Abram Bergson, editor, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press,
1966), pp. 51-90.
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is relevant for behavior. Ordinary citizens are probably quite unwilling ·to finance substantial transfers
of general purchasing power to the poor in their communities. But they are probably willing to finance
specific transfers, either directly as income-in-kind
or indirectly in purchasing power that is earmarked
for specific items of spending (vouchers}.ll
Buchanan's position is supported by the emphasis on in-kind transfers
in public welfare programs discussed in Chapter I.

Further evidence

of the popularity of in-kind transfers is provided by Daly and Giertz
who observe that charitable institutions receive their income primarily in cash, but redistribute it largely in the form of illiquid
commo d ~"t~es. 12

Moynihan also provides extensive documentation of

the public resistance to cash income redistribution strategies. 13
Subsidies of particular goods and services pose problems
analagous to those of selective taxation.

By altering the rela-

tive prices of goods, there are important substitution and incQme effects related to the restructuring of the choices confronting the consumer.

An

exception to the rule occurs when the price

elasticity of the goods in question is equal to zero -- in this
case there are no substitution effects.

General cash transfers

like income taxes (positive or negative) also distort choice,
but the distortion is between work and leisure rather than between
IlJames M. Buchanan, "What Kind of Redistribution Do We Want?"
Economica, (May, 1968), pp. 189-190.
12George Daly and Fred Giertz, "Welfare Economics and Welfare
Reform," The American Economic Review, LXII, (March, 1972} , p •. 131.
13Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of ~ Guaranteed Income:
The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan, (New York:
Vintage Books, 1973).
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particula~

goods (except in cases where the demand for particular

goods is income elastic}.

In general, in the case of subsidization

of a particular good or service, there is a "henefit shortfall" analogous to the "excess burden" created by specific taxation.

If the

public supply of a subsidized good is greater than what consumers would
have purchased, given a free choice and a general subsidy, then there
is a benefit shortfall. 14
Both in-kind and cash transfers may be considered in the context
of utility interdependence.
several forms.

This interdependence may logically take

Interdependence may be benevolent or malevolent;

it

may be related to income in general (as in the Hochman and Rodgers
model) or it may be related to the consumption or non-consumption of
specific goods.

In addition, interdependence may be related to charac-

teristics of both donors and recipients other than income or preferred consumption patterns.
Daly and Giertz have indicated that in a two-person economy, the
following interdependent relationships may exist between a wealthy and
an impoverished individual (3-6 below).15

For the sake of continuity,

Hochman and Rodger's terminology -- rich Mutt and poor Jeff -- will be
used.
(3)

If

~U~::>

0

=0

and

dU

14Richard A. Musgrave and pe.ggy B. Musgrave, cp. cit., p. 460.
l5George Daly and Fred··J Giertz, "Benevolence, Malevolence, and
Economic Theory," Public . Choice, XIII, (Fall, 1972), pp. 1-19.
George Daly and Fred J. Giertz, "Welfare Economics and Welfare
Reform, II ~ cit.
w
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oM

then a "utility externality" exists.

is Muttls.utility ~unction,

uJ is Jeff's utility function, and x~ is Je~f' s consumption of the ith
~

good.

In this case Jeff's utility index appears in Mutt's utility

function, while Jeff's consumption of particular goods does not.

This

is similar to Hochman and Rodgers' model (1-2 above) except that Hochman and Rodgers assume that the relationship between Mutt and Jeff is
reciprocal while Daly and Giertz specify it as one-way.
(4)

If dUM
-:>'0

dX~

duM
and
dU

~

J

0

then a "goods externality" exists.

Mutt's utility is related to Jeff's

consumption of a particular good while it is independent of Jeff's general level of well-being.

In both (3) and (4) transfers from Mutt

to Jeff would be Pareto optimal, since both Mutt and Jeff would benefit
from redistribution.

(It is assumed that increases in Jeff's con'-

sumption of X. increase Jeff's utility).
~

While (3) suggests a cash

transfer, (4) implies that a transfe:r-in-kind may be more efficient.
Wheuher or not a transfer-in-kind will in fact be the superior solution depends not only on the presence of a "goods externality."

The

efficiency of an in-kind transfer hinges on the original consumption
pattern of the recipient, on the magnitude of the "goods externality",
on the price and income elasticity of the good, and on the transaction
costs associated with the

trans~er

form.

These issues will be dis-

cussed in detail below.
While (1-4) assume benevolent interdependence, it is possible
that interdependence is malevolent.

Specifically, Mutt and Jeff's re-
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lationship may have the
(5)

duM

dV
"

follow~ng

forms.

<0

J

In this case, improvements in

Jeff~s

utility lead to a decline in that

of Mutt.
(6)

duM

<: 0

J

dX

i

In this case, Jeff's consumption of a particular good imposes an external diseconomy on Mutt.
While the existence of private charity and public welfare programs are evidence in favor of benevolent interdependence, observations
of real world behavior may also support a case for malevolent interdependence.

Mutt's perception of his own well-being may hinge, in

part, on his knowledge of Jeff's poverty.

Income differentials are a

major way of assigning status in society and one's social status is relevant to one's sense of worth.
cific, as in

equatio~

(6).

16

Mutt's

Malevolence may also be goods speenjo'~ent

of his Mercedes may be

diminished by Jeff's consumption of a similar vehicle.

In addition,

diseconomies related to the consumption of particular goods may involve
cases other than envy; equation (6) may hold when the private con sumption of particular goods (i.e. gambling, prostitution, drugs, communi16

Lee Rainwater, What Money Buys: Inequality and the Social
Meaning of Income (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974).
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cable diseases} inwoses external costs on the

la~ger

society.

In a two-person economy, the relationsmp between Mutt and Jeff
is fairly simple.

Moving to an n-person society creates several pro-

blems in addition to the "free rider" dilenuna.

The willingness of

the haves to transfer to the have-nots may hinge not only on the income and goods consumption patterns of the poor, but on their non-economic characteristics as well.

For example, donors may support trans-

fers to the "honest"· poor while rejecting them for the "lazy" poor or
for "welfare cheats".

They may be willing to transfer quality edu-

cation to poor whites but not to poor blacks.

They may be sympathetic

to the plight of the elderly, blind, or handicapped indigent, while
disinterested in the struggle of a working father to support his family
(In low wages.

In fact, the extreme complexity of our present welfare

system reflects precisely such an effort to differentiate between the
"deserving" and the "undeserving" poor.
THE EFFECTS OF TRANSFER MODES ON CONSUMPTION PATTERNS
17
18
Olsen
and Orr
have both explored the relationship between
transfer forms and the consumption patterns of the poor.

In the case

of housing, Orr assumes that a "goods externality" is present -- that

17Edgar O. Olsen, "Some Theorems in the Theory of Efficient Transfers," The Journal of Political EconOmll, LXXIX, (January/February, 1971). ,
PI" 166-176.
18Larry Orr; ·The Welfare Economics of Housing for the ~, Discussion Paper 33-60, (Madison: Institute for Research on poverty, The
University of Wisconsin, December, 1968).
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the donors' utility is related to the recipient's consumption of standard housing.

Orr compares the consumption effects of cash trans-

fers, housing vouchers (cash payments tied to the consumption of at
least standard quality housing) and public housing (assumed to equal
the lowest cost standard housing).

Figure lA demonstrates the im-

pact of various amounts and forms of transfers, assuming that the indifference map of the recipient is known and that all transfer forms
entail identical administrative costs.

The horizontal axis measures

housing consumption, H, while the vertical axis measures the consumption of all other goods, Y-H.
An

YO-H

O

is the original budget line.

unconditional cash grant would shift the budget line to YI-HI'

is the cost of standard housing.

A voucher requiring

t~e

H

consumption

of housing of at least H would result in a new broken budget line
YOabH •
I

Public housing which presents

nothing choice
gle point b.

res~£ts

the recipient with an all-or-

in the original budget line YO-H O plus the sin-

Given the budget constraints and indifference map in Fi-

gure lA, in the absence of a transfer, the household would consume
substandard housing at H' and enjoy utility II'

Receipt of either the

voucher or public housing would raise its consumption to H and its
utility to 1 ,
2

An unrestricted cash subsidy would result in the

household remaining in substandard housing, H", but at utility 13"

In

this example, the welfare of the recipient would be maximized by an
unrestricted cash grant.

However, if the nonpoor derive benefits from

the consumption of standard housing by the poor, then the other two
subsidy schemes may be warranted.

While the recipient prefers cash,

\N\\

y
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YO
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::r:
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Figure 1.
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Figure lC.

The impact of cash and in-kind transfers on housing consumption. 19

19 Ibid •

VJ

OJ
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all three schemes would be acceptable to him, since all involve an
improvement over pre-transfer conditions.
Orr indicates that the impact of the various transfer modes
depends on the initial income of the potential recipients, as he
assumes that housing consumption is income-elastic.

Figure lB de-

picts a situation in which the household will reject both the voucher and public housing as both would demand too large a proportion
of the budget being devoted to housing.

In this case, a change in

pre-transfer housing consumption H', to housing consumption H demanded by the voucher and public housing, would result in a decline
in utility from 11 to 1 •
0
utility to I
to H".

2

An

unrestricted cash transfer would raise

but would increase housing consumption only slightly

In this case, the in-kind transfer would fail to attain its

objective of increasing the housing consumption of the poor since
the intended beneficiary would reject 'the transfer and his housing
consumption would consequently remain unaltered.
A different result is obtained for households at higher in itial income levels.

In Figure Ie, the unrestricted cash grant and

the voucher have the same effect.

Housing consumption will move be-

yond standard to H" and utility will move from II to 1 •
3
housing will result in both lower housing consumption,
utility, I2 than the other transfer forms.

H,

Public
and lower

In this case, public hou-

sing is clearly the inferior solution, unless the external benefits
derived by the nonpoor from the poor's consumption of housing cease at
the minimal level of standard housing.

Increments beyond this point

may be viewed by the nonpoor as excessive.

From the view of the re-
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cipient, vouchers are equivalent to

ca~

when the household wishes to

spend more on housing than the value of the voucher.
'l'lle preceding analysis has focused on the demand side of the
transfer problem.

However, frequently supply conditions have been as

important in the selection of transfer modes.

In some cases, in-kind

transfers have been aimed not so much at "correcting" consumer choice,
Tobin indicates

as at "correcting" market failure on the supply side.
that the crucial issue in determining whether in-kind

O~

cash transfers

are optimal is the elasticity of supply of the commodity in question.
When the supply of a basic necessity of life is fixed or unresponsive
to demand in·the short-run, then in-kind transfers may be preferred;
the transfer of generalized purchasing power would not be meaningful
to the recipient if the market failed to provide him with the goods he
.

requ~re

d • 20

The subsidization of demand when supply is inelastic, as

in the case of medical care, may lead to rapid price escalation, in21
stead of (or in conjunction with) increases in consumption.
Even when there are supply bottlenecks, in-kind aid to the poor,
may not be the most efficient approach to the problem.

Governmental

intervention in the market to alter supply conditions may take several
forms, just as there are many ways of approaching demand.

For example,

Welfeld has suggested, in relation to housing, that subsidies that

20 James Tobin, "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality," The
Journal of ~ and Economics, (1970), pp. 263-277.
21Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin,Charles.L •. Schultze, and
Nancy H. Teeters; Setting NaticnalPricrities: . ~.!2Z! Budget,
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 109-129.
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are not targeted speci:f;ica11y at low-income groups may actually create
more housing for the poor through. the expansion of the housing supply.
This is because such la.rge subsidies per dwelling unit are required for
low-income households that the impact of such subsidies on the housing
inventory is small.
22
may be preferred.

A more general stimulation of thn housing market

CRITICISMS OF THE UTILITY INTERDEPENDENCE FRAMEWORK
While the development of the theoretical implications of utility
interdependence may be vital to more effective public policy-making,
there are numerous practical difficulties in translating theoretical
concepts into actual public welfare programs.
b1em has been mentioned above.

The "free rider" pro-

In addition, all interdependence models

assume a uniformity of tastes with regard to redistribution within income classes.

A system of taxation which is feasible to administer

requires a uniform treatment of those in each income bracket.

Peg-

ging taxation to each individua1's marginal evaluation of the transfer
would encourage the masking of preferences and entail large administra23
If the marginal rate of taxation exceeds the marginal
tive costs.
increment in utility derived from a transfer for one or more individuals
in a given income class, the transfer cannot, by definition, be Pareto
optimal.

This problem is common to all public goods

-- citizens are

22Irving H.. We1feld, "Toward a New Federal Housing policy," The
Public Interest, XIX, (Spr ing, 19701, pp. 31-44 .
23George M. Furstenberg and Dennis C. Mueller, "The Pareto Optimal
Approach to Income Redistribution: A Fiscal Application," The American
Economic Review, LXI, (September, 1971), pp. 628-637.
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frequently confronted with. a tax/service package

whic~may

be satis-

factory to the "average" household in a given income class, but which
many others, in the same bracket, find objectionable.
Efforts to justify specific public decisions in which some individuals are clearly "losers" generally result in a logrolling model of
democratic policy-making and a defense of majority rule.
• • • while majority rule might be unacceptable if outcomes
are evaluated in single-issue terms, it is compatible with
democracy if they are construed as episodes in a convergence
process, itself having the essential properties of logrolling.
Even under the Paretian ethic, majority rule may be satisfactory, given appropriate preference patt~=ns, because the
overall outcome is preferred to the inaction that would
result from issue-by-isBue judgements constrained by the
Pareto criterion.24
While logrolling permits a rough reflection of differences in the intensity of preferences of different individuals on specific issues, Mishan
warns that after vote trading, the entire package of decisions may
result in no net transfer, even if some of the individual components
' t r~'but '~ve. 25
o f the pack age are re d ~s

Von Furstenberg and Mueller

concur that if redistribution is not separated from vote trading on
allocational issues, it is likely that redistribution will be comproIf majority rule is the imposition of an "elite" (the winners)

mised.

on the minority (the losers) then the argument has come full circle
24
Harold M. Hochman, "Individual preferences and Distributional
Adjustment," The American Economic Review, LXII, (.May, 1972), pp.
353-360.
25 E• J • Mishan, "'rheFutility of Pareto-Efficient Distribution, \I
The American Economic Review, LXII, (December, 1972), pp. 971-976.
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and interpersonal comparisons of utility and a social welfare function
are required.
• • • a meaningful program of redistribution, with the
welfare of the poor improving relative to the rich, can
only be achieved through a Pareto-optimal tax-transfer
program if all transferors approved of the amount and
form in which redistribution would be carried out at
different tax shares.
Barring this, redistribution always involves the imposition of a program by some elite,
if it is to be effective.
Conversely, strict enforcement of the Pareto criterion under such conditions results in the preservation of the status ~ ante. with
a less than universal desire fo~ making transfers, the
main objective tends to be thwarted as potential losers
must be compensated via logrolling. 26
The impact of transfers on the intended beneficiaries may also
vary within income classes because of differences in taste among
those who are equally poor.

Figures lA-C demonstrate the effects of

various housing subsidy schemes on recipients with different preferences for housing consumption.

As noted above, a cash transfer will be

universally accepted by the poor, while in-kind transfers will be rejected by those intended beneficiaries whose "costs" of altering their
consumption patterns exceed the "benefits" they would derive from additional housing consumption (Figure

l~).

While Figures lA-C assume

that taste for housing is a simple function of income, there may be
significant differences in preferences for housing and other goods between those in the same income class.

For example, most public pro-

grams assume that family size is a relevant variable and many take
into account the age and s,ex of the family head.

other social, psy-

26
George M. Von Furstenbe,rg and Dennis C. Mueller,

.~

cit.
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chological, and economic variables may also be relevant to consumption
patterns.
If donors wish to insure an increase in the consumption of a particular good, such as standard housing or nutritious food, price discrimination within an income class will logically be required.

Those

individuals with a low desire to consume standard housing or nutritious
food, will require a lower price (a bigger bribe/subsidy) to alter
their consumption than will those of similar income with a stronger
preference for these goods.

Those with the least taste for the speci-

fied good will be those least likely to accept an in-kind transfer
and will be those with the lowest pre-transfer level of consumption
and therefore, those creating the greatest externalities for the nonpoor.

Thus, in the absence of price discrimination, the "wrong" con-

sumers are likely to be the beneficiaries of in-kind transfers, particularly when the supply of the transfer is limited.

The price discri-

mination problem is analogous to the tax discrimination problem which
results from the existence of donors with heterogeneous tastes for redistribution;

policies which are uniform within an income class will

confront some intended recipients with the "wrong" price.

27

While

the administrative problems caused by attempting to tune social programs
to non-income related differences are enormous, ignoring these differ-

27George Daly and Fred J. Giertz, "Welfare Economics and Welfare
Reform," ~ cit.
Larry Orr I 9i'...!.. cit.
Mark V. Pauly, "Efficiency in the provision of Consumption
Subsidies," Kyklos, XXUI, Fasc. 1, (l970I, pp. 33-57.
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ences would lead to a violation of the Paretian standard and/or unintended policy impacts.
In addition to the problem of intraclass differences in taste,
the impact of the transfer mode may be affected by significant disparities in administrative costs related to the subsidy form.

While

strong "goods externalities" may imply that in-kind transfers are to
be preferred over cash, in-kind transfers may still be inefficient if
the costs of the bureaucracy required to administer such transfers
exceed the benefits to be derived from that mode.

While there has

been little empirical investigation of the problem, it is generally
assumed that in-kind transfers are more expensive to administer than
cash.

As Figures lA-C reveal, cash transfers are expected to have

a less potent impact on the consumption of specific goods than are
transfers in-kind (unless the in-kind transfer is rejected).

However,

a cash transfer will still have some positive impact on the consumption of the specific good, if the good is normal or superior.

The

extent of the impact depends on the income elasticity of the good.
In some cases, (Figure IC), a cash transfer will result in greater
consumption of the good than will an all-or-nothing in-kind transfer.
In sum, the appropriateness of a given transfer mode will depend on
the effect of the transfer on consumption patterns, the form and intensity of the donors desires for various types of transfers, and the administrative cos.ts associated with the transfer form.
For the theoretical implications of utility interdependence to
be relevant to publi.c policy-making, a great deal of information is
required about preference patterns.

Mishan cites the inability to
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operationalize the concepts as. one

o~

his principal objections to the

utility interdependence argument.
In a community consisting of some scores of millions
of adults, knowledge of the requisite pattern of interdependence is for all practical purposes unattainable. 28
To fit the Paretian criterion, each person must individually benefit.
Thus detailed information about each person is necessary to insure the
consent of everyone involved.

Even if such information could be gath-

ered, the costs of such an undertaking might well outweigh the benefits
of any scheme adopted.
In addition to these practical problems, Mishan and Musgrave
both question the validity of the entire concept of treating distributional decisions in a Paretian context.

Mishan contends that redis-

tribution may be judged Pareto optimal only if the pre-transfer distribution of income is taken as given.

Since the pre-transfer distribu-

tion is only one of a virtually infinite number of distributions that
might have occurred with the same resource base, the choice of the
pre-tax distribution on which to base transfers is a matter of ethics v
not a matter of efficiency.

Accepting the prevailing income distri-

bution as given involves non--Paretian criteria and, in effect, legitimizes the prevailing power relationships.
becomes one of social contract determination.

In essence, the problem
29

28
E.J. Mishan,

.~

cit., p. 973.

29

Ibid., p. 974.
Richard Musgrave, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution:
~

cit.

Comment,"
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Hochman concedes some of the points made by Mishan and Musgrave.
• • • the Paretian logic may be able to explain significant
aspects of distributional choice, they do not define or produce "social justice". After all Pareto-optimal transfers,
the community must still choose, somehow, among a residual
set of Pareto-optimal distributions, each of which corresponds to a different system of rules and rights to property
and human capital. No one of these distributions is uniqqel¥y
optimal, and each, potentially, is Pareto efficient. Still,
once the argument is brought this far, consideration should
be given to the usefulness of extending the Paretian line of
reasoning to the constitutional level of abstraction at
which rights and rules themselves are determined. 3D
Another complication in the utility interdependence argument is
introduced by Polinsky.

He indicates that the utility interdependence

medels deal only with marginal Pareto optimal redistribution.

Polinsky

contends that there are cases when redistribution is Pareto optimal
beyond the margin when income transfers would be rejected on the basis
of marginal considerations.

For example, Mutt giving Jeff a dollar

may have such a limited impact on changing Jeff's consumption pattern
or utility that Mutt would consider the investment a poor one.

Jeff

may waste the dollar, from Mutt's point of view, by spending it on
liquor, etc.

However, if Mutt gave Jeff several thousand dollars, Jeff

might become an upstanding member of the community, pleasing both recipient and donor.

Polinsky concludes that individual

shorts~ghtedness

will generally not result in the perception of Pareto optimal points
beyond the margin and that a case for governmental coercion may be made.
3DHarold M. Hochman, ~ cit., p. 355.
31

A. Mitchell Polip.sky, "Shortsightedness and Nonmarginal Pareto
Optimal Redistribution," The American Economic Review, LXI, (December,
1971), pp. 972-979.
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In assuming that government will be able to respond, while
individuals cannot, Polinsky ignores the strong tendency for governmental decision-making to be conservative in the extreme.

32

Lindblom

maintains, "Usually • • • though not always, what is feasible politically is policy only incrementally, or marginally, different from
existing policies. ,,33

When last year's budget is the best guide to

this year's budget, it is as unrealistic to expect official policymakers to leap beyond the margin, as it is to expect private individuals to do so.
The theoretical development of the utility interdependence
argument suggests the importance of empirical investigations which
might verify the existence of hypothesized interdependence and to
trace its patterns.

Despite the significance of the criticism of

the utility interdependence argument, the establishment of large
public transfer programs testify to the likelihood of some sort of
benevolent interdependence.

Whether such transfers may be justified

by the Paretian criterion, strictly construed, is more problematic.
In addition to the sheer magnitude of public transfers, the proliferation of in-kind programs, suggests that interdependence may frequently be of

t~e

goods-specific form.

In the following chapters,

the case for in-kind income transfers will be examined in the context
of the new developments in welfare theory presented in this chapter.
32Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968).
Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process,
(Boston. Little, Brown and Co., 1964).
33Charles E. Lindblom, ~ cit., p. 26.

CHAl;'TER III

TRANSFERS IN"""KIND: BACKGROUND lvlATERI]U. ON THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING
AND ;FOOD STAMl? l?ROGRAMS
Introduction

An

empirical investigation of the dynamics of "goods-specific"

utility interdependence will focus on two major in-kind programs:
low-income housing and the food stamp programs.

the

These programs were

selected because of the dominance of food and housing expenditures in
the budgets of the poor and because of the strong public interest in
directing transfer

pa}~ents

to these areas.

The Bureau of Labor Sta-

tistics' (BLS) "Lower Budget" for a hi,!!othetica1 family of four in the
Autumn of 1973 reveals that out of a total budget of $8,181, $2,440 or
30% was allocated to food and $1,627 or 20% to housing. l

For lower

income households, these basic consumption categories command an even
greater share of the budget.

The public interest, as expressed through

the political process, in food and housing programs is revealed in
Table II which indicates that approximately one-third of need-tested inkind transfers were targeted to these areas.
LOW INCOME HOUSING ;1?OLI.Q!:
Goals and Background
Two major goals have guided the federal low-income housing program
1U.S. Department of Labor( Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Autumn 1973
Urban Family Budgets and Comparative Indexes for Selected Urban Areas,"
(June 19, 1974), mimeo., .p. 2.
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since its inception in the 1930's:

1) the desire to increase and up-

grade the housing supply and 2) the effort to insure all American
households decent housing at a "reasonable" rent/income ratio.

As a

result, housing policies have been oriented to stimulating housing
production, eradicating slums, and redistributing income in-kind to
the house poor.

(The house poor are generally defined as those

households compelled to allocate more than 25% of their income to
housing to command standard quality in the unsubsidized market.)
While housing subsidies are now dwarfed by expenditures on Medicaid
and food stamps (see Table II), housing subsidies preceded these
medical and food assistance effort by three decades.

The long his-

tory of public interest in housing reflects the importance of the
housing industry to the American economy and the relatively high
visibility of the external diseconomies associated with slum housing.
Proponents of subsidized housing have always emphasized the
indirect benefits accruing to the larger community from improved
housing for the poor.

Most housing policy discussions assume that

utility interdependence between taxpayers and tenants of poor
housing exists and that it is of a "goods-specific" nature.

Sub-

standard housing is assumed to impose external costs on those who
view it (most frequently on the journey-to-work) as well as private
costs on those who must dwell in it.

In addition, poor housing has

been associated with the spread of communicable diseases, high crime
rates, poor educational attainment and other problems which create
burdens for the larger community.

While the unique contribution of

the physical environment is unclear and very difficult to docu-
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ment, social cost argument
a in the
.

~ield o~

housing
. have. generally

been quite persuasive to policymakers.
While low-income housing programs have existed for forty years,
political support for them has vacillated over time.

Housing policies

have periodically encountered stiff Congressional resistance and executive displeasure.

Goal shifts have frequently occurred in an

effort to react to program criticisms.

In the 1950's and early 60's,

interest in providing low rent housing was all but supplanted by an
emphasis on the eradication of slums through urban renewal.
rent units were destroyed;

Low

replacement housing was aimed at the

lliiddle and upper income market;

and large parcels of cleared land

were reserved for commercial and civic structures.

The Housing and

Urban Development Act of 1968 refocused attention on the "house poor"
but acute official dissatisfaction with program operations, particularly
in the scandal ridden 235 program, culminated in an executive "freeze"
on housing programs in 1973.

Housing programs are currently back in

business, but have shifted their emphasis.

Programs which stress uti-

lization of the existing rental market will receive priority rather
than those providing new rental units or home ownership for the poor.
In sum<', low-income housing programs have had a long, but uneven, history of public support.
Congressional interest in subs.idized hous.iug has been bolstered
by concern for the health of the construction industry.

The earliest

federally funded public housing projects in the 1930's were aimed at
creating employment as much as they were aimed at creating housing.
New housing starts aided by direct federal assistance have been a small,
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but increasing percen"t;age of; total s.tarts..

Kris.to;e reports a. gain
'2

of assisted starts f;ram 3% in 1961 to 12% in 1968.

Despite this

small direct impact on new constructiDn, Congress has provided considerable indirect stimulation for the housing industry through favorable
tax treatment and the manipulation of the supply of credit.

While

the most overt political support for subsidiaed housing has come from
those who express concern for the high private and social costs of
slums, other, less frequently identified, beneficiaries of government
subsidies are the builders, contractors, and other private and governmental intermediaries involved in the supply of subsidized units.
Housing Market Conditions:

SUpply and Demand Elasticity

All established low-income housing subsidy programs direct payments to housing suppliers rather than to housing consumers.
new programs have

providedtQ~;prospective

While

tenant with a choice of

accomodations far greater than the traditional public housing program,
hox~~~~ing

subsidies are still of an all-or-nothing variety.

The consu-

mer cannot regulate the amount of housing he consumes nor can he allocate all or part of his housing subsidy to non-housing expenditures.
American housing programs, in their avoidance of demand subsidies have
reflected certain assumptions about the operation of the housing market
which require careful scrutiny.

Demand subsidies. have typically been

2Frank S. Kris.tof, "Federal Housing Policies:···· Subsidized Production, Filtration and Objectives: Part I, II Land Economics, X1WIII,
4, (November, 1972), p. 310.
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rej ected on the, grounds that the supply

o~

housi,ng i,s inelastic and

that consequently, demand subsidies would result in inflated housing
prices rather than increased housing production and improvements in
the housing stock.

In addition, the construction of new units for

low-income households has been justified on the grounds that a less
targeted stimulation of housing production would fail to "filter down"
and improve housing conditions for the poor.
Lowry's model of the filtering process is an example of the view
that the turnover of housing stimulated by new production fails to provide those at the bottom of the chain with adequate accomodations.
Lowry contends that as new housing is added to the stock, existing
housing declines in value, and that landlords of existing housing
are encouraged to disinvest and undermaintain their holdings.

Thus

the housing available to the poor tends to be of unsatisfactory,quality~
Kristof

challenges Lowry's view of filtering primarily on the

grounds that income is exogenous to his model.

If changes in real in-

come are included in a filtering model, quite different conclusions
about the efficacy of the process may be warranted.

Kristof

has traced

changes in the housing inventory from 1950 to 1969 and finds a remarkable record of improvement during that period.

During the 1960's

there was a net increase of 10,353,000 units despite a loss of(6,76l,OOO
units from the housing inventory.

The number of substandard units de-

clined by 70% from 17 million to 1950 to 5 million in 1969.

Crowded

3

Ira S. Lowry, "Filtering and Houf>ing standards," 'Land Economics,
XXXVI, 4, (November, 1960), pp. 362.270.
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standard units increased only slightly ;J;rom 3,957,0()Q in 1959 to
4,269,000 in 1969.

The average number of rooms pel:' person increased

from 1.42 in 1950 to 1.65 in 1969.
up with population growth;
addition

to households.

4

New construction more than kept

1.5 new units were added for each net
Kristof concludes,

These housing gains were accompanied by, and in
large part were attributable to, advances in family
income.
Only rising incomes whose rate of increase
equaled or exceeded rent and house price rises could
sustain the high volume of new construction experienced
over most of the past two decades.5
A closer investigation of the empirical evidence reveals that
complex movements within the housing stock contributed to the net
trends.

During the 1950·s Kristof found that over one million of

the substandard units were newly constructed while five million substandard units were upgraded to standard.

Thus the housing inventory

appears to simultaneously have filtered downward and upward in a way
that filtering models fail to explain.

6

In an effort to further investigate the response of the housing
market to new construction, Kristof and Winnick in New ¥ork City and
the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan covering the
nation traced the chains of moves stimulated by new units.

The pre-

vious housing of the occupants of new housing was located and the in4Frank S. Kristof, Ope cit., pp. 313, 315.
Frank S. Kristof, "Federal Housing Policies.: Subsidized Production, Filtration and Objectives: Part ·1.1," Lana Economics, .xLIX, 2,
(May, 1973), p. 170.
5 Ibid ., part I, p. 316.
6

Ibid., Part I, p. 319.
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come and other characteristics of the household moving into the vacated unit were ascertained.

This process was followed until a chain

of moves terminated with the demolition of a vacated unit or with
new household formation.

Kristof concludes that "By and large, the

turnover of housing generated in central cities has permitted lower
income segments of the community to inherit better housing • .,7

While

Kristof's analysis considers the housing market as a whole, he does
not investigate, in detail, the barriers that may inhibit the downward flow of sound units to the nonwhite poor.
Kristof makes a sharp distinction between housing shortages
which he characterizes as "one of the great mythologies of the housing
discussion.,B and the ability of the poor to effectively demand available housing which he concedes is a seriously problem.
housing abandonment illustrates the issue.

The problem of

Abandonment has alarming

consequences for the viability of entire neighborhoods as vacant
buildings serve as a magnet for addicts and criminals who spur households in surrounding buildings to flee the area if they possibly can.
Sternlieb notes that many of the
sound;

~~its

being lost are essentially

not necessarily the worst of the housing stock.

9

Kristof

views the abandonment of buildings, in part, as a sign of slack in the
7Ibid ., Part II, p. 170.
B1bid.
9George Sternlieb, "Abandonment and Rehabilitation: What is to
be Done? .,. Papers Submitted to the Subcommittee on Housing Panels on
Housing Production, Housing Demand and Developing ~ Suitable Living ~
vironment, Hbuse of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1971),
pp. 315-331.
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housing market created by new construction, but he also notes that the
inability

o~

low-income households to pay' rent sufficient to maintain

buildings has contributed heavily to Eany landlords' decisions to abandon their investments.

lO

The failure

o~

lending institutions to

finance rehabilitation in poor neighborhoods has also been a significant factor.

While conceding the complexity of the issue, Kristof

concludes that supply elasticity is not a serious problem and thus
recommends a housing allowance approach that would direct subsidies to
consumers in an effort to make the housing demand of low-income households more effective.

DerLeeuw, We1fe1d, Lowry and other housing ex-

perts have reached the same conclusion.

11

Muth also attacks the assertion that demand subsidies will
merely result in rent hikes because of' the unresponsiveness of supply.
The assertion, of course, ignores competition among landlords. Though it is in the interest of any single individual landlord to try to charge as much as he can for a
given dwelling unit, he can charge monopoly prices only
if he has a monopoly.
Otherwise, if he raises his rentals
above those charged by other landlords, his tenants will
move to other dwellings.
Vacancies at all rent levels
generally exist where there is no rent control, so that
better housing is available at higher rentals. 12
10

Frank S. Kristof,

~

cit., Part :U.

11Frank de Leeuw, liThe Housing Allowance Approach,1\ Papers Submitted ~ the Subcommittee ~Housing Panels ••• op. cit., pp. 541-554.
Ira S. Lowry, "Housing Assitance for Low Income Families: A
Fresh Approach,:?apers Submitted to the Subcommittee ~ Housing Panels ••• Ope cit., pp. 489-524.
-Irving H. Welfeld, America's Housing Problem: Art Approach to Its
Solution, Evaluative studies 10, lWashington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for l;'ublic policy Research, October, 1973).
12Richard F. Muth, Public Housing: ~ Economic Evaluation, Evalutive Studies 5, CWashington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, March, 1973).
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Since the housing .market is,

characteri~ed

by a

l~rge

number of inde-

pendent producers, collusion between them is unlikely.
Olsen lends some theoretical support to the notion that the
housing market would respond to a demand subsidy by increasing supply.
He contends that the housing market exhibits most of the character istics of a competitive market and that a housing allowance approach
would result in higher prices only in the very short-run.

The chain

of shifting opportunities for profit should eventually stimulate new
construction and an increase in supply.

13

Existing housing subsidy programs rest not only on the questionable premiss of inelastic supply, but also on an assumption of inelastic demand.

Housing proponents contend that general cash transfers

to the poor would not insure a socially acceptable level of housing
cons umption.

In-kind transfers are viewed as essential to diminish

the external diseconomies associated with the "underconsumption" of
housing by the poor.

De Leeuw, in a paper analyzing the results of

several researchers, concludes that the income elasticity of rental
housing in the

u.s.

is between 0.8 and 1.0, but indicates that income
14
elasticity appears to be lower for nonwhite households.
De Leeuw
suggests that the price elasticity of the demand for rental housing is
13

Edgar o. Olsen, "A Competitive theory of the Rousing Market,"
The American Economic Review, LIX, (Se~tember, 1969), pp. ·612-621.
14

Frank de Leeuw, ,."ThaDemand,.;forRousin(;p .. A.,Review of CrossSection Evidence," The·Review of Economics and 'statistics, LIII, 1,
(February, 1971), p:-r.
----
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about -1.0.

15

Thus general income increases, unti.ed to housing t

would result in increased housing consUInpti.on f but such. increases
would undoubtedly be less per household than under our present housing programs.

If taxpayers have a strong preference for increasing

the housing conumption of the poor, as an assumption of "goods-specific"
utility interdependence would indicate, then in-kind transfers may
maximize utility.

Whether or not tied transfers are preferable to

cash hinges on the strength of taxpayers' preferences, the actual
shape of consumption patterns and the relative costs of the transfer
modes.

Whether or not tied subsidies should be directed to the

suppliers or the consumers of housing hinges on the dynamics of the
housing market.

All of these issues require further empirical in-

vestigation, but the assumptions of inelastic supply and demand underlying present policies have little in the way of hard data to support
them.
Low-Income Housing Programs:

Description and criticisms

Public intervention in the housing market has taken several forms.
While housing subsidies are conventionally associated with programs
directed at the poor " Aaron demonstrates that the largest public housing
subsidy, by far, is the favorable treatment of homeowners in the income
tax code.
1966;

Aaron found this indirect subsi.dr was worth $7 billion in

only 8%

o~

whicQaccrued to

t~ayers

witQ annual incomes below

15

Frank de Leeuw and Nkan ta Ekanen, "Time Lags in the Rental
Housing Market," Urban Institute Reprint 159-112-19 (Washington, D.C.:
The Urban Institute, February, 1974), p. 41.
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$5,000. 16

The oldest housing program directed at the low-income population
is the Public Housing Pr.ogram which prior to the 1960' s subsidized
only the direct public provision of new unit.s.

Under this program,

the federal government contracts with Local Housing Authorities
(LHAs) for the construction of new dwelling units which rent to the
eligible at rates considerably below those prevailing in the unsubsidized market.

The new construction is financed by the federal govern-

ment which pays the interest and amortization costs of tax exempt bonds
issued by the LHAs.

The federal subsidy includes both this direct

capital component and an indirect component in the form of federal revenue foregone due to the tax-free status of the bonds.

Public hous-

ing also receives a small indirect subsidy from loca governments in
the form of exemption from local property taxes.

While LHAs make pay-

ments to local governments in lieu of property taxes, these payments
are considerably less than property taxes would be on comparable strucWhile nearly all of the financing for public housing comes

tures.

from the federal government, the units are planned owned and managed by
the LHAs.
Traditional public housing programs have been widely criticized as
inequitable and inefficient.

By traditionally concentrating on new

construction for the poor, very large per unit subsidies are required.
Large per unit subsidies mean that few of the eligible receive assis16

'" .. Henry J.·Aaron, Shelter and Subsidies: 'Who Benefits from Federal Housing policies?, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1972), p. 163.
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tance and that the }?X',ogram' s Un}?act on the total sUPl?ly of bousi,ng
is negligible.

Muth. estimates that, as an outer limit, public

O
dates about 1 5 % of t h e
h OUSLng
accomo

o.
1
el~g~b

e. 17

Most estimates are

considerably lower.
Muth also focuses on the inefficiency of public construction
and the perverse incentives created by the subsidy structure.

Prior

to the Brooke Amendments to the Housing Act of 1968, federal subsidies
were available only for capital costs.
stitute capital for

~~~rent

This encouraged LHAs to sub-

expenditures.

Maintenance was neglected

and capital costs inflated since subsidies from Washington were viewed
as "free".
Valuing capital and current inputs in public housing
at their opportunity cost elsewhere in the economy,
the resource cost per unit of public housing is 21%
greater than it would be if the LHAs were to bear the
full capital costs of the real estate they use. 18
In an effort to improve the efficiency of public housing construction, the Turnkey program was introduced.

Responsibility for

development was shifted from the LHAs to the private sector.

Under

the Turnkey program, private contractors develop housing projects, sell
them to the LHAs and turn them over to public management upon completion.

Welfeld notes that the original impact of the program was to

substantially reduce development costs.

However, the lax supervision

of private developers also led to some well-publicized fraud which in
turn resulted in an elaborate code of development r,egulations.
l7Richard F. Muth,~ cit., p. 30.
18 Ib ~ d ., pp. 19-20.
o

Welfeld
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claims that as. a cons.equence,

II

•••

th.e

d~velopment ~rocess

was made

so much more complex that the Turnkey method is nowmore expensive
than LHA designed and managed construction. lll9
In addition to high development costs and the failure to serve a
significant percentage of the eligible, public housing has been
ticized for pricing the neediest out of the program.

cri-

Prior to the

Brooke Amendments of 1968, tenant rents were required to cover all
As operating expenses rose, many LHAs confronted

operating costs.

the choice of bankruptcy or of manipulating admissions so that those
households too poor to pay rent suffi,cient to cover operating costs
were balanced by households who could pay rent in excess of operating
Too large a concentration of the very poor threatened the

costs.

solvency of the

LHAsi

thes the small existing supply of public housing

was allocated in a way which did not necessarily favor the neediest.
The Brooke Amendments opened the door for federal subsidies for
operating as well as capital expenditures.

While the Brooke Amend-

ments permit a greater concentration of benefits on the very poor,
Muth and Welfeld note that they have also created a structure of inc entives which is not conducive to efficient management.

Since operating

deficits as well as capital costs are now picked up by the federal
government, LHAs have little incentive to reduce these deficits.
Leeuw investigated public housing operating costa

~rom

De

1968-71 and

discovered that operating 6X)?enditures have been rising more rapidly
than the inflation

o~

inputs.

ror example, during 1970-71 costs in-

19
Irving H. Welfeld, 92.:.. cit., p. 17.
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creased 11.3% in large housing authorities and 8.4% in small housing
authorities.

In the same period the estimated contribution of in-

flation was only 6%.

20

High operating expenditures do not appear to

be linked to greater resident satisfaction and improved maintenance.
Sadacca, Loux, Isler and Drury conducted an extensive survey of
management practices and operating costs in public housing programs.
They concluded that LHAs with high performance in terms of resident
and staff satisfaction and building
significantly lower operating costs.

m~intenance

were those with

2l

other objections to public housing programs have centered on
the spatial distribution of benefits -- both within and between urban areas.

The concentration of the poor in large projects in cen-

tral cities is viewed by most as exacerbating the difficulties associated with this population.

Many social scientists assume that

low-income households reinforce one another's socially costly behavior and that spatial integration with the middle-class would help
alter this pattern.

Housing authorities have been accused of sub-

stituting new, public slums for old, private ones.

However, others

view the concentration of the poor as more benign.

Concentration

may lower the costs of social service delivery.

Furthermore, many

low-income groups fear that dispersion would dilute the political,
20Frank De Leeuw, Operating Expenses in Public Housing, 196871, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1973), p. 29.
21

Robert Sadacca, Suzanne B. Loux, Mort6n I. Isler, and Margaret J. Drury, Management Performance in Public Housing, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1974).
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social and cultural benefits ther derive froI(\ the 9e,09ral?hi.c concentration of their members.
Efforts to scatter projects throughout metropolitan areas have
met with powerful political
race.

22

resistance, strongly linked to issues of

This resistance has effectively prohibited the significant

dispersal of projects, with the exception of those constructed for the
elderly.

As the elderly do not pose the explosive issues of school

integration and crime, the integration of the low-income elderly into
middle-income neighborhoods has been relatively smooth.

Conflict is

minimized because the elderly are essentially middle-class in behavior
pattern.

Friedman notes that public acceptance of early public hous-

ing programs during the Depression was linked to the assumption that
tenants would come from the "submerged middle-class" temporarily inHe contends that enthusiasm for public

jured by the economic crisis.

housing waned as it became clear that its inhabitants were increasingly
lower-class and black in origin.
ments of the 1960's most LHAs
selecting lower-class

Prior to the tenants' rights move-

att~~pted

to assuage public opinion by

families for occupancy who were most middle-class

in structure and behavior.

Those households with severe problems were

not admitted to public housing in the first place or were often arbitra23
rily ousted if accidently let in.
These unwritten policies have

22

Mario M. CUomo, Forest Hills Diary:
Housin9' (New York: Random House, 1974).

£f

The Crisis of Low Income

23
,Lawrence M. Friedman, Government and ~'H()US'ing:
Frustration, (Chicago: Rand Mc Nally and Co., 1968).
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largely been rel?laced, but as more I'problem" fami..1ies enter public
housing, the acceptability of dispersed sites to the lar-<;Jer conununity
has probably diminished.
The low-income housing program has also been attacked for its
uneven distribution of benefits across the nation.

Von Furstenberg

compared the dispersion of subsidized housing with the distribution
of low-income households and concluded:
••• the probability of a low-income family rece~vLng
Federal housing assistance varies drastically from
state to state.
In general, the richer the state, the
more assisted housing units are provided for its (relatively fewer) low-income families and the poorer the
state, the worse the odds.
• •• there is a systematic
under supply in the West and an oversupply in relation to
the needs of the East. 24
In an attempt to respond to the numerous criticisms of public
housing programs several new approaches to low-income housing have
evolved.

These efforts emphasize increased reliance on the private

market.

The section 23 Leasing Progrmn, enacted in 1965, allows LHAs

to lease units from private owners and sublet them to lowOincome households at below-market rents.

The program has the advantage of avoiding

the excessive development costs associated with direct public construction and ownership.

other advantages of the program are the scattered

location of sites in existing neighborhoods and the greater anonymity
this dispersal permits the tenants.

While the pr09ram uses the private

real estate market and the existi,ng s.tock 0;1; housin9 mOre heayi1y than

24George M. Von Furstenberg, "The Distribution of··Federally .. Assisted .Rental .. Housing· Services ·byRegions ·and··States/~··· .The EoonOInics of
Federal Subsidy Programs: PartS -- Housing Subidies~.S. CongresS;
Joint Economic Committee, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1972), p. 641.
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did traditional public housin<;1 pr,09rams, the LHA remains an active
intermediary between housing consumers and nousin9 suppliers.

The

LHA searches for units, inspects and reinspects them, negotiates
leases, collects and pays rents, and assumes responsibility for maintenance. 25
section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
establishes the Housing Assistance Payment Program as the major program for low-income households.

section 8 is basically an expansion

of the Section 23 concept, with the important difference that the
household will be permitted to locate its own housing.

The LHA will

still inspect the unit, collect rents, and sign leases, as under
Section 23.

The unit must be available at or belew'," HUD established

Fair Market Rents for a given city and must be of standard quality.
The subsidy will be the difference between 25% of the household's income, net of permissable deductions, and the market rent of the unit.
Tenant rent will vary with tenant income, not with the cost of the unit,
so the incentive structure encourages households to locate housing at
or near the established maximum rent.

The Fair Market Rent for a two-

bedroom walk-up unit in Portland has been set at $235 for new construc26
tion and $169 for existing construction.
These limits appear to be
quite generous as the median gross rent (includes utilities ) for the

25Frank. de Leeuw and Sam
gram, II Ibid., pp. 642-659.

li.

Leaman, "The Section 23 Leasing l'ro-

26Ronald M. Duzy, Director, Housing Programs Management, Portland
Area Office, DepartJnent of Housing and Urban Development, Interview,
February 18, 1975.
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Portland SMSA was only $115 in 1970.
The Rent Supplement Pr,ogram also relies, on privately owned
housing but restricts sponsorship to non-profit or limited profit
developers.

The program stresses new or substantially rehabilitated

units for low-income families who must also be elderly, handicapped,
displaced by government action, victims of disaster or living in substandard housing in order to qualify.

A subsidy is paid to the hous-

ing owner equal to the difference between 25% of the tenant's net income and the market rent.
the rent.

However, the subsidy may not exceed 70% of

This limitation on the amount of the subsidy has prevented

the operation of the program in high rent communities unless the program is "piggy-backed" on to one of the interest rate subsidy

28

programs.i~

Section 235 and 236 are the major interest rate subsidy programs
for "lower-income" families.

They were part of the Housing and Urban

Development Act of 1968 and are administered directly by HUD, not by
the LHAs.

Sec1:ion 235 and 236 subsidize, at a maximum, the difference

between the cost of debt service at the market rate of interest and
the cost of such service at 1%.

section 235 is designed to enable fa-

milies to purchase homes, while section 236 is intended to provide
rental housing.

Both programs require the tenant or owner to pay the

cost of debt service at 1%.

This requirement prevents the lowest in-

27U.. s . Bureau of the Cens,us, Census of Population and Housing:
1970, Census Tracts, final Report PHC(,l>'-165 portland, Or,egon-- Washington, SMSA, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GcfVerl'llllent Printing Office, 1972).
28Irving H. Welfeld, ~ cit., pp. 18-19.
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come fa."TIilies from participati:ng in the pr,ogram.

In 1971, the median

family income in public housing was, $2,548 but in 236 it was $5,303 and
29
in 235 it was $5,760.
Considerable criticism has been directed at
this failure of two major housing subsidy programs to reach the neediest.

In addition to being criticized as inequitable, the 235 program
30
has been plagued by fraud and defaults.
Both the 235 and 236 programs are characterized by incentive
structures which encourage inflated costs.

In the 235 program, the

homebuyer's payments hinge on his income, not on the size of his mortgage.

Thus the subsidized household is encouraged to purchase expen-

sive housing (within the program limits) because it does not bear the
cost of its extravagance.

Large public subsidies have permitted the

small number of households fortunate enough to enter the 235 program to
be housed in relative lUXury.
As many as 50 percent of the households are being overhoused relative to the national average, and, therefore,
oversubsidized.
Approximately 50% of the families entering the Section 235 program would only qulify for a
two bedroom apartment under most of HUD's multifamily
housing programs.
Nevertheless, virtually all of the
homes in this program have three or more bedrooms. 31
29

Donald D. Kummerfeld, liThe Housing Subsidy System," Papers Submitted to the Subcommittee ~ Housing Panels ••• .2E.:. cit., p. 469.
30rrving H. Welfeld, £?J2..:.. cit., p. 22. ,
U.S. CO,ngress, Joi.i.t EconolllicCommitteel" Subcommittee on J?riorities and Economy in Government, Housing Subsidiea and HousingJ?olicy,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govermnent printing Office, March 5, 1973),.
31

Irving H. Welfeld, £?J2..:.. cit. ,

pp. 20-21.
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The structure of the 236 program does not reward efficiency either.
Tax benefits and other profits permitted builders increase with the
size of their mortgage.

As a consequence, development costs have

been high and the "market rents" in the 236 units have not been competitive with those in comparable unsubsidized units.
In sum, while attempts have been made to break away from direct
public provision of new units and to increase reliance on the private
market, the new programs have not escaped the old charges of inequity
and inefficiency.

In many ways, the new programs have introduced

the illusion of a competitive market without its discipline.

While

private suppliers are utilized, their profits are either independent
of their efficiency, or, in the case of 235 and 236, linked to inefficiency.

The housing tenant is not encouraged to economize either

since he is not allowed to profit from limiting his housing consumption.

Decision-making remains overwhelmingly bureaucratic.

The Pub-

lic Housing Program (both conventional and Turnkey) and the leasing
program for low-income households will be examined in the context of
the "goods-specific" utility interdependence framework.

The Rent

Supplement, 235, and 236 Programs will not be investigated further
Lecause of their smaller impact on the federal budget (Table II)
and because 235 and 236 largely fail to reach the poverty population.
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THE

E22E.

STAMJ;l J;>ROGRAM

The Politics of Hunger
The current Food stamp Program began in 1961, on a pilot basis,
through executive action of President Kennedy.

Congress made the

Food stamp Program permanent with the passage of the Food Stamp Act
of 1964.

The major obstacle to passage was getting the bill out of

the House Agriculture Committee which was dominated by rural interests
who viewed food stamps as a welfare program for urban areas.

Most

committee members favored the established surplus commodities distribution program as it was overtly linked to farm price support policies.
Vote-trading finally allowed the bill to reach the House floor where
urban Democrats agreed to support the wheat-cotton bill in exchange
for the votes of rural Democrats on food stamps.
made Republican support unnecessary;
straight party' lines.

Democratic unity

voting in the House was on

In the Senate, support for food stamps was so

strong that passage was obtained by voice vote. 32
Program growth was modest for a
rapidly in the '70s (Table I).
commodity program was phased out.

numb~r

As food stamp participation grew the
Commodity distribution remained in

operation on only a few Indian reservations.
Food Stamp Program has been

of years, but accelerated

str~n91y

The expansion of the

linked by pqlitical analysts to the

tremendous publicity given the \\hunger issue" by the media ?-uring the

32Randall B. Ripley, "Legislative Bargaining and the Food .. Stamp
Act of ·1964./' .. in .. Frederic N. Cleaveland and Associates Ceds), Congress
and Urban Problems, (T~shington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1969).
.
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1960's.

John F. Kennedy, press in tow, was visibly affected by the

poverty he viewed during the west Virginia primary.

The establishment

of a pilot Food stamp Program was one of his first acts as president.
In April, 1967, Senators Robert F. Kennedy and Joe Clark received extensive coverage on their trip to the Mississippi Delta where they
were shocked at the extent of hunger and malnutrition. 33

In May, 1968,

CBS News presented "Hunger in America" which opened with the death of
a baby attributed to starvation.

The program drew a flood of letters

to Congressmen demanding an expansion of the domestic food programs.
Congress was disposed to respond despite Secretary of Agriculture
Orville Freeman's denial of the CBS claim that there were 10 million
hungry or starving Americwls.

In addition, 1968 witnessed the publica-

tion of Hunger U.S.A. by the citizens' Board of Inquiry into Hunger and
Malnutrition in the United States.

Hunger U.S.A. identified 256 "hunger"

counties and contained suggestions for expanding the food program. 34
Hunger had become a hot political issue.
In hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition anc
Human Needs in 1969, both Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas and Dr.
Thomas E. Bryant, Assistant Director, Office of Economic Opportuni-ties
for Health Affairs, directly acknowledged that the publicity given to
hunger had created the political environment conducive to expanded food
programs.

Yarborough commented:

33 U• S • Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Hearings ~ Nutrition and Human Needs, Part 2--USDA, HEW, and OEO Officials,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 241.
34Judith A. Segal, Food for the Hungry: The Reluctant Society,
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 12-14.
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I believe we have come to the point where a majority of
Americans want to see hunger and malnutrition ended. I
think that the dramatization of the problem during the
past 2 years by various Senators and Senate committees,
by some Members of the House, by your own Department
(Agriculture), and by such private organizations as the
Citizens Board of Inquiry and CBS television, has aroused
the American conscience to the point that at last we will
see the elimination of poverty, hunger, and malnutrition. 35
Bryant testified:
.•• the publicity, in the best sense of that word, that
has been given to these issues has in a sense made many
millions of Americans aware of the problem and a'Vlare that
something needs to be done about it. I don't know that
it is totally desirable that it happend this way, but
the publicity that has been given to this is important. 36
Program Mechanics
Ths purpose of the Food Stamp Program is to increase the food
consumption of low-income households by providing them with coupons
whose face value represents the cost of a minimal, but nutritionally
adequate, diet.

Monthly coupon allotments vary with family size and

are based on the price of the Economy Food Plan, the least expensive
of the five dietary plans published by the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).

Prior to 1971, payment and eligibility standards were

set by the states and varied considerably between them.

Since 1971,

schedules are uniform for the 48 contiguous states, and somewhat higher
for Alaska and Hawaii.

Lower per capita allotments are given to large

households than to small on the grounds that there are economies of

~

35U•S• Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs,
cit., p. 241.
36 Ibid ., p. 336.
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scale in food purchasing.

The USDA is required to update allotments

every six months to reflect increases in food prices.

The cost of

the Economy Food Plan is the cost of a particular market basket of
food.

However, some changes in quantities purchased over time are made

in response to changes in the relative prices of food items. 37

The

Census Bureau's definition of poverty is three times the cost of the
Economy Food Plan, thus poverty in America is defined in real terms.

38

Host participating households must purchase their stamps, although free stamps are available to households with very low net incomes (gross income minus deductions allowed by the program).

The

household's purchase price depends on household size and net income
under a complex formula which is intended to reflect those factors
which most commonly impede a household's ability to devote adequate
resources to food.

The purchase price is supposed to reflect what a

household would "normally" spend for food, while the subsidy is intended to augment "normal" food purchases.

However, the complexity of

the formula creates disparities between what households of equivalent
size and gross income pay for their stamps.

The subsidy or bonus value

of the food stamps is the difference between the participating household's payment and the face value of the coupons.

For example, as of

37U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, ¥eference Materials to Part! Food Price Changes, 1973-74, (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 102.
38U•S . Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series
p. 60, no. 91, "Characteristics of the Low-Income Population: 1972"
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 1.
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December, 1974, a family of 4 with net income below $30 per month would
receive $150 of food stamps free -- this household's monthly subsidy
would equal $150.

A four person household with net monthly income

of $200 would pay $53 for $150 worth of stamps -- its bonus or monthly
subsidy would equal $97.

It is possible that these two hypothetical

households have similar gross incomes, but the first family may have
higher medical, housing, and other deductible expenditures under the
program's income calculation formula.
Food stamps may be used to purchase all food items in markets
which have been approved by the Food and Nutrition Service of the USDA.
Interested stores must apply to participate in the program and must
agree to abide by program regulations.

Certification of a store in-

volves the completion of a simple one page form and is virtually automatic.

Most markets in urban areas participate in the program.

Par-

ticipating enterprises may not accept food stamps in payment for nonfood items such as paper or cleaning products and they are not permitted to make change in cash.
of change.

Store coupons must he issued in lieu

The supermarket must bundle and cancel the food stamps as

specified by the program rules and deposit them in a commercial bank.
The commercial bank deposits the stamps at a Federal Reserve Bank
where they are destroyed.
While the entire cost of the food stamp bonuses to participating
households is borne by the federal government, the program is administered by county governments.

Administrative costs are shared by

federal, state and county governments.

Prior to October, 1974, the
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USDA paid 62.5% of direct

sala~,

~rayel

and

travel-~elated

costs of

personnel involved in 1>. certifying

non-~lic

1'_ssitance households,

2) outreach (publicity to bring new

household~

into the program) and

3)

Fair Hearings.

county.

The remaining 37.5% was shared by the state and

In Oregon, the county share was 30% and the state share

70% of those administrative costs not covered by USDA.

While USDA's

share of administrative costs appears generous, in fact, the cost
sharing applied to such a small percentage of program personnel that
the burden on state and local government was considerable.

The USDA

cost sharing did not apply to supervisory personnel, quality control
investigators or data processing.

A survey by the Senate Select

Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs revealed that the USDA was
actually covering only 28% of overall administrative costs for non'
Publ ~c

,

Ass~s t

ance part"~c~pan t s. 39

Administrative costs E0r partici-

pating Public Assistance households are shared between HEW and state
and local governments.

In response to complaints from the states

that the administrative burden of the Food stamp Program was prohibitive, the USDA agreed

~o

fund 50% of all administrative costs of the

program for non-Public Assistance households as of October 1, i974. 40

39U• 8 • Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Food
Program Technical Amendments: ~ Workinsr Paper, liThe Administrative-Cost of the Food stamp Program," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1974), p.' 103.
.
40

Willard Renkin, Food stamp Coordinator, MultnomahCounty Oregon
Welfare Department, intervie\>T, November 27, 1974.
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To receive food s.tamps, a hous.ehold not on l;lublic Assitance
must be certified as eligible br the county food stamp office.

In

Multnomah County, there are five branch offices, in four geographic
locations, where certification oocurs.
certification is planned).

(Further decentralization of

The applicant must present proof of

earnings, shelter expenses, tuition, medical payments, etc., in the
form of receipts, cancelled checks, check stubs, etc.

The certifica-

tion period varies from one month to one year depending on the certification worker's appraisal of the.stability of the household's income.
For example, an elderly participant on Social Security is likely to be
certified for a year while an 18 year old unemployed blue collar worker
is likely to be certified for a month or two.

When the certification

period ends, the participant must be recertified -- a process nearly
identical to the original certification procedure.
certified households are mailed Authorization to Purchase cards
(ATPs).

I~

Multnomah County, the ATPs and the participant's cash

payment, if any, are exchanged for the authorized amount of stamps at
county food

sta~p

offices.

stamps are issued by mail for those

households with severe difficulties in traveling to issuing offices
i.e., the disabled, the senile.
mailed their stamps.

Fublic Assistance participants are

In other counties, other distribution systems

prevail -- some counties. use commercial banks and/or post offices.
In

Oregon, all counties other than Multnomahand Lane, distribute

stamps through. the post. office which receives 81 cents per transac-
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tion. 4l

In some states where banks or post

cost per transaction is more;
or the state.

off~ces

are used, the

the price i.s negotia.ted by the county

Transaction costs are shared by the county and the

state.
It was the intention of Congress that Public Assistance recipients be automatically eligible for food stamps.

By and large

they are, even if their income from Public Assistance in high payment
states exceeds the national income limits established
Stamp Program.

fo~

the Food

However, all food stamp recipients must have cooking

'facilities in their place

of residence, although elderly or disabled

participants may use their stamps for "Meals on Wheels" food delivery.
A major administrative difficulty was created when the USDA refused
to accept state Public Assistance income determination formulas in calculating payment schedules for Public Assistance households.

Dif-

ferent deductions from gross income are permitted by food stamp regulations and Public Assistance rules.

This means that a separate form

must be completed and a separate calculation made of income for food
stamps, even though the household is "automatically" eligible.

Thus

the food stamp program has contributed to the paper work of the
Public Assistance Program \'lhich is already drowning in a sea of forms.
A Public Assistance household may elecb:.. to have a portion of its roonthly check withheld in payment for food stamps and ma¥ have its alloca41

Multnomah. County Oregoll, Department of Administrative services,
Food stamp Division, "Comparative Services and Cost Figures, Multnomah
County Food stamp Issuing vs. Post Office Issuing, It (December 30, 1974),
mimeo., p. 2.
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tion of stamps mailed with. its. check.

Mos,t Public Assi.stance house:""

holds rec:eive their stamps in this manner f but th.e household -may follow the same purchasing procedures as non-Public Assistance households
if it wishes.
Program Criticisms
A barrage of criticism has been aimed at the Food stamp Program
since its inception.

Most attacks have focused on the level of be-

nefits and on the administrative shortcomings of the program.

Wel-

fare Rights Organizations and other spokesmen for the poor have persistently claimed that program benefits are too meager to provide a
42

"nutritiously adequate diet" as the Food stamp Act requires.

Pub-

lications of the Department of Agriculture and a deposition taken
from Dr. Robert Rizek, Director of Consumer and Food Economics Research
Division, USDA, state that the Economy Diet Plan on which food stamp
allotments are based is deficient in four nutrients recommended by the

48
National Academy of Sciences to insure nutritional adequacy.

In

addition, the USDA Eood Consumption Survey of 1965 revealed that less
than 10% of the families spending at the level of the Economy Food
plan received the Recommended Dietary Allowance (RDA) and less than

42
U.S. Senate,Select Commi.ttee on Nutritiqn and Human Needs,
Nutrition and Human Needs --··1972: part 3B ..- Unused Food
AS sis tance Funds: Food Stamps; AdminUit;t;'ation Wi.tnesses, &ashington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972l, p. 655.

~rings:

43

Ibid., p. 636.
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44
50% had obtained even 2/3 of the RDA.

The USDA itself

~ecom-

mended the Economy Diet Plan for only temporary use and suggested
that welfare agencies consider basing food allowances on the Low
Cost Food Plan which is about 25% more expensive than the Economy
45
The cost of the Economy Diet Plan is calculated for hypothetical
families of various sizes.

For example, the USDA family of four

consists of parents ages 20-35, a boy, age 9-12, and a child age
6-9.

The family members are assumed to engage in only moderate physi46
Thus the food stamp allowance, based on the needs
cal activity.

of this hypothetical family, may be generous or niggardly for real
four person households, depending upon their similarity to the hypothetical family.

A household with adolescent children and a male

head would be likely to find their coupon allotment inadequate, while
a mother with three preschool youngsters might find the same allotment
generous.
The introduction of uniform national standards in 1971 was intended to simplify administration and insure equitable treatment for recipients in different states.
44
Ibid., pp. 759-760.
45
Ibid.
46
Ibid., p. 637.

However, uniform standards have been
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attacked as inequitable to those partic4>ants. residing in high ;food
47
Arthur Schiff, Director, New York City Food stamp
cost areas.
Program, testified before the senate Select Committee on Nutrition
and Human Needs that the program, in effect, transfers money from the
48
North to the South.
Food costs do vary substantially between
urban areas.

The Bureau of Labor Statistics eBLS) "lower" budget

for a hypothetical family of four in the Autumn of 1973 found that
the annual cost of the same market basket of food at home ranged from
$1852 in Dallas to $2300 in New York;

a difference of $448 or 24%.

(The food expenditures in the BLS"lower u budget are based on the
49
Other critics of benefit levels have
USDA's Low Cost Diet Plan).
noted that the USDA prices its market baskets at supermarket chains
whose prices are lower than the Mom and Pop stores frequented by many
50
low-income shoppers.
Another frequent

complaint~s

that despite mandated semi-annual

47

U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs,
"Hunger 1973" and Press Reaction, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1973), p. 4.
48

U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs,
Hearings: Nutrition and Human Needs -- 1971, Part 3: Food Stamp Regulations, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971),
p. 794.
49U•S• Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, ~ cit.,
Table 1.
50

Howard Kunreuther, "Why the Poor May 1?ay More for:Food: Theoretical and Empirical Eyidence," U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs; Reference Material to Part I",Food priceChanges, 1973";'74,·~ cit., pp. 110-125.
- - - - ---
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schedule up-dates, increases in benefits. have £;ai.1ed to match increases in the cost of food.

The National Nutri.ti.on l?olicy study

issued in June, 1974 notes that the "poor person's price index" Ca
price index weighted to reflect the consumption patterns of low-income
households) has advanced more rapidly than the Consumer Price Index
The Policy study argues that in periods like 1973-74 when

(CPI).

food prices rose more rapidly than other-prices, poor households,
which spend a larger percentage of their budget on food than do middle
and upper income households, suffered disproportionately from inAs upper and middle income consumers .altered the composi-

flation.

tion of their food purchases by switching to cheaper items, the demand for these items increased and inflated their price more than the
rate of inflation in more expensive foods.

For example, from 1967

to 1974, the price of hamburger increased by 89% while that of sirloin
51

advanced by only 60%.

Grains, which are an important component of

low-income diets, exhibited larger than average price increases due
to crop failures and foreign purchases as well as increases in domestic demand.

The poor, who are already consuming the lowest cost items,

have few substitution options.

Some have suggested that the poor are

responding by eating less and/or eating pet food not intended for hu.

52

man consumption.

These charges are practically impossible to

5l U• S • senate, Select Committee on·Nutrition and H.uman Needs,
Panel on Nutrition and Special Groups: National Nutrition );lolicy
Study: Report and ReCOltlIllendations -- VIII, (Washin~ton, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1974l, p. 19.
52

Ibid., p. 20.
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document.
While the "poor person IS. price index" has advanced sharply,
these increases are reflected in the cost of the Economy Food Plan,
although where may be some time lag.

From March, 1973 to March,

1974 the price of the Economy Food Plan increased by 21% while the
Liberal Cost Food Plan, the most expensive of USDA's five plans, in53
creased by only 16.9%.
The cost of the Economy Food Plan is reflected, with some lag, in food stamp allocations.

Table IV corn-

pares increases in per capita monthly food stamp bonuses with increases in the CPI, increases in the BLS" cost of food at home" component of the CPI, and with changes in average monthly payments per
recipient under the AFDC program.

Table IV reveals that food

stamp bonuses have outpaced inflation and were nearly three times
greater than increases in AFDC payments.

Despite this rapid rate of

increase, it is possible that the absolute level of bonus payments is
inadequate as many critics contend.

While President Ford attempted

to reduce Food Stamp bonuses through raising the price of stamps to
54
many participants, Congress has overwhelmingly rejected this policy.
In sum, bonuses under the Food stamp Program have increased rapidly
and are likely to continue to do so given the depth of Congressional
support.

Charges that the progX'am has ;l;ailed to keep pace with in-

flation are not s.ubstantiated by the data.

!54Nancy
38,"TheNewNancy
stamps, I: The

Hicks, "Food Stamp Price Freeze voted by House, 374 to
York Times, (February 5, 1975), p. 1.
Hicks, "Senate, 76-8, votes Freeze in Price of Food
New York Times, (February 6, 1975), p. 1.
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TABLE IV
RATES OF CHANGE IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, THE PRICE OF FOOD AT
HOME INDEX, FOOD STAMP BONUSES AND AFDC PAYMENTS, F. Y. 1971-1974

1971

Fiscal Year
1973
1972

1974

Percent
Change

Consumer Price Index1
(1967=100)

119.0

123.3

128.2

139.7

17

price 0f Food at Home
Index1 (1967=100)

114.6

118.8

128.6

153.9

34

Mean Monthly Food S2amp
Bonus per Recipient

$13.40

$13.50

$14.50

$19.36

44

Mean Monthly AFDC )ayment per Recipient

$49.65

$51.65

$54.10

$56.95

15

1

Monthly Labor Review, XCIV, 8, (August, 1971), pp. 104-106;
XCV, 6, (June, 1972), pp. 94-96; XCVI, 4, (April, 1973), pp. 110112; XCVII, 1, (January, 1974), pp. 110-112; XCVIII, 1, (January,
1975), p. 113.
2

u.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
Food Stamp Program: Statistical Summary of Operations, June, 1971,
1972, 1973, and 1974, mimeos.
3U•S• Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs;
Report and Recommendations -- ~,
~ashington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1974),
p. 45.
Figures are for December of the years indicated.
Nati onal Nutr; t i OD pol; cy study'
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Many critics of'the

~ood st~~ ~rogram

footdragging in expanding program

have accused the USDA of

~artici~at~on.

a large leap in the number of program participants:

There has been
in July, 1970

nearly 7,000,000 individuals received food stamps -- by January, 1975
17,000,000 were benefitting from the program.

55

Despite this growth,
56
it is estimated that less than 40% of the eligible are reached.
Unlike public housing programs which have long waiting lists of eligible households that can not be accomodated, the Fbod Stamp Program
is open-ended.
benefits.

All those who are certified as eligible may receive

Thus critics view participation in the program as low

and blame the lack of response, in part; on inadqquate publicity for
the program.

Critics claim that many potential recipients are simply
57
unaware that they are eligible.
While it may be the case that publicity has been ineffective, the failure of eligible households to

perceive that they qualify for benefits may also be due to the complexity of the formula for calculating net income for food stamps.
Even official estimates of the number of eligible are extremely rough
because the incidencaof permissable deductions in various income
55

Ibid.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
"Food Stamp ~rogram: Statistical sunanary of O~erations, J'uly, 1971,"
(April 6, 1972), mimeo.
56 Gary w. Bickel and .Maurice MacDonald, "l.'articipation Rates in
the Food Stamp l,lr,og:r::cuo: Estimated Levels for 1974, by State,: in u.S.
Senate, Select Committee on Nutrit~on and Human Needs, Rep£rt~Nu
trition ~ Special' GrOU;eS, Af>pendix B to' J;la:t:'t r -.,.;.. '~ood .Stamps,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government ~rinting Office, 1975).
57"Food stamp Fund Freed by J'udge," The Ne"lY"'York Times, (October
14, 1974), p. 19.
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classes is essentially unknown.
decisions~ compellin~ mo~e

Court

extensive

out~each effo~ts

to

new households into the program, tend to substantiate the

b~ing

charge

o~

footdragging.

Judge Miles Lord, a federal district court

judge in Minneapolis, held in October, 1974 that Agriculture Secretary
Earl Butz and the USDA had failed to comply with the outreach provisions of the 1971 Amendments to the Food Stamp Act.
Judge Lord

In his ruling,

con~luded,

Congress intended outreach action, but inaction at
both the state and federal level was what actually
took place.
(Butz's) response to the Congressional.
directive, when viewed in its totality, is fairly
described as a total failure on his part to do what
Congress clearly intended him to do. 58
Judge Lord also noted that from April, 1972 to June, 1973 the number
of persons receiving federal food assistance actually declined becat.:e
increases in the Food Stamp Program were more than offset by decreases

in the Commodities Distribution Program.

The USDA did not challenge

59

the accuracy of the data in the suit.
The USDA has exhibited a lack of enthusiasm for its own program
uncharacteristic of a bureaucracy.

Analysts of bureaucratic beha-

vior have emphsized the tendency of officials to expand and protect
60
their domain.
In contrast, for several years, spokesmen for the
USDA sought to transfer the Food Stamp

~ro~ram

to HEW.

The USDA

58
Ibid.
59 Ib id.

60

Ant.hony Downs,
and Co., 1966).

~'!~

Bureaucracy, (Boston:

Little, Brown,
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was also in ;favor o;f· HR 1 f a version o;f

~i.xon \ s r~ily

Plan that would have cash.edout food staIOpS.

Assistance

In June, 1972 Assis-

tant Secretary of Agriculture, Richard Lyng, testified before the
Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs.

In response

to Senator Percy's suggestion that food stamp benefits be liberalized,
Lyng commented,
We in the Department of Agriculture have tried as
best we can to administer this program in full cooperation with other agencies that are perhaps more expert
than we in this area -- OEO, HEW, and so on.
But I
think it is appropriate now ••• that we begin to look
at the whole problem of poverty and not try to solve
that problem by simply adding more funds to the feeding
p~ogram.61

In response to Senator percy's questions about the appropriateness of
the Food Stamp Program for the elderly indigent, Lyng replied,
It seems to me that we might be wise, as a Nation, to
perhaps ~liminate the high administrative costs of the
Food Stamp Program in terms of elderly people.
Of
course, the administration has been trying to move in
this direction in terms of HR I for families as well;
but, particularly for elderly people, there seems to
me to be justification for a cash allowance to give
them flexibility to use that cash in many ways. 62
In sum, the Food Stamp Program, which is primarily a welfare program
for the urban poor, has been a misfit in a department primarily responsive to rural middle-class interests.

6l U• S • Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs,
Hearings: Nutrition ~ Hllm:m ~s
ill3.. ... 2£.:... Cit., pp_ 675-676.
62
Ibid., p_ 671.
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In addition to the lack
p~.ogram

at the

~ederal

o~ of~icial a~do~ ~O~

leve.lt the

l?~,ogX'axo. has been

staffed at the state and county levels.

the Food

St~p

chronically under-

In response to the admini-

strative cost-sharing fermula .outlined above, states have attempted
te keep administrative cests dewn by understaffing the program.
Oregen is .one .of the many states that has fellewed this pelicy.

The

state feed stamp .office in Salem has a staff .of feur, precisely the
same number it had when the Feed stamp Pregram came te Oregen as a
small scale Multnemah Ceunty pilet preject in 1963.

Multnemah Ceunty,

which had nearly 44,000 pregram participants in February, 1975, has .one
field investigater.
incidence .of fraud.

This may be one explanatien fer the lew .official
63

In July threugh September .of 1974, typical

months, ne benefits in Oregen were terminated because .of failure te
,
,64
cemply w1th pregram requ1rements.
In several states, staff shortages have resulted in long lines
at food s'tamp .offices and delays in certificatien which have undoubtedly disceuraged petential participants.

Fer example, all night lines

at feod stamp offices and one month waits for appeintments prevailed
in Arizona during November, 1974.

65

63 Deug 1as Yeater, SupervLser,
"
IssuLng Sec t'1on, Fee d stamp Divisien,
Department .of Administrative Services, Multnomah county, Oregen, interview, ~ebruary 7, 1975.
64Multnomah County, Oregen, feod staml? O~fice, "Report of Reductien/Terminatien of ;peod Stamp Benefits," .Form ,FNS-26S (9-71), (July,
september, 1974), mimeo.
65"Feod Stamp Lines Abate in Arizena," The New 'York 'Times, (December 27, 1974), p. 27.

87

While the lines have diroinisned in that state, some communities still
take as long as three
'b'l't
~ ~.y. 66

g~

montr~

to process applications and certify eli-

The new administrative cost-sharing formula, discussed

above, shou'l,d encour,age states to ltIore adequately staff the program
but shou1Cl also add to its administrative price tag.,
In addition to the high transaction costs imposed on the eligible
by long lines, transportation costs inhibit participation by the less
mobile.

Non-Public Assistance participants must travel to certifi-

cation offices periodically to be certified and recertified.

Further-

more, they must travel to a designated distributor to receive their
stamps one to four times per month, depending on the purchase schedule selected by the household.

Certification and issuing points

are particularly inaccessible to those in rural areas.
in cities, transportation may be a serious obstacle.

However, even
For example,

in Multnomah County there are no certification or issuing offices west
of the Willamette River.

Transportation costs impose particular

burdens on the elderly and disabled.

While stamps are sold in some

public housing projects and are mailed to a small percentage of households witn severe transportation difficulties, most food stamp recipients are required to do a considerable amount of traveling.

Thus the

structure of the program probably inhibi.ts participation.
66
Nancy Hicks, IlUse of ;Food stamps Soars as Jobless Turn to
Them," Th.e ~ York Times, (January 29, 1975}, p. 1.
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Another

p~ogram

attribute associated withdamRening participa-

.tion is the purchase price o;e the stamps.

welfare advocates in

Oregon opposed the switch from commodities distribution to food
stamps largely on the grounds that compelling low-income households
to pay for stamps (commodities were free) would discourage participa67

Accumulating sufficient cash at one time to purchase stamps

tion.

may require a degree of planning uncharacteristic of low-income
households, many of whom have irregular incomes.

Prior to 1971,

participating households were required to produce their entire month's
purchase payment at one time.

However, since 1971, households have

been offered a variable purchase option which allows them to purchase
stamps in quarter-month or half-month bundles.

Thus the pressure to

produce one large lump sum payment has been relieved.

In addition,

households do not forfeit their eligibility if they fail to redeem
their entire momthly allotment of ATPs.

Despite this flexibility,

the National Nutrition Policy Study suggests that purchase prices are
too high and that the cost of stamps inhibits participation.
study recommends a price reduction or a free stamp policy.

The
The free

stamp policy suggested by the Study calls for the issuance of coupons
equal to the bonus value of the stamps alone rather than the bonus plus
purchase price coupon value.
68
size and income, as now.
67

Bonuses could still vary with family

Douglas yeater,2£:... cit.

6Bu.s. Senate, select Committee on Nutrition and HUman Needs,
Panel of Nutrition and Special Groups,~cit., pp. 31-33.
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Another
P~ogram

si~nificant

may be the·

s~i9JtlO.

impediment to participation in the Food stamp
attached to the us;e of stamps-.

Gillim

notes,
perhaps the key element in the program -- the
stamps themselves -- pose the greatest obstacle to
a person considering participation in the program.
By requiring the use of food stamps instead of money,
the food stamp program publicly identifies the recipient of the subsidy at the time he buys his food -probably his largest and most conspicuous purchase.
For large numbers of housewives the grocery is a center
where neighbors meet.
There is no privacy at the checkout counter.
Many sensitive persons must refuse to enter the program rather than suffer the embarrassment of
being forced to pay with stamps and thereby reveal their
financial difficulties before people they know. 69
Willard Renkin, Multnomah County Food stamp Coordinator, concurs that
the psychic costs of the program, significantly discourage participation and are particularly severe for the elderly.

70.

Some of the stigma attached to stamps is being reduced due to
recent efforts of labor unions to inform unemployed and striking members of program benefits and to urge them to take advantage of them.
The Wall Street Journal recently printed excerpts of

union publicity

designed to increase the acceptability of food stamps to workers.

An

union official was quoted as saying, "Workers in need have a right to
stamps.

When they're working our members pay taxes so others can

69Mar ion Hamilton Gillim, "An Economic Analysis of Federal Food
Subsidies," The Economics. of Federal Subsid¥ pro<]raIJls; Part .~ -- Selected Subsidies, u.s. Con<;Jress, .:;Joint Economic·CollJlllittee, Subcommittee on Priorities. and Economy in Goverrnp.ent,(}'Jashington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Ji'rinti,ng Office, 1974).1 p. 10.9Q.
'
70Willard Renkini~ cit.
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71
have food stamps. n .

E;t;forts to reach non-;Public As.sistance house-

holds are starting to pay-otf.

In January, 1975 the New York Times

reported an important shiXt in the composition of tood stamp recipients:

for the first

time, more than 50% of the recipients were non-

Public Assistance househo1ds.

72

Increasingly, middle-class families,

squeezed by inflation, appear to be joining the program.

Wall

Street Journal interviews with officials in the Massachusetts Department of public Welfare revealed that
Food stamp applicants are incrasing1y 'you and me'
••• Among those applying for food stamps these days
are accountants, truck drivers,goverrunent employees,
factory workers, college students and even a few
Massachusetts school teachers. 73
As more non-Public Assistance households join the program, the stigma
attached to participation is likely to diminish.
Some critics of the Food Stamp Program are more concerned with
the recipients' alleged abuse of the program than with the issue of
stigma.

For example, many are strongly opposed to aiding strikers.

While this issue has yet to be resolved by the courts, strikers are
currently receiving benefits.
also been controversial.

Assistance to college students has

The Wall Street Journal editorialized re-

7111Layoff Cushion: Unions Teach Jobless Members How to Get Food
Stamps,ll The Wall St;reet Journal, (J'lovember 1;2, 1974>', p. 1.
72Nancy Hicks., "Use o~ rood staIllPS. Soars as. Jobless Turn to Them,"
.9£!.. cit.
73David G'UlUpert, lIOn the Dole: Becaus.e Glf Inflation, :Middle-Class
Families Join ;Food Stamp Rolls·, II The Wall Street Journal, OJecember
20, 1974), p. 1.
.
--
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cently that while many: genuinely needy;e'aroili.es

~ail

to obtain ;food

stamps" ••• college.students have been taking advantage of them in
growing numbers, transforming a program designed to provide a balanced
diet for the poor into a form of government scholarship.,,74

The

USDA responded to this criticism by declaring students ineligible for
food stamps as of March 1, 1975 if their parents claim them as dependents for income tax purposes?5

This ruling still does not solve

the "hippie connnu11e ll problem which has upset some program critics for
many years.

In 1971, the USDA.sought to indirectly deal with the

issue by denying benefits to households consisting of unrelated individuals.

This policy was struck down by the courts, but the issue

remains a live one.

The Wall Street Journal complains that food

stamps are "subsidizing the diets of able-bodied young men and women
who are using food stamps not to relieve poverty, but to allow them to
maintain

a preferred life-style. 1I76

In addition to criticisms relating to the "unworthiness" of some
recipients, there are persistent reports that food stamps are being
used to purchase luxuries that few non-participants can afford.

Since

no record is made of items purchased with food stamps and no market
74

"Food stamps and the Future," Th.e Wall street Journal, (;Tanu-

ary 15, 1975), p. 10..

-- -
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survey has been conducted, it is dif:f;icult to estimate how prevalent
steak is 'in the sooPPi?g carts of food stamp hoUsehold.s.
notes that the publicness of food stamp

purchases~ay

Gillim

trigger reac-

tions to shopping patterns which are probably not characteristic of
the program.
other persons buying in the grocery, especially nonparticipants in the program, will note examples of extravagance or poor judgement in the choice of groceries bought
with stamps and base their condemnation of the entire program of family food subsidies on what may be only occasional
indiscretions in buying. 77
There have also been unsubstantiated reports of black markets in food
stamps or food purchased with food stamps.
Concern over the operation of the Food stamp Program has grown
with its share of the budget and its importance as a welfare program.
The Food Stamp Program, by the second half of 1974, in effect, guaranteed an $1800 annual income to a household of four.

The concept of

an income guarantee is extremelyi controversial and was explicity rejected by Congress in 1969 and 1970 when it considered the Family
Assistance Plan and HR 1.
ra~~er

While the food stamp guarantee is in-kind

than in cash {and therefore more politically palatable}r it is

nevertheless a guaranteed income, available to intact families, households of unrelated individuals, households without children, and the
working poor who have been r,egulated out of most cash 1?ublic Assistance
programs.

strong Congressional support for the

77

Marion Hamilton'Gillim,

~

cit.

p~ogram

has probably
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been aided b¥ the ;t;act that the program has. never been· discussed
in terms of an income guarantee;

instead it has beeriyiewed as a re-

sponse to the popular "hunger issue".
In his analysis of the politics of the Family Assistance Plan
Moynihan notes:
All of the parties to the dispute within the administration, and presumably most of those observing it from
outside regarded the establishment of a guaJanteed income
as a profound departure from existing practice.
Some were
for it, some against: a~l agreed it would constitute a quantum change.
And yet this was not quite the "reality".
The Food Stamp Program, was, in essence, a universal system
of income support for the working poor. 78
The distinction between an "incremental" change and a "quantum leap forward" is much in the eye of the beholder •••
The general observation may be made that in retrospect programs such as food stamps will often be seen to have involved
major changes in policy which were obscured at the time because the start-up costs of the prqgram were small and because it was not presented as anything of extraordinary import. 79
The growing importance of food st.1.Il\pS as an income support mechanism is suggested by Table IV which reveals that food stamp benefits
have been increasing much more rapidly than benefits under AFDC, the
major cash program for the non-elderly poor.

Table IV shows that

while the average food stamp bonus per recipient increased by 44%
from F.Y. 1971-1974, the average monthly per capita AFDC payment regis78

Daniel .;F •. Moynihan, The politics. 2f s.Guaranteed. Income: The
Nixon Administration ~ the Family Assistance pian, (New York: vintage Books, ;L9731, p. 175.
79
Ibid.
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tered a gain

o~

only 15%.

While semi-annual

u~dates

of food stamp

schedules are required, updates of state ;l?ublic Assistance s.chedules
are not.

Table V indicates the relationship between food stamp and

AFDC payments for the U.S., Oregon, the five highest AFDC benefit

states and the five lowest AFDC benefit states.

Table V reveals

that food stamps have become a major component of the welfare package.
In

some states with low AFDC payments, food stamp benefits now ex-

ceed cash benefits.

The National Nutrition Policy study viewed

this trend with some alarm.

It commented:

The dramatic increases in the cost of the Food Stamp
program do not alter the fact that they move us in a
direction all thoughtful stUdents of income maintenance
long ago recognized as unwise.
If food stamp benefits
improve apace with welfare ~noreases that is one thing.
But we are now seeing food stamp benefits increase in
place of welfare or other forms of cash support, and
that is a wholly different -- and unacceptable -- matter. 80
While recommending the ca'shing out of food stamps, the Study .assessed
this as politically unrealistic and turned its attention to program
modifications, some of which have been discussed above.
The political popularity of the Food Stamp Program may be
viewed as evidence of the existence of "goods specific" utility interdependence.

The public has been willing to support a large in-kind

income transfer program during the same time period when new cash
transfer program s were rejected lthe Ji'amily Assistance Plan and HR 1)
and when per recipient benefits under AFDe,
80

~

old cash program, have

U.S. Senate, select committee on .Nutri.tion and Human Needs,
Panel on Nutrition and Special Groups, ~ cit., p. 48.
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TABLE V
FOOD STAMP BONUSES AND AFDC PAYMENTS, U. S. AND SELECTED STATES

Mean Monthly
Food Stamp
Bonus Per
Recipient
January, 1974

Mean Monthly
AFDC Payment
Per Recipient
November, 1973

1

Food stamp
Bonus as
Percent of
AFDC Payment

U. S.

$19.54

$56.86

35

Oregon

$21.08

$68.17

31

Five Lowest AFDC States
Mississippi

$17.58

$14.45

129

Alabama

$23.27

$21.61

105

South Carolina

$24.03

$24.34

100

Louisiana

$23.99

$25.25

96

Texas

$21..01

$30.77

68

Five Highest AFDC States
Wisconsin

$14.58

$93.89

16

Minnesota

$17.63

$82.78

22

New York

$12.91

$81.34

16

Massachusetts

$13.83

$79.83

18

Michigan

$13.81

$73.77

19

1
Source:, u.S. Senate, ,Select, Committeeon .. Nutrition and .. Hurnan
Needs, National Nutrition PolicyStudX:Reportand'Recommendations -VIII, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1974),
pp. 42-43.
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been relatively stagnant.

Unlike housing programs, the ability of

the market to supply food to the low-income has never been questioned.
However, like housing programs, certain assumptionscabout the inelasticity of the demand of poor households have been made.

Underlying

the Food stamp Program is the premiss that low-income families need
to be induced to consume an "adequate" amount of food.

It is feared

that general income transfers would be "wasted" by the recipients
from the point of view of the taxpayer.

As with low-income housing

programs, the efficacy of the food stamp strategy depends on the
shape of taxpayer and potential recipient's preferences, on the
relative administrative costs of various transfer schemes, and on
the degree to which consumption patterns of program participants
differ from those of nonparticipants of equivalent income.

These

issues will be examined in an empirical investigation of the Food
Stamp Program in Multnomah County.

CHAPTER rl

CRITERIA FOR THE EVALUATION OF IN-KIND TRANSFERS

Hypotheses

~

be Tested

The preceding chapters on the development of the utility interdependence framework in welfare theory and on the current operation
of two major in-kind transfer programs indicate some fertile territory
for empirical investigation.

In-kind programs are emphasized in

this research because of their rapid rate of growth relative to cash
transfers (Table I) and because of their current dominance of the
welfare package (Table II).

The strong political support for in-kind

programs suggests that this transfer mode will command an even
share of the welfare budget in the immediate future.

~arger

Given the in-

creasing importance of transfers in-kind, the many untested and frequently unstated premisses underlying this transfer mode demand explanation.
In-kind transfers assume that the "natural" consumption patterns
of intended program beneficiaries impose external costs on the larger
community, that these external costs are diminished by transfers inkind which induce alterations in consumption patterns, and that the
costs associated witiL such. trans:f;ers dQ not exceed the sum of private
and social bene:f;its derived

~rom

them.

In the vocabulary of wel:f;are

theory, in-kind transters reflect a belief in the existence of "goodsspecific" utility interdependence and a

conv~ction

that special incen-

tives are required to persuade the poor to purchase a socially accep-
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table level of basic commodities.
rejected on the grounds that the

Generalized income transfers are
un~egulated ~rket

behavior of con-

sumers (and in some cases, of suppliers) would not -maximize social
utility.
Empirical validation of these important assumptions has not been
rigorously attempted.

The following research gaps, vital to a proper

evaluation of the efficacy of in-kind strategies need to be filled.
In-kind transfers assume that the consumption patterns of the target
population of intended beneficiaries are substantially altered by inkind programs, but actual comparaisons of the consumption patterns of
program participants and eligible nonparticipants have been neglected.
To what extent to in-kind programs succeed in altering market behavior?
Private and social benefits of transfer programs are assumed to equal
or exceed program costs.
of

conceivab~e

Is this the case?

How does the magnitude

private and social benefits compare with the market

value of the transfer and the administrative and other costs of the
program?
tion.

In-kind transfers are expected to reach the target populaTo what extent are program benefits, in fact, distributed in

the manner intended by policymakers?
An

empirical examination of the operation of the low-income

housing and food stamp programs in Multnomah County, Oregon will serve
as a vehicle for analyzing these important

theoreti~al

issues.

Speci-

fically, the equity and efficiency of in-kind transfers will be assessed by testing the following hypotheses.
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I.

In-kind transfers are inefficient.
A.

In-kind transfers are characterized' by bigh administrative and participation costs.

B.

In-kind transfers do not have the intended impact of significantly diminishing the external diseconomies associated
with the consumption patterns of the target population.
1.

Transfers generous enough to significantly alter
the consumption patterns of the recipients reach
'i only a fraction of the eligible and thus have little

impact on the consumption choices of the target population as a whole.
2.

Transfers which reach a large proportion of the eligible are not generous enough to significantly alter
consumption patterns.

II.

In-kind transfers are inequitable.

Those of similar income

and demographic characteristics do not receive similar treatment.
Problems in Evaluating Public Progrruns
There are numerous impediments to the effective evaluation of
programs aimed at redistributing income.

Many of these are a pro-

duct of the political environment of welfare legislation described
in Chapters I and III.

One problem is the

tendenc~

of public poli-

cies to have blurred objectives and multiple goals which are not
clearly we.igh.ted or 1l\a¥ even be in conflict with. one another.

For

example, low-income housing programs have been simultaneously oriented
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to increasLi9 the supply- v! housing and
low-income population;
program structures.

tran~erring

income to the

goals which may call for quite different
Once the goals of a particular program are

identified, criteria for assessing them in the light of broader social
objectives and for measuring the operation of the program in relation
to its goals are required.

Since there is a wide divergence of

opinion as to what societal goals, in regard to income redistribution
ought to be, the researcher must resort to very general standards to
appraise the adequacy of public transfer programs.

At a minimum,

it is assumed in this work that public transfer programs strive to
operate equitably and efficiently:

that a program should insure the

equal treatment of equals and that the societal and private benefits
of a program should be maximized relative to its cost.
Even when clear criteria for evaluating programs are accepted,
there are important practical problems which stem from the nature
of decision-making and administration in the public sector.

A serious

obstacle to program assessment is the control of information by the
responsible bureaucracies which have aconcratestake in concealing program flaws.

Oversight by Congressional committees, the General Ac-

counting Office, and the media place limits on the capacity of public
,agencies to conceal or misrepresent
still relies heavil¥ on data

info~atiQnf

~enerated

in house.

but program evaluation
While explicit

questions from ccngreasional committees or the G.A.O. do elicit explicit, if uncomfortable,

re~ponsesf

in many cases, it is not clear to

outsiders what the key questions should ce.

Thus program evaluations

are difficult, in practice, because evaluations by those responsible

101
for programs, are biased and external evaluations. suffer' from the control of data by· insiders.
The effective evaluation of public programs is further inhibited
by their non-market character.

In the private sector, a firm has a

strong incentive to engage in self-criticism, since failure to do so
may result in a loss of profits, or, in the extreme, bankruptcy.
the public sector, the link between budget

In

share (profits) and the

efficient production of a desired good or service is obscure.

The

future funding of a particular program hinges more heavily on the
level of past funding and on the characteristics of the political environment than it does on agency performance.

In

addition, as discus-

sed above, the standards for measuring the "goodness" of a public
product are far more controversial than the generally accepted index
of success in the private sector, profits.
Despite these unresolved issues, a,' set of criteria will be proposed for evaluating in-kind transfer programs.
~l

The criteria will be

extension and specification of standards suggested by Weisbrod
1

for evaluating programs aimed at the redistribution of income.
Weisbrod contends that transfer programs ought to:
1.

Minimize administrative costs.

2.

Maximize "target efficiencyll Croaxiroize the l?articipation
of those in the target 9rouP and miniIllize the J?articipation
of thos.e outside the target 9rOul?~

lBurton A. Weisbrod, "Collective .Action"andtne Distribution of
Income, II in l;'ub1ic 'Expenditures and}?olicY"A;n.a1ysis, Robext H. Haveman
and Julius Margolis C.edi tors}, (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company,
1970), pp. 117-141.
'
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3.

Maximize a110cative efficiency (minimize substitution
effects).

4.

Maximize nondemeaning benefits (minimize the "stigma"
associated with transfer programs).

5.

Maximize the utility of the taxpayers and the transfer
recipients.

6.

Maximize program flexibility over time.

Weisbrod notes that these criteria are frequently in conflict
with one another and difficult to operationa1ize.

For example, pro-

grams which are highly accurate in channeling benefits to the target
group may require large administrative costs, depending on how the
target group is defined.

In-kind transfers, which are intended to

have substitution effects, involve trade-offs with a110cative effi-'
ciency.

Some of the empirical dimensions of these trade-offs will

be analyzed with the aid of a model for evaluating in-kind transfers.
This model, presented below, operationa1izes most of Weisbrod's
criteria.

It will be employed in two empirical investigations of the

strength of the case for in-kind transfers.
A Model for Evaluating In-Kind Transfers
A model for evaluating in-kind income transfer programs appears
in Figure 2.

The model proposes methods for measuring key concepts

identified in the theoretical discussion of "goods-specific" utility
interdependence in Chapter II and in Weisbrod's work discussed in
this chapter.
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A

AB

= Recipient

BC

= Cash

Payment

B

Value of Transfer
to Recipient

AC = Private Benefits

C

AD

= Market

BD

= In-Kind

CD

= Substitution

DE

= Administrative

Value
Income
Effects

D

and

Other Costs

BE = Program or Public Costs
AE

= Total

Costs

E

Figure 2.

A model for evaluating in-kind transfers.

All of the following definitions refer to value per recipient.
AB

= Recipient Payment, if any.

BC = Cash Value of the In-Kind Transfer to the Recipient.
AC

= Cash

Value of the In-Kind Good or Service to the Recipient or
Private Benefits = AB + BC. AC is defined as the recipient's
point of indifference between an in-kind and a cash transfer
or what the recipient would have been willing to pay for the
in-kind good or service, if he had received cash.

AD = Market Value of the in-kind good or service or its unsubsidized
cash value. AD may be equal to or greater than AC, depending
upon the recipient's marginal propensity to consume the good
or serVice in question.
BD

= In-Kind

Income provided by the transfer program.
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CD

=

DE

= Administrative and Other Pr9sramCosts.

BE

=

BD + DE = Program ~Public Costs or the sum of the market
value of the transfer minus the recipient's contribution and
the other costs of making the transfer.

AE

=

AS + BE

Substitution Effects or the utility loas suffered by the recipient from tne distortion of his consumption Rattern resulting
from the. acceptance of an in-kind transfer. CD;:; 0 when the
marginal propensity of the recipient to con~e the good or
service in question is equal to or greater tlian the consumption
level demanded by the in-kind program.

= Total

Costs.

Figure 2 includes social costs, but it does not contain an estimate of social benefits.

While theoretically social benefits are

measurable, in practice, it is not feasible to directly assess the
external benefits of transfer programs from existing data.

However,

De Salvo has suggested an indir.ect method of estimating what the minimal external benefits must be for a pr<;>gram to "pay-off" from a benefitcost viewpoint.

He suggests that social or external benefits

must,

at a minimum, equal total costs minus the cash value of the in-kind
good or service to the recipient.

2

Equation 1 contains De Salvo's

conceptualization of minimum required social benefits (SB) in terms
of Eigure 2.

(1)

sBInin = AE - AC

This equation permits the comparison of pr.ograllls on the basis of the
minimum external benefits that they require to warrant their costs
and sugges.ts that pr.Ograms with high.. administrative costs require com2Joseph S. De Salvo, "A Methodology for Evaluatin~ Housing
programs, u Journal:. of Re9inn~ Science, XI, 2 {J\ugust, 1971), pp.
173-185.
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mensurately

l~rge

external benefits to be deemed efficient.

While De Salvo's approach considers the size of social benefits
required to cover costs, his methodology does not measure actual social
benefits.

An

indirect attempt will be made to approximate the actual

social benefits of in-kind programs through an analysis of substitution
effects and participation rates.

The discussion of utility inter-

dependence in Chapter II suggested that in-kind transfers are evidence
of the taxpayers' desire to transfer particular goods and services
rather than general income.

If this is the case, then the magnitude

of substitution effects, or the degree to which in-kind transfers increase the consumption of particular goods or services, may be used
as a proxy for external benefits.

While the receipient suffers dis-

utility from altering his consumption patterns, presumably taxpayers experience increments in

uti1i~y

related to the size of such

alterations.
The effect of changes in consumption patterns or substitution
effects on program nonparticipants is linked not only to the size of
the alterations in expenditures but to the extent to which the desired
effects prevail among the target population.
large substitution

If a program induces

effects but reaches only a small fraction of the

eligible, then it is unlikely to signiiicantl¥ dimini.sh the negative
externalities associated with the consumption vatterns
population as a whole.

o~

the target

for example, installing 5% of the occupants

of substandard housing in high quality units

ma~

have large effects

on the consumption patterns of those selected, but it is unlikely
to significantly alter the impact of substandard housing on the non-
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poor because 95% 0:1; the tCl:rget population
accomodations.

r~ains

in s.ubstandard

In an e:l;fort to incorporate these keY7ariables in

an estimate of social bene:l;its, Equation (2) will he used to approximate the social or external benefits of in-kind programs.
(2)

SB

= ClD X

PR

where CD equals the substitution effects, if any, el±cited by the
transfer (Figure

2~)

and PR is a participation ratio··. defined as the

number of program participants divided by the number of program eligible.

Equation (2) indicates that if there are no substitution ef-

fects then there are no external benefits.

This is a result of the

stringent assumption that in-kind transfers are motivated solely by
the desire to increase the consumption of particular commodities
rather than to transfer income in general.
While participation ratios are important in the assessment of
external benefits, they may also be viewed as indicators of supply
bottlenecks and/or participation costs.

Low participation ratios

suggest that there is a limited supply of a transfer or that the
costs of participation outweigh its benefits from the intended bene:l;iciary's perspective.

In pr.ograms with elastic supply but low

participation ratios, the preceding chapters suggest that the following
factors are important in the potential recipient's participation
decision.
1.

In-kind transfers may have in:l;oxmaiion, transaction,
and transportation costs whi.ch exceed the value of the
transfer to the recipient.
For example, there may be
excessive red tape, complex eligiblity requirements,
inadequate program publicity and/or inconveniently
located vendors.
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2.

The disutility of altering preferred consumption
patterns required by the in-kind tr~nsfer may exceed
its value to the recipient. tIn l?igure 2 f CD 1ll.ay be
greater than BC).

3.

The high psychic costs associated with some programs
which publicly identify and stigmatize the recipient
may exceed the value of the transfer to the recipient.

4.

The transfer may not be available in the geographic
area in which some of the eligible reside.

Thus participation ratios may be important indicators of participation
costs as well as a component in the evaluation of social benefits.
The model presented in Figure 2 and Equations (1) and (2)
will be employed in an empirical evaluation of the low-income housing
and Food stamp programs in Multnomah County, Oregon.

These programs

will be evaluated exclusively in the context of their equity and
efficiency as

~oods-specific

income transfer mechanisms.

Other

functions that thesa programs may serve will not be dealth with in
this research.

Chapters V and VI contain the empirical results for

housing and food stamps respectively, while Chapter VII relates these
results to the proposed
utility interdependence.

hypothes~and

the theoretical framework of

CHAPTER V

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF IN-KIND TRANSFE,RS:
INCONE HOUSING

THE CASE

or

LOW-

In this chapter, the model presented in Chapter IV will be applied to the low-income housing programs managed by the Housing
rity of Portland (HAP).

Autho~

All HAP data are for April 1, 1972 to

March 31, 1973, (HAP fiscal year 1972) unless otherwise noted.

(This

unconventional fiscal year, beginning in April, is the HUD accounting
period and does not conform to accounting pericds ±nother federal departmen ts • )

HAP's jurisdiction extends over Multnomah County, which

includes the City of Portland.

As of 1972, HAP's inventory included

1400 conventional public housing units, 526 Turnkey public housing
units, and approximately 1660 privately owned, leased units which HAP
sublet to low-income households.
Program Costs
The first step in evaluating housing programs as an income transfer strategy is to assess program costs or BE in Figure 2 of Chapter
IV.

For conventional and Turnkey structures, owned by HAP, program

costs are the sum of 1) capital costs, 21 operatinc;J subsi..di.es and 3)
tax subsidies.

For leased units.,

p~o<;:Jram

cOsts consist solely of

operating s.ubsidies.
1)

Capital Costs.

velopment costs of
version of

~hese

HAP.IS

Tables VI and VII. list the orisinal deconventional and Turnkey units' and the con-

costs into constant 1972 dollars.

Table VIII con-

TABLE VI
DEVELOPMENT COSTS, CONVENTIONAL PUBLIC HOUSING, PORTLAND, OREGON, 1938-1972 1
PJ::"oject
Number
2-1
2-2 3
2-3

Project
Name
Columbia Villa
Dekum
Iris Court
Maple Mallory
Peaceful Villa
Royal Rose
Royal Rose Annex
Sumner Court
Northwest Tower
Tamarak
Columbia Villa Addition
Hillsdale Terrace
Hollywood East
Dekum Court

2-8
2-7
2-9
2-10
2-4
2-13
2-5
2-6
2-11
1

Source:

Number

Cost in
2
1972 Dollars

CD. Units

Year

Cost

440"
82
54
48
66
36
9
9
180
120
38
60
300
40

1938
1942

1,683,863
217,833
526,939

8,793,018
1,002,453
1,386,682

523,152
257,099
74,504
91,772
2,186,639
1,694,194
2,405,791

1,188,982
558,911
137,970
169,948
3,706,168
2,455,354
2,797,431

4,349,031
785,857

§,a36,289
845,008

194B-

194
1952
1954
1959
1959
1963
1967
196~
197
1969
1971

Housing Authority of Portland, records.

2costs were converted to 1972 dollars by using the "Boeckh Index of Construction Costs:
Apartments, Hotels, and Office Buildings," in 1973 Business statistics, 19th Bienniel Edition,
U.s. Department of Commerce, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 55.
3Demolished 1972.
I-'

o

\D

TABLE VII

DEVELOPMENT COSTS, TURNKEY PUBLIC HOUSING, PORTLAND, OREGON, 1938-1972

NUlwer

Project
Name

2-14
2--15
2-16
2--17
2-18

Dahlke Manor
Holgate House
Sellwood Center
Schrunk-Riverview Tower
Williams Plaza

PJ~')ject

lsource:

Number
of units
115
80
112
118
101

Year
1971
1971
1971
1971
1971

Cost
2,262,370
1,556,767
1,809,195
2,109,599
1,927,051

1

Cost in
1972 Dollars 2
2,432,656
1,673,943

1,945,371
2,268,386
2,072,098

Housing Authority of Portland, Records.

2Costs were converted to 1972 dollars by using the "Boeckh Index of Construction Costs:
Hotels, and Office Buildings," in ~Business Statistics, ~ Biennie1 Edition,
u.S. Department of Commerce, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 55.

~?artments,

I-'
I-'

o

III
.TABLE V:U.I

MODERNIZATION COSTS, CONVENTIONAL ~UBL!C HOUSING, 1969-1972
tin 1972 dollars}l
Modernization costs

Project Number

Project Name

2~1

Columbia Villa

1,587,470

2-3

Iris Court and
Maple Mallory

100,678

2-4

Northwest Towers

195,260

2-7

Royal Rose

203,261

2-8

Peaceful Villa

88,457

2-9

Royal Rose Annex

29,067

2-10

Sumner Court

24,614

1

Source: Housing Authority of Portland, Records.
Costs
were converted to 1972 dollars by using the "Boeckh Index of Construction costs: Apartments, Hotels, and Office Buildings," in
1973 Business Statistics, 19th Biennie1 Edition, U.S. Department
of Commerce, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1973), p. 55.
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tains HAP's expenditures ;for :l\lode;rnization a!;;. ot: 19.72.
capital

e~enditure

per 'Unit (o;r,iginal

plu~

The .mean

modernization

costl of

conventional public housing was $2Q, 719. 99 while Turnkey units
averaged $19,757.52

(Table

IX~

Column 1).

While Turnkey units were

slightly less expensive than conventional units, they are not of cornparable size.

conventional units averaged 1.46 bedrooms, while

Turnkey units average 0.66 bedrooms.

In Portland, all of the Turn-

key projects have been built for the elderly and consist exclusively
of efficiency and one-bedroom units.

Portland development costs

are very close to average national per unit costs for low-rent public
housing of $20,967. 1
The key controversial issue in estimating capital costs is the
selection of the discount rate or the social opportunity cost of
transferring resources from the private to the public sector.

Few

analysts would quarrel with the contention that public projects compete with private endeavors for resources and that consequently, opportunity, rather than actual capital, costs are relevant in assessing
public prorgrams.

However, the choice of a specific discount rate

is more problematic.

The discount rate is crucial because project

cost est.iInates are very sensitive to the rate employed.

Table IX

shows the annual per unit capital subsidies required ;for conventional
and Turnkey units at

~our d~ferent

discount rate!;;..

would probably opt for a ra,te between 5 and 7 pe;rcent.

Most economists
Smolensky,

lU. S. Department of Housing and Urban Deyelopment, '1972 HUD' statisticalYearbook, (washington, D.C.: U.S. Goverrnnent Printing Office,
1974), p. 163.

TABLE IX

CAPITAL SUBSIDIES, CONVENTIONAL AND TURNKEY
Total Development and
Modernization Costs
per Unitl

~uaLIC

HOUSING, PORTLAND, OREGON, 1972
2

~er

4%

Unit Annual Subsidy, at Selected Interest Rates
10%
5%
7%

Conventional

20,719.99

lQ46,99

1207.45

l554~33

2118.61

Turnkey

19,757.52

998.36

1151. 37

1482.18

2020.20 .

1

Derived from Tables VI, VII and VIII.
"Costs in 1972 Dollars" and "Modernization Costs"
were summed and divided by the total number of units.
2The annual per unit subsidy was calculated by solving for S in the following formula:

v'"5-

<n=40

(S )

.c::.

(1

+

+

X) t

t=l
where V = per unit development and modernization costs in 1972 dollars, S = annual subsidy per
unit and X = interest rate.
The formula is suggested in Eugene Smolensky, "public Housing or
Income Supplements -- The Economics of Housing for the Poor, " American Institute of planners
Jmprhal, (March, 1968), p. 95.
I-'
I-'
W
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in a calculation of the capital costs of public housing, used 5% which
reflected the average yield of FHA bonds from 1952-1964, the period
of his study.2

An

extremely conservative estimate of the social rate

of discount is 4%, the average yield of Aaa bonds from 1938-1972, the
period of HAP's investment. 3 At the opposite extreme, Baumol makes
a strong case that the corporate income tax structure requires investments in the private sector to yield at a rate twice as large as the
rate of interest to be profitable.

Baumol argues that given the com-

petition between public and private projects, public projects ought
to yield at roughly double the interest rate on government bonds or
10%.4

However, Baumol assumes that the entire private sector is cor-

porate in structure and does not account for the favorable treatment
of certain forms of corporate debt.

Table IX reflects the range of

viewpoints on the question of interest rate and reveals that moving
from a discount rate of 4% to 10% more than doubles the estimated annual per unit subsidy.

In this study, 7% will be used as the discount

rate as a reasonable reflection of the sharp climb in interest rates
in recent years and as a partial concession to Baumol's argument.

2Eugene Smolensky, "Public Housing or Income Supplements -- The
Economics of Housing for the ?oor," American Institute of Planners
~urnal, (March, 1968), p. 96.
3U•S• Department of Commerce, 1973 Business Statistics (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 105.
4william J. Baumol, "On the Social Rate of Discount," The
American Review, LVIII, (September, 1968), pp. 788-802.

11S
In the calculation of capital costs in Table IX, a building life
of 40 years was assumed -- this is standard for public housing projects.

In addition, it was assumed that capital costs are completely

subsidized by the federal government.

(Smolensky assumed that a

small portion of tenant rents was used to defray capital costs.
was the case in 1966,
tenw~t

~hp-

This

year of his study, but since the late 60's

rents have not been sufficient to cover even operating expen-

ditures. )
2.

Operating Subsidies.

Tables X, XI, and XII contain the

monthly operating receipts, expenditures and deficits for conventional,
Turnkey and leased units, respectively.

Per unit operating deficits

in conventional units, ($24.21), are over twice as large as those in
Turnkey units, ($10.42), primarily because of higher maintenance and
administrative expenses in conventional units.

These higher costs

are largely attributable to the much older average age of conventional
units (Tables VI and VII) and the fact that many conventional units
serve families with children who present HAP with greater "problems"
than the elderly residents of the Turnkey projects. S
monthly per unit subsidies for

LHA

Nationally,

owned units (includes conventional

and Turnkey) were $13.46. 6
Monthly receipts, expenditures, and deficits for leased units,
(Table XII), are not directly comparable with those for projects owned

5Norman Branvold, Comptroller, Housing Authority of Portland
Interview.
6U•S . Department of Housing and Urban Development, ~ cit.,
p. 133.
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TABLE

O~ERATING

.x

P,E.CEI?TS AND EXPENDITURES., CONVENTIONAL 1(UBLI:C HOUSI:NC;,
PORTLAND, OREGON, AJ?RJ:L 1, 1972 -- :MARCH: 31, 19731

Total

~

. O?erunitMonthl .

. . (l6i986PUMs)

gperating·Receipts
Tenant Rents

33.07

561,656,00

Other Income

7.66

130,151.00

40.73

691,807.00.

14.66

249,035.00

1.46

24,878~00

utilities

14.92

253,415.00

Ordinary Maintenance
and Operations.

23.90

406,027.00

9.95

169,033.00

.05

850.00

64.94

1,103,238.00

TOTAL OPERATING
RECEIPTS
Operating~penditures

Administrative
Tenant Services

General Expenses 2
Non-routine Expenses
TOTAL OPERATING
EXPENDITURES
(Operating Deficit}
lsource:

Housing Authorit¥ o~ Portland:

Records.

2General Exl?e::1ses include eml?lo~ee ~rin9'e b.ene;its.. . The s.eparation of ~ringe beneftts from administrative exl?enditures is mandated'
by the HUD accountin~ fOI1\lat and doe~ not reflect a decision of the
local housing autnoritr.

117

TABLE XI
OPERATING RE.CEn'TS AND EXPENDITURES, TURNKE:(, PUBLIC HOUSING, PORTLllND,
OREGON, APRIL 1,1972 --.MARCIl 31,1973 1

PUM

Total

(per Unit Month! .

.. (6; 312 . PUMS)

Tenant Rents

32.98

208,142.00

Other Income

5.05

31,888.00

38.03

240,030.00

10.15

64,023.00

.75

4,706.00

Utilities

14.69

92,744.00

Ordinary Maintenance
and Operations

16.33

103,059.00

6.50

41,018.00

.03

167.00

48.45

305,717.00

(10.42l

. (65,687.00)

TOTAL OPERATING
RECEIPTS
OperatinjiExpenditures
Administrative
Tenant Services

General Expenses 2
Non-routine Expenses
TOTAL OPERATING
EXPENDITURES
(Operating Deficit}

lSource:

•

Housing Authority of portland;

Records.

2General Exl?enses include employee fringe benefi-ts.
The separation of fringe bene~its from administrative expenditures i-s mandated
by the HDD accounting tormat and does not reflect a decision c~ the
local housing authority"~
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TABLE XI.I
OPERATING RECEIJ?TS AND EXl?ENDI~URES, LEASED LOW""INCOME HOYSING,
PORTLAND, OREGON, APRIL 1, 1972 -- MARCH. 31, 1973

PUM
(per unit 'Month) ,

Total
'PUMS}

, , (19 i 962

Operating Receipts
Tenant Rents2
Other Income
TOTAL OPERATING
RECEIPTS

20.17
3.85

402,657.00
76,926.00

24.02

479.583.00

15.68
.78
.26

312,915.00
15,580.00
5,263.00

5,09
3,06
.02

101,523.00
61,131. 00
445.00

24.89

496,857.00

87

2,073,436.00

128.76

2,570,293.00

(104.74)

(2 1 090;710.00)

OperatingE~penditures

Administrative
Tenant Services
Uti1ities 2
Ordinary Maintenance
and Operations
General Expense 3
Non-Routine Expense
TOTAL OPERATING
EXPENDITURES
Landlord Lease Payments
TOTAL EXPENDITURES
(Deficit)
lSource:

H~3.

Housing Authority of Portland:

Records.

2Near1y all utility bills are paid by the tenants and are not reflected in the utility line of the bUdget.
However, tenant rents are
considerably below those in conventional and turnkey public housing because expected utility exJ?enditu:ces are considered when setting rents.
3General ExJ?enses include employee fringe benefits.
The separation of fringe benefits from adminis.trative ~J?enditures. is mandated by
HUD accounting format and does not reflect a decision of the local housing authority.
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by RAJ;>..

flects

The

RAJ;> ,

1~rge

.monthly pe;r: unit de;l;icit 0;1; $lQ4.74 largely re-

s l?ayments to· i?rivate landlords.•

Tenant rents and utility

expendi tures by HAl? are lower than those in public housing because tenants in leased units pay utility vendors directly.

Their rental pay-

ments to the housing authority are adjusted downward to reflect this
arrangement.

Table XIII summarizes the operating subsidies required

for low-income units on a monthly and annual basis.
3.

Tax Subsidies.

Housing authorities do not pay, 'property

taxes on the structures that they own.

In lieu of property tax, they

pay 10% of shelter rent (tenant rents minus utility payments) to local
governments.

For example, in 1972, in conventional units, HAP col-

lected $561,656 in rent and paid $253,415 for utilities (Table X).

In

lieu of taxes, HAP paid 10% of the difference or $30,824 to local tax
districts.

Table XIV indicates that

Hl2's pa~~ents

in lieu of taxes

are substantially lower than full property taxes would be on their
structures.

In 1972, this tax subsidy, the difference between full

property taxes and actual HAP payments, amounted to $298.95 per unit
per year for conventional units and $435.39 per unit per year for Turnkey units.

The larger tax subsidy for Turnkey units reflects the fact

that Turnkey units are newer and consequently have a considerably higher
per unit valuation.

While the assessed value per unit in conventional

projects was $11,213, Turnkey units were assessed at $15,814.
RAJ;>

Since

rental receil?ts are related to tenant income, not unit value, the

spread between 10% of'shelter rent and full property tax is greater for
nore valuable units.
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TABLE .xII:!

OPERATING SUBSIDIES, CONVENTIONAL AND TURNKEY l?UBLIC HOUSING, LEASED
LOW-INCOME LEASED HOUSING, PORTLAND, OREGON, APRIL 1, 1972 -- MARCH
31, 19731

Per Unit
Month ($)

Per unit
.Annual . t.$)

unit
Months .

Total' ($)

Conventional

24.21

290.52

16,986

411,431

Turnkey

10.42

125.04

6,312

65,687

Leased

104.74

1,256.88

19,962

2,090,710

1

Derived from Table X, Xi, XII

TABLE XIV
PROPERTY TAX SUBSIDIES, CONVENTIONAL AND TURNKEY PUBLIC HOUSING, PORTALAND, OREGON, APRIL h, 1972 -MARCH 31, 1973l;,

Conventional
(Assessed Valuation
$ 15,697,820)

Turnkey
(Assessed Valuation
$ 8,317,940)

30,824.01

11,539.83

453,980.96

240,554.82

(423,156.95)

(229,014.99)

Payment in Lieu of Taxes
Approximate Full Real Property Taxes
(@ 28.92 per thousand)2
(TAX SUBSIDY)
Tax Subsidy Per unit Month
Annual Tax Subsidy Per unit

1Source:
2

Housing Authority of Portland:
Taxing Authority
Mu1tnomah County
city of Portland
Port of Portland
School District #1
Mu1 tnomah lED
Portland Community College
TOTAL

24.91

36.28

298.95

435.39

Records

Tax

~

5.08
8.21
1. 02
9.15
4.72

I-'

.74
28.92

I-'

t\)
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summa:¥, of . pro<;l!a:m· costs.

Table Y.V summarizes. the total .monthly

and annual per· unit costs of HAP owned and leaSed units, assuming a
7% discount rate.

In

terms of the model in 'Figure 2, BE or program

costs are $2143.80 per year for conventional units, $2042.64 for Turnkey units, and $1256.88 for leased units.

AS or annual tenant rent

equals $396.84 for conventional units and $395.76 for Turnkey units.
In leased units, AS equals the sum of rent and utility payments to
private vendors or $422.04 per year.

AE or total annual per unit

costs are $2540.64 for conventional units, $2438.40 for Turnkey units,
and $1678.92 for leased units.

Thus leased housing is 34% less ex-

pensive than con'ventiona1 units and 31% less expensive than Turnkey
units.

As noted above, direct comparisons between Turnkey and con-

ventional units are distorted by differences in averaga.:·unit size, age
and type of occupant.

However., leased units serve roughly the same

population as conventional public housing and are comparable or slight1y larger in size.
These results for conventional and Turnkey units are very close
tc those reported recently by Solomon for Boston.

Using a similarly

inclusive concept of costs, Solomon found total annual costs in conventiona1 units were $2586 while those in Turnkey units; averaged
$2430.

However, he :l;ound annual costs in leased units aver.aged

$2484, substantiall~ 9reate~ than those calculated

tor portland. 7

7Arthur p. Solomon, !!9E.,.singthe Urban poor, {Cambridge: the
MIT press, 19741, p.1494

TABLE XV
HOUSING SUBSIDIES PER

UNI~C',

Monthly
Capital
Subsid

CONVENTIONAL, TURNKEY AND LEASED LOW-INCOME HOUSING, PORTLAND, OREGON
APRIL 1, 1972 -- MARCH 31, 19731
Monthly
Operating
Subsid'

Monthly
property
Tax Subsid

Total Subsidy
Per
Month
Annual

Annual
Tenant
Rent

Total Annual
Cost
Per Unit

Conventional

129. 53'~

24.21

24.91

178.65

2143.80

396.84

2540.64

Turnkey

123. 52'~

10.42

36.28

170.22

2042.64

395.76

2438.40

104.74

1256.88

422.04**

1678.92

Leased

o

104.74

o

1Derived from Tables IX, XIII and XIV.

*Assumes a

d"~scount rate of 7%.

**Inc1udes utility payments to private vendors.

I-'
N
W
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Part of the

dif~erence

in Boston-- average

is attributable to

~enant

l~r~er

tenant rent payments

contributions. exceeded those in

~ortland

This difference may be due to the greater affluence

by $300 per year.

of Boston public houSing tenants and/or to the higher rent levels that
prevail there.

In

1970, median contract rent in Portland was $97

while in Boston it was $111. 8

Most of the remaining difference be-

tween the portland and Boston results for leased housing is a function
of Solomon's inclusion of accelerated depreciation in his assessment
of program costs.

Accelerated depreciation was not included in the

cost calculations for Portland leased housing because of the judgement
that these tax benefits are available to all private landlords, not just
to those leasing to HAP.

As such, these costs should not be charged

exclusively to the low-income housing

p~cgram.

Market Value
The market value of public housing units, AD in Figure 2, is difficult to determine because in many respects public housing is a unique
product without a private sector counterpart..

Housing authorities faci-

litate the provision of social services to their tenants in addition to
furnishing housing.

For

ex~le,

~

has arranged for public health

nurses, counselors, and food stamp vendors to visit large

~

projects.

Other services are also delivered directl¥ to BAr residents because of

81975 the US Factbook, The American Almanac, 1.neStatisticalAbstract .of· th.e U. 5."' as prepare'dby the Bureau of· theTe'nsus, Departm~
of Commerce, QNeWYork: Grosset and Dunlap, 1975), pp. 895, 915.
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HAPls.cooperat~on

witQ social service

While these services

.agenci~s.

~IS

are undoubtedly important to their recipients,
is to provide a substitute for private housing.

prilnary objective

While the non-housing

services may enhance the value of public housing, the stigma that many
low-income households associate with living in public projects and the
neighborhood effects of the concentration of low-income households may
reduce the value of

public~.y· ~'

owned units below the "market pnice" of

physically comparable units.
Table XVI contains several approaches to pricing public housing
as well as the median rent for the county and the SMSA.

The first

set of suggested market rents were proposed by HUD when requested to
estimate the market value of public housing by the Subcommittee on FisHOD proposed using its

cal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee.

rent standards which include utilities for Relocation Assistance.

In

Multnomah County, these standards were $136 for a one-bedroom unit and
$172 for a two-bedroom unit.

When compared with the median gross rent

in the SMSA, which includes some affluent suburban developments, the
market values propesed by HUD appeal inflated.

It is not credible that

the "market" would price public housing units substantially above the
$125 for a one-bedroom unit and the $152
ing in the SMSA.

~or

a two-bedroom unit

prevail~

Table XVI. indicates tha.t another l?ossible approach

to estimating the market value of public housin9 units is to use the
maximum rent limits established for low-income leased units in the
county as proxies.
inspection.

In

Leased units must

addition~

qualif~

as standard and pass HAP

they are intended as an alternative to pub-

lic housing for a comparable population.

In constant 1972 dollars, the
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TABLE XVI
SELECTED METHODS OF ESTIMATING THE MARKET VALUE OF PUBLIC HOUSING UNITS,
PORTLAND, OREGON, 1972 1
Monthly Rent
1 Bedrm.
2 Bedrm.
Proposed Market Rents
1)
2)
3)

HUD Max. Gross Rent Relocation
Assistance Payments, Multnomah co. 2
HUD Max. Gross Fair Market Rents,
Existing Leased Housing, Multnomah
county3
Median Gross Rent in Public Housing
Census Tracts 4
Conventional
Turnkey

Median Gross Rent Multnomah county4
Median Gross Rent Portland SMSA4

136

172

117

137

110
120

133
no 2-bedrm. units

120
125

145
152

lAll necessary conversions to 1972 dollars were made by using
the Shelter Rent Component of the Consumer Price Index in Handbook of
Labor Statistics, 1973, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974),
p. 299.
2

U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal
Policy, Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No. 15: Welfare in the 70's:
~ National Study of Benefits Available in 100 Local Areas, (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 16.
3U•S• Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Region 10,
Fair Market Rents (Maximum Gross Rent Payable) for Existing Section
23 Leased Housing," Federal Register, 39, 131, July 8, 1974.
4U•S• Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing;
1970, Census Tracts, Final Report PHC(1)-165, portland, Oregon-Washington SMSA, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972).
Median rents in public housing tracts were weighted by the number of
public housing units appearing in those tracts. Median rents were assumed to be for one-bedroom units since the median number of persons in
rental units = 2. 2-bedroom rents were estimated by using the average
differential in the HUD schedules between 1 and 2 bedroom units.
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~ums estahlished~or'existing

bedroom unit and $137 for a

leased housin9were $117

two~bedroom

~or

a one-

unit.

Another approach.. is to asswne that public housing is comparable
to the median rental unit in the census tracts in which public housing
is located.

This technique yielded a market value of $110 and $120

respectively for conventional and Turnkey one-bedroom units.

This

methodology appears to successfully pick up the fact that Turnkey
units, on the average, are newer and are located in "better" neighborhoods than are conventional units -- and hence should be more valuable.
Two-bedroom conventional units are assigned a market value of $133,
using the same technique.

(There are no two-bedroom Turnkey units).

These rents are close to the median gross rents for the county.
such, they seem quite generous to public housing.

As

For lack of a more

direct measure, these median rents in the relevant census tracts will
be employed as proxies for the market value of conventional and Turnkey
units, AD in Figure 2.
Estimating the market value of leased units is much less convoluted since private landlords presumably demand a "market price" for
their units from HAP.
meanmonthl~

Table XVII indicates that leased units have a

gross rent of $107.63 for a one-bedroom unit and $128.85

for a two-bedroom unit.

utility and maintenance expenditures have

been added to the payments to landlords to
owned units which.. include these outlays.

ex~edite

comparisons with HAP
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TABLE XVII

ESTIMATED MARKET VALUE f LOW-INCOME LEASED HOUSING, J?ORTLA,ND, OREGON, 1972

1 Bedroom Unit
.. for Elderly
Average Landlord Rent

1

Utilities 2
Maintenance

2 Bedroom
.Unit

87.54

108.76

15.00

15.00

5.09

5.09

107.63

128.85

3

TOTAL ESTIMATED GROSS
MONTHLY MARKET RENT

1

Housing Authority of Portland, "Leased Housing status Report,"
mimeo.
2Uti1ities are not included in landlord payments.
utility expenditures in conventional and turnkey units, as shown in Tables XIII
and XIV, plus the small utility expenditures for leased housing in
Table XV were used to approximate utility expenditures in leased low
income housing.
3

Maintenance in low-income leased housing is the responsibility
of the housing authority.
Maintenance expenditures are from Table
XV.
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Benefits.: .. The.

~

Val ue of PUblic HOllsi.n<;

~

Tepants

The calculation 0;1; substitution effects., CD: in Figure 2, or
the degree to whicQin-kirid subsidies alter the. recipients' preferred
consumption patterns, requires an estimate of what tenants' would be
likely to expend on housing, if their subsidy were in cash.

Table

XVIII contains mean gross monthly rental expenditures of households
by family size and income class.

While the source of these statistics,

the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure Survey of 1960-61,
Therefore, the

is quite dated, no adequate alternative was located.

rent and utility components of the Consumer Price Index were used to
9

convert gross rents into 1972 prices.

A new BLS survey has recently

been completed but the results will not be available until 1976. 10
Two checks were made on the accuracy of projecting housing consumption expenditures for low-income households from data nearly a
decade old.

These checks revealed that there appears to be astonish-

ingly little error in the methodology.

A survey of low-income house-

holds prepared for HAP in 1972 found that, of those eligible for public
housing, median monthly rent was $S6, median family size was 1.S and
.

1 .

med~an annua~ncome

was below $ 300 0 • 11

Table XXI indicates that a

9U. S • Departmento;f Labor, &lreau of Labor Statis.tics, Handbook
of Labor statistics 1973, tWashington, D.C.: u.s. Goverrunent ;('rinting
Office, 1974), p. 29~

lOBruce Hanchett, Assistant Regional Director, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, to JuditQA. Bamack, Letter, October 3, 1974 •
. ...

..

. llLund.,MoCUtoheon~·Jacobson, qInc.iAna1xsisof pUblicl.Y·Assisted Low Income FarRily HOUSing Requirements portland, Oregon, ·197.1-1975,
Report prepared for the aousing Authority of Portland, January, 1972,
pp. T4-TS.

TABLE XVIII
ESTIMATED GROSS MONTHLY RENT BY FAMILY SIZE AND INCOME SLASS, URBAN UNITED STATES, 1972

Family Size

10001999

1

Estimated Gross Monthly Rent by Money Income After Taxes
200030004000500060007500.;6999
2999
3999
4999
5999
9999

1

63

67

87

82

100

119

117

2

64

85

92

101

108

110

133

3

57

77

88

99

109

122

140

4

*

75

78

97

101

113

133

5

*

78

89

94

110

120

123

6+

*

55

83

93

107

113

138

lU.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditures and Income:
Cross-Classification of Family eharacteristics, ~ united States, 1960-61, Supplement 2, Part A
to BLS Report 237-38, (Washington, D.C.: u.S. Government printing Office, 1965), Tables 11a-llg.
1972 gross rents (includes utilities) were estimated by applying the rent and utility components of
the Consumer Price Index to the rent and utility statistics from the 1960-61 survey.
TIle Consumer
Price Index and its components is from u.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook
of Labor Statistics, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 299-304.
*Smal1 sample size in these categories made results unreliable.
I-'
W

o

131
household of two with income between $2000-2999 was expected to have
a 1972 rent of $85 -- nearly identical to that reported in the HAP
survey.

A second verification of the methodology was made by com-

paring Table XVIII with county data from the 1970 census.

In 1970

the mean gross rent of households below the poverty line in Multnomah county was $83 ($90 in 1972 dollars).

12

This is also quite close

to the projected rents for low-income households in Table XVIII.
While these attemps at independent verification of the methodology suggest that large errors are improbable, it would be desirable to revise
Table XVIII, as necessary, when the new BLS survey becomes available.
Table XVIII will be used to estimate the cash value of in-kind housing
transfers to the tenant, AC in terms of Figure 2.
Participation Rates
In Chapter IV it was suggested that a major issue in assessing
the social benefits of in-kind subsidies is the extent to which the
transfers reach the target population.

Table XIX contains HAP's 1972

eligibility limts for leased and public housing.

Table XX contains

the distribution of households (includes families and single individuals) in the county by household size and cash income at the time of
the 1970 census.

Table XXI, showing the number of county households

eligible for HAP programs, was derived by applying HAP's eligibility
12U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, General Social and Economic Characteristics, Final Report, PC (1)-39 Oregon, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 262.

TABLE XIX

1

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF PORTLAND, ELIGIBILITY LIMITS, 1972

Elderly· (E) or
None1der1y (NE)

Family
Size
1

Maxj.murn Annual Income for
Admission public Housing
Net for·Rent
Gross

Annual Income for
Admission Leased Housing
Gross
Net for Rent

Maximum

E

3778

3400

4722

4250

1

NE

3579

3400

4474

4250

2

E

4556

3800

5611

4750

2

NE

4316

3800

5316

4750

3

NE

5368

4500

6553

5625

4

NE

6211

5000

7§26

6250

5

~

7053

5500

8500

6875

6

NE

7789

5900

9342

7375

7

NE

8526

6300

10184

7875

1-

1

Source:

Housing Authority of Portland, Records.
I-'
W
N

'l'ABLE XX

ANNUAL MONEY INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, 1970
Household
Size

2000

20002999

Number of Households by Income
3000500070001000014999
4999
6999·
·9999

1500024999'

25000+

I

1

Total

1

17323

7293

9333

6977

5905

2884

748

374

50837

2

4656

4378

9325

8840

12891

14801

7067

2188

64146

3

1506

1022

2522

3618

7093

8914

5077

1231

30983

4

859

642

2309

2064

5512

8974

4940

1388

24369

5

383

305

718

969

3557

5415

3130

871

15348

6+

350

254

716

928

2778

4884

3066

978

13954

TOTAL

199637

ISource: Portland State University, Center of Population Research and Census, Census
Tract Records, 1970.
Income refers to 1969 income as reported in the 1970 Census of Population.
Income is the algebraic sum of wage and salary income, nonfarm net self-employment
income, farm net self-employment income, Social Security or railroad retirement income, public
assistance or welfare income, and all other income.
Income does not include the value of
income "in-kind."
I-'
W
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TABLE XXI
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS ELIGIBLE FOR LOW-INCOME ~UBLIC OR L~ED HOUSING, BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE
AND INCOME, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, 1972
Household
Size

2000

Number of Households by Income
2000-2999
3000-4999
5000-6999
7000-9999

I Total

1

17323

7293

7466

0

0

32082

2

4656

4378

9325

2033

0

20392

3

1506

1022

2522

2822

0

7872

4

859

642

1309

2054

992

5856

5

383

305

718

969

1779

4154

6+

350

254

716

928

2167

4415
TOTAL

74771

lEstimated by applying the gross income eligibility limits for leased housing in Table XIX
to the county income distribution in Table XX.
It was assumed that the households in a given
income class are evenly distributed across that class.
For household sizes 1 and 2, eligibility
limits half way between those for elderly and nonelderly households were employed.
I-'
W
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limits (Table XIX) to the distribution of households in Table

xx.

Assuming that the distribution of households by income and size
did not change radically between 1970 and 1972, Table XXI indicates that approximately 74,771 households in Multnomah County
were eligible for HAP assistance.

Since HAP had only 3511 units

in 1972, only about 5% of the target population was accomodated.
Table XXI reveals that 37% of the households in the county
were eligible for HAP programs.

Since other HUD programs, such

as 235 and 236, have more generous eligiblity limits, an extremely
large proportion of the county population is eligible for some form
of housing subsidy.· _ Table XXII compares HAP I

~

eligibility limits

with the 1972 poverty thresholds established by the Census Bureau.
HAP eligibility limits are far above the official poverty lines.
For example, HAP's eligibility limits for leased units are 46% to
136% above the Census thresholds -- depending upon household size.
In addition, HAP's limits are more generous for elderly households,
while Census poverty lines are higher for the nonelderly.

The Cen-

sus Bureau's differentiation between elderly and non-elderly in
setting poverty lines is based on the definition of poverty as
three times the cost of a minimal diet;

elderly households are

assumed to require less food than younger households.

HAP's standards

reflect the view that the housing needs of the elderly than are those
of younger households of comparable size.

136
TABLE XXII

LLOW-INCOME 'l'IiRESHOLDS FOR NONFAID-j HOUSEHOLDS B~ ~OUSEHOLD SIZE f U.S. f
1972 AND HOUSING AUTHORI~ OJ? J;lORTLAND LOW-INCOME HOUSING ELIGIBLLH'Y
LIMITS

Household···· .Elderly. ·eEl· ·or . . Low-Incom~
None1derly (NE) .. Threshold·
Size

Max. Income
Max. Income
Public·Housing 2 ·Leased Hsg. 2

1..

NE

2168

3579

4474

1

E

2005

3778

4722

2

NE

2808

4316

5316

2

E

2530

4556

5611

3

NE

3339

5368

6533

4

NE

4275

6211

7526

5

NE

5044

7053

8500

6

NE

5673

7789

9342

7 or more

NE

6983

8526*

10184*

*7 person household
lU.S. Bureau of the Census, Current population Reports, Series
p-60, No. 91, "Characteristics of the Low-Income Population; 1972,"
U.S. Government printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1973, Table A-2,
p. 143.
.
.
2Maximum gross. annual income for admiss,ion, Table .xU.
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Dis.tribution

££. ;i;>rivate

Benetits.:

Characteris~ics.
«

e(

of

~

- -

Tenants

While households far above the povert¥' line are eligible for
subsidies, Table

xxrrr

indicates that actual benet its are concentrated

on extremely indigent households.

The mean annual income of tenants

in all of HAP's units was below $3000 per year and virtually all
of HAP's tenants receive same form of governmental cash transfer payments.

Less than 3% of HAP's tenants are employed.

Table XXIV

reveals that the average HAP household is small, consisting of 2.22
individuals.
dren.

Only 42% of the households served by HAP contain chil-

Benefits are heavily skewed toward the elderly and toward

households with female heads.

Table XXV

shows that the median age

of all HAP household heads is 65; 76.2% of households are headed by
women.

HAP's emphasis on the elderly is clear;

the 1970 Census
13
found that of persons below the poverty line, 24% were elderly.
contrast, over 50% of HAP~s units are allocated to the elderly.

In
HAP

also has a heavy representation of non-whites relative to their presence in the county population.

Table XXV indicates that 27.7% of

HAP's units were occupied by non-white households.

The 1970 Census

counted blacks as only 4% of the population of the county and about 10%
14
of the county's poverty po~ulation.
Table XXVI contains characteristics of low-rent public housing
13

1975 the

14

~ Factboo~, ~~,

u.s. Bureau of

the Census,

~

p. 911.

cit., pp. 262-63; 266.

TABLE XXIII

CHARACTERISTICS OF TENANTS:

INCOME AND SOURCE OF INCOME, HOUSING AUTHORITY OF PORTLAND, 1973

Conventional
public Housing
Number of Households

1390

Mean Ar!nual Income

$2376.64 *

Turnkey
public Housing
527
$2212.00

Low-Income
Leased Housing
1594
$2962.68

1

Total
HAP

3511
unavailable

Workers per Household
(percent)
None
1
2 or more

96.9
3.1
0.0

99.6
0.4
0.0

96.9
3.1
0.0

97.3
2.7
0.0

8.3
39.3
0.8
6.2
51.6

11.8
0.0
2.7
3.2
90.0

8.0
43.3
0.9
6.0
43.0

8.7
35.2
1.1
5.7
53.6

Cash Transfer Payments
(percent)

OM
AFDC
AB
APTD
Other

*Does not include the following projects for the elderly:
and Peaceful Villa.

Northwest Tower, Hollywood East,
~

ISource:

Housing Authority of Portland, Survey of Tenants.

w

00

TABLE XXIV
1

cHARACTERISTICS OF TENANTS:

HOUSEHOLD SIZE, HOUSING AUTHORITY OF PORTLAND, 1973

Conventional
Public Housing
Number of Households
Percent
Household

Siz~

1390

Turnkey
public Housing
527

Low-Income
Leased Housing
1594

Total Housing
Authority
3511

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

·A9.2

94.0
6.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

44.8
15.6
13.4
9.6
7.0
4.1
3.0
1.5
0.4
0.3
0.4

53.7
15.0
11.7
7.7
5.3
2.8
1.9
1.1
0.4
0.2
0.2

(Percent)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 or more

17.7
14.1
8.3
5.4
2.3
1.4
1.0
0.4
0.1
0.0

Mean Household Size
Families with Children
(percent)

2.24
46.0

1.06
0.2

2.60
52.9

2.22
42.3

I-'

w

1

1.0

Source:

Housing Authority of Portland survey of tenants.

TABLE XXV

CHARACTERISTICS OF TENANTS:

AGE, SEX, AND RACE OF HEAD, HOUSING AUTHORITY OF PORTLAND, 1973

Conventional
Turnkey
Public HousinSL __Publ~c_Jiousi!lg
Number of Households

1390

527

Low-Income
Leased Housing
1594

1

Total
HAP

3511

Age of Head (Percent
of Households)
Under 18
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
64+

0.1
12.0
16.7
10.8
8.1
5.9
46.5

0.0
0.0
0.2
0.9
1.3
7.2
90.5

0.1
6.2
22.5
15.7
10.3
7.6
37.6

0.1
7.3
16.:11.1
7.9
7.0
50.5

Estimated Median Age

58

74 (mean)

50

65

Female Head (percent
of Households)

78.3

78.9

73.4

76.2

Race:

27.8

10.4

33.3

27.7

2

Percent Nonwhite
1

Source:

Housing Authority of portland, Survey of Tenants.

2Estimated by assuming that ~ases are evenly distributed within each age class.

I-'
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TABLE XXVI

LOW...BENT PUBLIC HOUSING, CHARACTERI.STI:.CS OJ? HOUSEHOLDS REEXlUUNED FOR
CONTI:NUED OCCUPAN~. DUR:I:NG TWELVE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMaER 3~,
.
1

1972, U.S.

Elderly Households
Number of Households
Percent
Mean Household Size

All·Households

135,810

367,641

100

100

1.65

3.34

Median Age of Head

71

48

Percent Nonwhite

35.9

60.9

Median Annual Income
Percent of Households
Receiving Cash Transfer
Payments

$1988.00

$2879.00

97

75

1

u.s. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1972 HUD
Statistical Yearbook, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1974), Tables 108-111, pp. 121-123.

I
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bas~s.

occupants. on a national

As in 1?oxtland ( .;l?ublic housing bene-

fits nation-wide are concentrated on very low income households.

The

median annual income :eor housing authority tenants in the nation was
$2879.

Compared to Portland, a smaller, but still substantial, 75%

of tenants receive

ca~

transfer payrnetns.

However, HAP clearly

serves older and smaller households· than the average public housing
program.

Nationally, the median age of household heads was 48, com-

pared to 65 for HAP.

The median household size, nationally, was

3.34 while HAP's was 2.22.

While nationally the percent non-white

in public housing is more than double HAP's rate;

most public housing

is located in urban areas with substantially larger non-white populations than Mul tnomah County.

In sum, benefits from low-income housing

Subsidies, both in Portland and in the nation, appear to reach:the
genuinely needy.

However, HAP has a strong bias in favor of the needy

elderly -- perhaps reflecting the greater political palatability of
projects serving a less controversial population than younger indigent
households with school-age children.
Evaluating Housing Subsidies
Figures 3 and 4 contain applications of the model presented in
Chapter IV to the empirical data contained in

thi~

chapter.

Figure

3 demonstrates the effects of heus.inS subsidies on an elderly couple
in a one-bedroom Turnkey or leased unit.

The couple is assumed to

have an annual cash income of $2;>00, close to the :mean income for HAP
residents (Table XXIII} •

ExcerjJts from HAP's rent schedule appear
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A

AB

=

AD

=

$41.00 = Tenant Rent (includes
utilities in leased)

20

= Market

$107.63

Unit

=

AD'

40r-________________

~

60

= Market

$120.00

key Unit

B

BC

=

BD

=

Value, Leased
Value t Turn-

$51.00 = Cash Value of In-Kind
Income to Recipient
$66.63

=

In-Kind Income, Leased

Unit
BD'

=

$79.00

key Unit

80

AC

=

$92.00

Tenant

=

=

In-Kind Income, Turn-

Cash Value of Unit to

C

CD

100

-----------

$15.63 = Substitution Effects,
Leased unit

D

CD' = $28.00 = Substitution Effects,
Turnkey Unit

~20~----------------__~ D'

f--------- __ _

=

DE

=

$19.80 = Administrative and
Other Costs, Leased Unit

E

=

$83.20 = Administrative and
Other Costs, Turnkey Unit

D".:e:'
140

BE
160

BE'
AE

=

$86.43 = Total Public Costs,
Leased Unit

= $162.20· =

Total Public Costs,
Turnkey unit

= $127.43 = Total

Monthly Costs,

Leased Unit

180

AE' = $203.20 = Total Monthly Costs,
Turnkey.Unit
200

E'

Figure 3. Impact of housing subsidies on two-person, elderly
household in turnkey or leased unit, annual cash income of $2,500.
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A

AB

=

AD

= $128.85 = Market

20

AD'

40

BC
60

$70.00 = Tenant Rent (includes
utilities in leased)

Unit,

Value, Leased

= $133.00 = Market Value, Conventional Unit
= $31.00 = Cash

Value of In-Kind
Income to Recipient

BD = $58.85 = In-Kind Income, Leased
Unit
B

BD'
80

AC

= $63.00 = In-Kind Income, Conventional Unit

= $101.00 = Cash Value

of Unit

to Tenant
CD

100

120
D

Effects,

c\ .• ' :

CD'

---------

= $27.85 = Substitution
Leased Unit:. . -

C

DE

= $32.00 = Substitution Effects,
Conventional unit
= $19.80 = Administrative

and

Other Costs, Leased Unit

D'
~'E' =

$78.92 = Administrative and
Other Costs, Conventional Unit

140

---------

E

BE

= $78.65 = Total

Public Costs,

Leased Unit
160

BE'
AE

180

= $141.72 = Total Public Costs,
Conventional Unit
= $148.65 =

Total Monthly Costs,

Leased Unit
AS'

200

= $.211.72 = Total Monthly Costs,
Conventional Unit

E'

Figure 4. Impact of housing subsidies on four-person hOllsehold
in conventional or leased unit, annual cash income of $4,500.
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in Table XXVII.;

at $2500 per year I tlu:! couple. would pay'

~

$41 per

month. for a Turnkey unit and approximatel¥, the. same to HAP and private
utilityyendors' for a leased unit.

Therefore, in terms of tfie model

in Figure 2, AB or tenant rent in Figure 13 is $41.
AD or the market value of a leased unit is $107.63 (Table XVII)

while AD', the market value of a Turnkey unit is $120.00 (Table XVI).
The market value minus the tenant's rent is the amount of in-kind income provided to the tenant, BD or BD'.

Bec;,is $66.63 ($799.56 annual-

ly) for leased housing and BD' is $70.00 ($948.00 annually) for Turnkey
housing.

As indicated in Chapter IV, this market value of the in-kind

transfer may not be identical with its cash value to the tenant.

To

estimate the cash value of the unitt> to the tenant, it is necessary to
determine what the tenant would be likely to spend on housing, if his
income were entirely in cash.

Table XVIII, which contains typical

housing expenditures by income class and household size, was employed
to establish the tenant's

poin~

of indifference between a cash and an

in-kind housing subsidy, or the cash value of the HAP unit to the tenant.

To locate the relevant income class in Table XVIII the couple's

in-kind income, BD or BD', must be added to their cash income, so that
a comparison may be made with the consumption pattern of a two person
household of similar total income whose income

i~

entirely in cash.

In Figure 3, when in-kind income is added to cash- income, the household moves up to the $3000-3999 income
~us

clas~

in terms of Table XVIII.

AC, or the amount.the couple would be expected to spend on housing

if their income were entirely in cash, is equal to $92.00.
cash value of the in-kind income to the recipient, is $51.00.

BC or the
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TABLE .xxv!I

HOUSING AUTHORITY ~F J;lORTLAND, MONTHLY' RENT SCHEDULES, 1972

Gross InCome

Elderly- 2 - Person -HousehOiL:dNet Income for Rent

-Monthly Rent

1500

1050

22

2500

1950

41

3500

2850

59

4500-

3750

78

5500

4650

97

Gross -Income

4 person Household
Net Income for Rent

Monthly Rent

1500

525

11

2500

1475

31

3500

2425

51

4500

3375

70

5500

4325

90

6750

5512

116

1

Source:

Housing Authority ot; Portland, Records.
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CD and CD'. the market value of the unit minus the cash value
of the unit to the tenant, are the substitution effects or the distortion in consumption patterns induced by the in-kind housing subsidies.

For leased housing, the couple expands its housing consumption

by $15.63 or 17% while in Turnkey housing, consumption is increased
by $28.00 or 30%.

From the point of view of the tenant, subsidized

housing is a bargain in that the subsidized rent of $41.00 per month
is 55% less than the $92.00 the couple would expect to pay for an
unsubsidized unit of worse quality.
AE, $127.43, the total monthly cost of the leased unit, was derived from Tables XII and XVII.

Total monthly cost of a leased unit

is defined as the sum of landlord rent, operating expenditures and
utility payments to private vendors.

AE', $203.20, or the total cost

of a Turnkey unit is from Table XV, (total annual cost divided by 12).
DE and DIE', the administrative and other costs, are the difference

between the total cost of the units (AE and AE') and the market value
of the units (AD and ADI).

BE, the total public costs of the leased

unit, was $86.43; while BE' the total public cost of the Turnkey unit
totaled $162.20.

For leased housing, administrative costs were $19.80

or 23% of total public costs, while administrative costs in Turnkey
units were $83.20 or 51% of total

publi~

costs.

Figure 4 traces the impact of in-kind housing subsidies on a four
person household with annual cash income of $4500 in a two-bedroom conventional public housing or leased unit.
precisely the same way as in Figure 3.
rent equals $70.00 (Table XXVII).

All terms are defined in
In Figure 4, AB or tenant

AD, the market value of the leased
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unit is $128.85 (Table XVII).

AD', the market value of the conven-

tional unit, is $133.00 (Table XVI).

BD, the in-kind income pro-

vided by the leased unit is $58.85 ($706 annually) while BD', the
in-kind income associated with the conventional unit is $63.00 ($756
annually).

In terms of Table XVIII, the household's total cash and

in-kind income makes it comparable to a household in the $5000-5999
income class.

AC or the expected housing expenditure for a household

in this income class whose income is entirely in cash is $101.00.

BC,

the cash value of the in-kind income to the recipient, is $31.00.

Thus

the leased unit induces substitution effects, CD, equal to $27.85 or
a 28% increase in the household's housing consumption.

Conventional

public housing increases housing consumption by $32.00, (CD'), or 32%.
Total costs, AE, for the leased unit are $148.65 (Tables XII and XVII)
or which $19.80 is allocated to administration, DE.

For the conven-

tional unit, total costs, AE', are $211.72 (Table XV) while administrative costs, D'E', are $78.72.

Total public costs, BE, were $78.65 for

the leased unit and $141.72 (BE') for the conventional unit.

Admini-

strative expenditures were 50% of total public dosts for the conventional unit and 25% of total public costs for the leased unit.

The

household in Figure 4 paid 31% less for its subsidized unit than it
would expect to pay for unsubsidized housing of inferior quality.
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that housing subsidies do succeed in
inc~easing

the housing consumption of tlleir recipients.

HAP tenants

consumed 17 to 32 percent more housing than they would have, if given
an

equi~alent

cash subsidy.

From the tenant's point of view, the ad-

vantages offered of living in a higher quality, lower priced unit
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than he would be likely. to select if he were unsubai.di:z;ed, apJ?arent1y

outweigh the diautility experienced in
patterns.

a1teriA~

preferred consumption

The length¥' waitinCJ lists for admission· into

~i1lbsi.di:z;ed

housing programs testify to their popu1ari.ty all}ong potential recipi-

nl recent years, 300.0 to 4000 households have typically

ents.

appeared on HAP's waitin<;r list.J.,5
The changes in consumption patterns induced by housing subsidies, when considered in the goods-specific utility interdependence
framework, are assumed to produce external social benefits.

How-

ever, in the case of units owned by the housing authority, these externa1 benefits are associated with extremely high administrative costs.
Leased housing in Portland was found to be considerably more efficient.
While the impact of leased housing on housing consumption patterns is
somewhat smaller than that of public housing, administrative costs
are much lower than those associated with pub1ica11y owned units.

These

results are in agreement with the work of other investigators who have
noted the very large administrative costs involved in the direct pub1ic provision of housing units (Chapter III).
Equation 1 of Chapter IV stated that one measure of the minimum
social or external benefits

re~uired

for an in-kind investment to pay-

off is

11

min

SB

;:::; AE "" AC

or social benefits must equal or exceed total

co~ts

minus private

15

Lund, Mc

Cutchei:m~

Jacobson Inc.,

~

cit., p. 12.

150
bene~its

In

(the

cash value
min

Figure 3 SB

o~

the in-kind

=-$35.43per unit

$111.20 per unit per month

~or

t~ansfer

to therecipient1.

p~ month. :l;or leased housing and

Turnkey.

In

F,igure 4 f SBmi.n is $47.65

for leased and $110.72 for conventional public housi.ng.

Thus in Turn-

key and conventional units, the minimum social benefits required exceed the private benefits of the transfer, CAC).

In Turnkey, the

minimum social benefits needed are 55% of the total benefits, while in
conventional units they are 52% of the total.

In leased housing, the

minimum social benefits demanded are still considerable (28% of the
total in Figure I and 32% of the total in Figure 4) but less than those
associated with units owned by the housing authority.
A second measure of social benefits, which attempts to assess

probable actual benefits rather than the

minim~~

benefits required for

pr9gram pay-off appears in Equation 2 of Chapter IV:
2)

SB

= CD x PR

or social benefits are held to be a function of substitution effects
times the participation ratio.

As an estimate of the magnitude of

substitution effects for all HAP households, the average of CD and CD'
in Figures 3 and 4, or $26.00, was employed.
tution effects are
o~

HAl? units}.

e~ual

SB;::;

to $93,236 per month l$26 times 3586, the number

Since HAl? pr,ograms were found to reach only 5% of the

eligible, PR ;::; .05.
31

Thus,

$93r2~6

X .05 ;::; $4661.80

or $2.60 per unit per month.
indicates that

Therefore total substi-

th~y

This rough. calculation of social benefits

are far less than the minimum social benefits neces-

sary to justify the subsidies on a benefit-cost basis as calculated above
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according to Equation 1.

However, this very low estimate of social

benefits is the result of defining such benefits very narrowly.

The

model does not include social benefits which may be derived from income transfers in general, and does not include benefits from public
housing which are unrelated to the transfer of income.

other concep-

tualizations would yield other results.
summary
The data presented in this chapter indicate' that housing subsidies do not equitable and efficiently redistribute income.

By

directing large subsidies at a small number of eligible households,
housing programs are successful in inducing changes in the consumption
patterns of program participants.

However, since 95% of the target

population remains untouched, the negative externatlities presumed to
be associated with the housing consumption patterns of the target
group, as a whole, are not significantly diminished.

In addition,

the substitution effects induced, are associated with high administrative costs.
g~ounds,

While housing subsidies may be desirable on other

they are deficient as an income redistribution strategy.

CI-f.lU>TER VI.

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATI.ON OF IN-KIND TR.ANS.FEF.S;

THE CASE O.F .FOOD

STAMl?S

In

this chapter, the model for evaluating in-kind transfer pro-

grams presented in

Chapte~

IV will be applied to the Food Stamp Program

in Multnomah County, Oregon for FY 1973.

In 1973, the county averaged

40,573 food stamp recipients per month or approximately 15,500 households.

Of these, 27,184 or two-thirds were Public Assistant recipients

and the remaining 13,389 or one-third were not associated with the
Public Assistance Program. 1

County food stamp personnel certify

eligi~.

bility and distribute stamps to Non-Public Assistance (NPA) households
through five branch offices at four geographic locations.

Cer-tifica-

tion and stamp distribution for Public Assistance (PA) households is
the responsibility of the Public Assistance Program.
Program Costs
Di~ect

program costs are shared by program participants and the

federal, state and county governments.
in Table XXVIII..

A summary of these costs appears

Purchase l?apLents b¥ county

l?a:.::tj~:;il?a.nts

totaled

$5,236,199 in FY 1973 -- an ayer,age of $129.Q6 pe:.:: reciJ?ient

0:'::

$336,84

lU.S. Department of Ag:.::ic'altu:.::e, Food and Nutrition service,
"Food sta:rnp P:.::og:.::am: . Statistical Summa:.::y 0; 0l?e:.::ations, \I (July, 1972 June, 1974), mimeo.
State of Oregon, Public Wel£;are Division, ltJ.=!ublic Welfare in
Oregon," (July, 1972 -.June, 1973), Table 0, mimeo.
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TABLE X1.'VIII
DIRECT FOOD STAMP PROGRAM COSTS, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON,FY 1973

Total

Annual per
Recipient

Annual per
Household

Private Costs
Participant Payments

1

$5,236,199

$129.06

$336.84

7,740,063

190.77

497.91

1,204,207
94,872
427,725
84,169

29.68
2.34
10.54
2.07

77 .46
6.11
27.52
5.41

1,811,000

44.63

116.50

8,944,270

235.40

6;1.4.41

14,180,469

364.46

951.25

Public Costs
Bonus Payments (USDA)

1

Administrative Costs
Federal
USDA2
HEW 3
State 4
County 5
TOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE
TOTAL PUBLIC COSTS
TOTAL PUBLIC

&

PRIVATE

lU.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
"Food Stamp Program: Statistical SUIlUnary of Operations, June, 1973,"
mimeo. ,p. 23.
2Estimated by multiplying USDA non-bonus progra~ costs per recipient by the number of county recipients. USDA costs are from The
Budget of the U.S. Government, Appendix, FY 1975, (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 204-5.
3Estimated, see text.
4U•S• Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs,
Food Program Technical Amendments, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 196-1. Partially estimated, see text.
5Multnomajl County Budget, Fiscal ~ 1974-1975, (portland:
Multnomah County, 1974), p. 264.
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per household.

Participant payments depend upon household size and in-

corne net of permissable deductions.

Tables XXIX and XXX contain pay-

ment schedules, eligibility limits, and the market value of the coupons
for 1973 and 1974.

The formula f.or calculating monthly net income

for food stamps is extremely complex.

Monthly net income is defined

as monthly cash gross income minus the following deductions:
1)

taxes

2)

work expenditures such as union dues and child care

3)

10% of

earne~

income up to a maximum of $30 per month

tional expenditures
month and 6)

4)educa-

5) medical expenditures in excess of $10 per

shelter expenditures (rent or mortgage plus utilities

including basic telephone service) in excess of 30% of income net
of all other deductions.

In addition to this basic formula, special

deductions are permitted for unusual emergencies such as funerals or
natural disasters.

Assets, (bank deposits, stocks, bonds, cash on

hand, etc.), may not exceed $1500 for a nonelderly household or
$3000 for an elderly household of two or more.
elude a horne, household furnishings, or one car.

Assets do not in2

The bonus value of food stamps distributed in the county in
FY 1973 was $7,740,063 or $190.77 per recipient (Table XXVIII).

The

bonus value is the difference between the face or market value of food
stamp coupons and the payments made by recipients.

In other worBs,

the bonus value of the food stamps is the market value of the in-kind
income provided by the program to participating housellolds.
2

!£od

u.s.

~tam~

County

Department of Agri~ulture, Food and Nutrition Service,
Program, (current as of July 1,1972), pamphlet, pp. 9-10.
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TABLE XXIX
MON'Y"rlLY FOOD STAl-U' COUl?O~ ALLOTMENTS t PU;R.CHASE' R.E.QUJ:.MMENTS t AND ELJ:-, ,
GIBILtT't LIMITS, 48 STATES' AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBT'A, EFFECTIVE JULY 1,
,
1972 1

Household Size
1

Allotment,
Net Income

o-

19.99
20 - 29.99
30 - 39.99
40 - 49.99
50 - 59.99
60 - 69.99
70 - 79.99
80 - 89.99
90 - 99.99
100 - 109.'99
110-- 119.99
120 - 129.99
130 - 139.99
140 - 149.99
150 - 169.99
170 - 189.99
190 - 209.99
:no - 229.99
230 - 249.99
250 - 269.99
270 - 289.99
290 - 309.99
310 - 329.99
330 - 359 .. 99
360 - 389.99
390 - 419.99
420 - 449.99
450 - 479.99
480 - 509.99
510 - 539.99)
540 - 569.99
570 - 599.99
600,.. 629 .. 99
630 - 659.99

$36

.'2
$64

3
$92

11
$112

5
$132

:6
$152

7
$172

8
$192

Purchase Requirement
0
$1
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
26
26

Max. Net Inc. 178

0
$1
4
7
10
12
15
18
21
23
26
29
31
34
36
42
44
44
44

233

0
0
$4
7
10
13
16
19
21
24
27
30
33
36
40
46
52
58
64
70
74
74

307

0
0
$4
7
10
13
16
19
22
25
28
31
34
37
41
fA7
53
59
65
71
77
82
86
86
88

373

0
0
$5
8
11
14
17
20
23
26
29
33
36
39
42
48
54
60
66
72
78
84
90
94
98
102
104

0
0
$5
8
11
14
17
21
24
27
31
34
37
40
43
49
55
61
67
73
79
85
91
97
104

440

507

lOS
112
116
12Q

0
0
$5
8
12

15
18
21
25
28
32
35
38
41
44
50
56
62
68
74
80
86
92
98
107
116
122
126
130
134
136
136

573

0
0
$5
8
12
16
19
22
26
29
33
36
39
42
45
51
57
63
69
75
81
87
93
99
108
117
126
130
134
138
142
146
"'150
;b5a
640
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':CN3LE XXIX

(continuedl

lsource: U.S. De)?artment of Agriculture,;pood and Nutrition
Service, "Food Stamp Program, CUrrent as of July 1, 1972," mimeo.,
pp. 26-27.

157
TABLE XXX

MONTHLY FOOD STAMP COUI?ON ALLOTMENTS, J;>URCH1\SE REQUlREMENTS, AND ELl-·
GIBILITY LIMITS, 48 STATEs AND DISTFCT OF COLUMBIA f EFFECTIVE JULY L,
1974

Household Size
Allotment

1
$46

2
·$82·

0
$1
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
36

o

Net Income

o-

19.99
20 - 29.99
30 - 39.99
40 - 49.99
50 - 59.99
60 - 69.99
70 - 79.99
80 - 89.99
90 - 99.99
100 - 109.99
110 - 119.99
120 - 129.99
130 - 139.99
140 - 149.99
150 - 169.99
170 - 180.99
190 - 209.99
210 - 229.99
230 - 249.99
250 - 269.99
270 - 289.99
290 - 309.99
310 - 329.99
330 - 359.99
360 - 389.99
390 - 419.99
420 - 449.99
450 - 479.99
480 - 509.99
510-- 539.99
540 - 569.99
570 - 599.99
600 - 629.99
630 - 659.99
660 - 689.99
690 - 719.·99
720 - 749.99

3

4

$118

$150

7

8

$178 . ·$204$230

5

6

$$256

Purchase Requirement
$1
4
7

10
12
15
18
21
23
26
29
32
35
38
44
50
56
62
62
62

a
a

0

a

0

0

$4
$4
$5
778
10
10
11
13
13
14
16
16
17
19
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
33
33
34
36
36
37
39
40
41
42
46
47
48
52
53
54
58
59
60
64
65
66
70
71
72
76
77
78
82
83
84
88
89
90
94
95
96
100
104
105
100
113
114
122
123
126
132
126
141

ISO
150
150

o
o

o
o

o

$5

$5

$5

8

11
14
17
21
24
27
31
34
37
40
43
49
55
61
67
73
79
85
91
97
106
115
124
133
142
151
160
169

172
172
172

8

12
15
18
21
25
28
32
35
38
41
44
50
56
62
68
74
80
86
92
98
107
116
125
134
143
152
161
170
179
188
194
194
194

9
8

12
16
19
22
26
29
33

36
39
42
45
51
57
63
69
75
81
87
93
99
108
117
1~6

135
144
153
162
171
180
189
198
207
216
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TABLE

.xxx

. Ccontinuedl

1
Net Income
750 - 779.99
780 - 809.99
810 - 839.99
840 - 869.99
Max. Net Inc.

194

2

273

.. Household .Size..
·5.
6
4
3
.Purchase Re~irement

393

500

593

680

7

8

767

216
216
216
216
853

lsource; u.s. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee
on Fiscal Policy,Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No. 17, National
Survey of Food Stamp and Food Distribution Program Recipients, A
Summary of Findings of Income Sources and Amounts and Incidence of
Multiple Benefits=, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1974), pp. 18, 21.
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bonuses l?er recipient were slightly higher than the average annual
bonus of $174.33 that prevailed nationally (Table XXXI).
bonus payments are funded completely by the

u.s.

Food stamp

Department of Agri-

cuI ture (USDA).
The administrative costs of the program are shared by three
levels of government (see Chapter III).

In FY 1973, the USDA's

food stamp budget explicitly allocated only $23.8 million or $1.95
per recipient to administration. 3

However, Table XXXI reveals that

program costs beyond the value of the bonuses were substantially
higher.

Of the $204 per recipient spent by the USDA, $29.68 or 15%

failed to reach the participants in the form of stamps.

Administra-

tive costs for Public Assistance households are not "broken out" of
the HEW Public Assistance budget.

The costs allocated to HEW in

Table XXVIII were estimated by employing known county and state
expenditures and the prevailing cost-sharing formula.

It is esti-

mated that HEW spent approximately $94,872 in the county for food
stamp.administration in FY 1973.
The county budget shows that Multnomah County spent $84,169 on
distributing food stamps in 1973 (Table XXVIII).
the state of Oregon reported total

expen~itures

In the same period,
of $876,000 on the pro-

gram, excluding costs shared with HEW for PA households.

4

Since Mult-

nomah County contained 38% of the state's recipients, $330,880 of state
3The Budget of the ~ Government, Appendix, FY 1975, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 205.
4

U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs,
Food Program Technical Amendmen~s, (Wasbington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 196.
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'iABLE XXXI

u.s.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRI:.CULTURE, FOOD STAMP PROGR.AM COSTS, U.S:;r ,FY:1913

Total

Annual.per
Recipient

$2,132,600,000

$174.33

Non-Bonus Expenditures

363,600,000

29.68

TOTAL USDA COSTS

$2,495,654,000

$204.01

Value of Bonus Stamps Issuedl

Average Monthly Number of
Recipients = 12,233,382 2

D.C.:

lBudget of the !!.:..§.:.. Government, FY 1975, Appendix, (Washington,
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 204-205.

2U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
"Food Stamp Program, Statistical Summary of Operations," (July, 1972 June, 1973), mimeo.

161
expenditUres were a1lecated te ceunty administratien. 5
share, $280,563 is asSumed te cever

st~~

Of this ceunty

distributien in cenfermance

with the 30/70 ceunty/state cest-sharing fermula.

The remaining

$52,317 is assumed te be the state share .of certifying NPA heusehe1ds,
which accerding te the USDA fermu1a is 37.5% .of the certificatien
cests .of these heasehe1ds.

Dividing the tetal NPA certificatien bud-

get by the number .of NPA recipients resulted in a NPA certificatien
cest .of $10.42 per recipient.er $27.20 per heuseheld.

Willard Renkin,

Multnemah Caunny Feed Stamp Ceerdinater, suggested that certificatien
cests fer PA recipients were reughly twe-thirds .of these fer NPA recipients. 6 In a Cengressienal survey .of feed stamp administrative cests,
the state .of Nerth Daketa suggested the same ratie.

7

This ratie was

used te estimate state and HEW cests fer PA heusehelds in Table XXVIII.
Table XXVIII centains .only the direct cests .of the Feed Stamp
Pregram.

Hewever, the pre gram has indirect cests as well, many .of

which are difficult te quantify.

An

infermal telephene survey .of the

majer supermarket chains in the ceunty revealed that feed stamp purchases averaged abeut 2 minutes mere per transactien in check-eut time
than did regular purchases.

The extra time is primarily due te the

5

U.S. Department .of ~gricu1ture, ~eed and Nutritien Service,
"Feed stamp pr.ogram: Statistical SUIllIIIary .of Operations," .~ cit.
6Willard Renkin, Feed Stamp Ceerdina ter, Mu1 tnemah. Ceunty,
Or,egen, interview, November 27, 1974.
7u• S • Senate,'~ cit., p. 184.
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necessity of separating items whicQmay be
from those whichinay not

(p.on-~ood

~urchased

witQ

~ood

stamps

l?roducts f a1coho1 f qigarettes,

etc.) and tallying the two categories separately.

Supermarketmanar-

gers indicated that frequently shoppers do not warn the checkers, in
a~vance,

of a food stamp transaction.

When this occurs, the checkers

tally all of the items together as they would for a normal purchase.
When the shopper attempts to pay in food stamp script, the order must
be unpacked, sorted, and reta11ied to conform to program rules.

Addi-

tiona1 checker time is also involved in making change in script, rather
than cash, as the program requires.

The

~nagers

also reported addi-

tiona1 clerical work in connection with bundling and canceling the
food stamp coupons.

Despite the extra burden the program imposes on

the supermarkets, the managers, with one exception, welcomed the program as beneficial to their businesses. 8 A rough calculation of supermarket food stamp costs, based on the two minutes extra per transaction reported above and the prevailing checker wages in 1973, was made.
It is estimated that indirect

supe~rket

costs in the county were

about $6.40 per recipient per year ($16.69 per household) or over
$250,000 total.

These indirect costs are undoubtedly passed along to

the general public.
Food stamp coupons move from the markets to the cOIllIIlercial
b~s

to the Federal Reserve Banks where they are eventually de-

stroyed.

Telephone interviews with bank

o~ficials

indicated that

extra clerical personnel have been hired to handle food stamps.
8Interviews with the managers of Kienows, Albertsons, Fred
Meyer, and Safeway~ Nov~er1 1974.

The
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J?ortland area federal Reserve Bank which. serves· ox:egon, southern
Washington, Northern Idaho and Nevada, was processi,ng 3 inillion food
stamp coupons per month in the Fall of 1974.

This volume required

the services of three full-time clerks and a part-time supervisor.
Additional security personnel have also been needed because food
stamps are treated like cash, rather than checks. 9

A very rough and

conservative estimate of the county share of food stamp banking costs
in 1973 is $15,000, less than $1.00 per household per year.
other indirect program costs which have not been measured are
the travel costs and waiting time demanded of program participants.
Innaddition, no attempt has been made to calculate the psychic costs
which may be associated with being identified as a food stamp reci-pient.

For the purpose of evaluating the Food stamp Program in terms

of the model presented in Chapter IV, only the direct costs shown in
Table XXVIII will be considered.

This conservative approach will en-

hance the comparability of the food stamp results with analyses of
other transfer programs which rarely include indirect costs, despite
their Eelevance.
Market Value
The market value of food stamp coupons is simpl¥ their face
value which. is equal to the sum of participant payments and the bonus
provided by the USDA.

In 1973, the average annual value of food

9Kenneth Carr, Fiscal Department,. Federal Reserve Bank, Portland area, interview, November 8, 1974.
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stamp coupons per recipient in Multnomah County was $319.83 or
$843.75 per household.

Of this $129.06 per recipient ($336.84 per

hosuehold) or 40% was provided by the participant.

The remaining

$190.77 per recipient ($497.9l.per household) or 60% was furnished
by the USDA (Table XXVIII).

Nationally, in the same period, the

average coupon value per recipient was $317.98 of which 45%

repre~

sented recipient payments and 55% was funded by the USDA. lO
Private Benefits:

Cash Value of Food Stamps to Recipients

In an effort to estimate what households of various sizes and
income would be likely to spend on food, if their income were entirely
in cash, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure Survey
of 1960-61, described in the preceding chapter, was employed.
satisfactory data sources of more recent vintage were located.

No
The

1960-61 results were updated through the use of the food expenditure
component of the Consumer Price Index. ll

Table XXXII contains esti-

mated food expenditures by household size and income class for FY 1973.
Incomplete and partial results of the 1972-73 survey; released by BLS
in April of 1975,suggest that the values in Table XXXII may be up to
20% too high. 12

As with the housing expenditures in Table XVIII,

10The Budget of the ~ Government,

OPe

cit.

llu.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook
of Labor Statistics, 1973, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1 974>::P. 299.
12Julius Shiskin, "The 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure Survey, Some
First Year Diary Results," U.S. Department of Labor, (April 16, 1975),
mimeo.

TABLE XXXII

ESTIMATED MONTHLY FOOD EXPENDITURES BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND INCOME CLASS, URBAN U. S., FISCAL YEAR 1973

Household
Size

Estimated Monthly Food Expenditures by Annual Money Income After Taxes
6000..,. .
.4000,- ..
.. 5000"".
3000..,.
2000 ...
1000..
5999
7499
4999
2999
3999
1999

1

55

74

2

76

92

3

77

4

5
6 or more

88:.; .

1

75009999

100

101

129

134

112

125

137

154

178

100

129

145

160

178

215

76

123

142

158

176

199

227

79

127

156

174

183

216

256

105

149

161

184

214

231

274

1source: U.s. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor statistics, Consumer E~enditures and Income:
Cross Classification of FaMily Characteristics, Urban U.S., 1960-61, Supplement:; Part A 'to BLS Report
237-38, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), Tables 11a-g. Food expenditures for
FY 1973 were estimated by applyi~g the total food component of the Consumer Price Index to the food expenditures reported in the survey. The Consumer Price Index appears in U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau
of Labor statistics, Handbook ~ Labor statistics, 1973, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1974), pp. 299-304.
I-'
~

U1
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it would be desirable to revise Table
results from the new survey become
Dis~ribution

xxxrr

f

as

necessary~

when the

avail~ble.

of'private Benefits;

Recipient Characteristics

Information on the characteristics of food stamp recipients is
surprisingly scarce.

The

on~y

major national survey of participating

households was conducted in 1974 by Chilton Research Services for the
Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy.

This survey relied on personal inter-

views with recipients and was plagued with non-response.

Of a total

of 3,600 sample households, only 2,191 or 61% were ultimately interviewed.

In addition, the survey elicited information pertaining to

November of 1973 in February and March of 1974.

The high rate of non-

response, the time lag associated with the interviews and the dependence on recipient self-report for data relating to income and expenditures produces an undetermined but potentially significant bias in the
results.

13

Some of the principle findings of the Chilton survey were that
the mean cash, after tax, income of tood stamp households was $238 per
month while in-kind income aver.aged $126 per month.
in-kind income accounted
from private

so~ces

Public Assistance

~or

o~

amounted to only 2Q%

pro~rams
.

.

about 80%

Public cash and

total income
o~

the total.

whi~a

income

Benefits from

were received by 60% of the surveyed
house.

13U ... s .... congress,.JointEconomiccommittee, Subcommittee .. on Fiscal
Poli,cy,:Sttldies !!!.l.'ubli.c Wel:e'are, P!Wer ~ 17 ,'~ationalsurV'e¥of
Food '. stamp ahd .Food Distribution l.'rogram Recipients; A SUmmarY'.c.f
Findings of Income Sources and Amounts and Incidence of Mlll tipJ e Benefits, (Washington, D.C.:. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974).
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holds.

The aver,age recipient hous.ehold obtained benetits frQItl three

major federal

programs~

Household size averaged',3.2;1?ersons, while

one and two person households made 'ilp one-half o:e those surveyed.
Female headed households were 66% of the total, while Blacks constituted 37% of those interVie~ed.14

The average deduction from gross

income, under the pr,ogram formula for determining net income for Food
Stamps, was approximately $73-78 per month.

On the average, net

income for food stamps was 70 to 72 percent of gross pre-tax income
for interviewed households. lS
In an effort to investigate the characteristics of recipient
households in greater detail and to avoid the possible biases associated with the Chilton survey, a study of 498 Non-Public Assistance
food stamp households in Multnomah County, Oregon was conducted in
December of 1974.

A 6 percent random sample of active NPA files

was pulled and data were gathered from agency records.

The use of

records rather than interviews, has the advantage of at least minimal
verification of income, rent, and other expenditure data by food stamp
personnel.

In addition, the records indicate which deductions were

actlually permitted from gross income in the computation of pr,ogram
benefits.

In some cases, the deductions itemized by applicants dif-

fered from those.,allowed by the ,a<;Jency.

This dive,rgence raises some

,14 Ibid ., pp. 1-2.
, l5Gary W. Bickel and Maurice Mac Donald, "l'articipation Rates
in the Food stamp l'r,ogram: Estimated Levels for 1974, Py State" ~~ .. ,
in u .. s ... ' Senate" ,Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Report
~

Nutrition and Special Groups, Appendix B to Part I -- Food Stamps,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. ,Government Printing Office, 19751.
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nique for the evaluation· of }?rogram benefi.ts.

Another advantage of

working with agency records was the elimination of the proqiEem of
non-response;

all active files were accessible.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to survey Public Assistance
food stamp households, so the results are not representative of the
food stamp population as a whole.

However, in considering issues of

program expansion and in calculating the number of potential eligible,
the characteristics of the NPA caseload are most pertinent.

While

in the county, by late 1974, about 55% of recipient households were
,

assoc~ate

d

'h t h e Publ"~c

w~t

Ass~stance

,
1y, NPA
program1, 6
nat~onal

households now dominate the program (see Chapter III).

It is the NPA

share of the total that has been growing most rapidly and that will
continue to grow.

Currently, in the county, about 85% of Public

Assistance households are receiving stamps.

This is near the upper

limit of PA participation anticipated by program officials. 17

Since

virtually all PA households that wish to participate are doing so,
those eligible, but not participating, are primarily NPA hoaseholds.
Tables XXXIII through XL contain the results o£ the Multnomah
County

~A

survey.

holds are small;

Table XXXIII indicates that }?articil?ating housemean

s~ze

Male heads of househol6....:

was 2.53 }?ersons while median size was 2.
: 55% of the N};>A sample.

Benefits were

l6Doug1as Yeater, Supervisor, Issuing Section, rood Stamp Program, Multnomah County, or.egon, interview, februaryu7, 1975.
l7 Ibid •
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TABLE XXXIII
CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: HOUS~
HOLD SIZE, SEX, AND AGE OF HEAD, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DEC., 1974
Number

Percent

2

208
92

3

72

4
5

51
40
35

41.8
18.5
14.5
10.2
8.0
7.0

498

100.0

274
224

55.0
45.0

498

100.0

3
141
149
62
45
22
76

0.6
28.3
29.9
12.4
9.0
4.4
15.3

498

100.0*

Household Size
1

6 or more

TOTAL
Mean Household Size = 2.53
Median Household Size
2.00

*

Sex of Head
--Male
Female
TOTAL

Under 18
18 - 24
25 - 34
35 - 44
45 - 54
55 - 64

65+
TOTAL
Mean Age of Head = 38.1
Median Age of Head = 30.0

*Does

not equal 100.0 due to rounding error.

1source: Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Multnomah
County, Oregon, December, 1974. See text for description.
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heavily concentrated on young households:
were below age 35.
35 and 64.

58.8% of household heads

Only 25.8% of the sample had heads between ages

Elderly households comprised 15.3% of the total.

Table

XXXIV indicates that the reported value of the assets of surveyed
households was very low.
Table XXXV contains mean gross monthly income, mean net monthly income (income after deductions permitted by the program formula) ,
and mean bonus values by household size for the sample as a whole.
For the total sample, gross income averaged $256 per month, mean
monthly net income was $132 and the average monthly bonus was $66.
The difference between net and gross income was $124 per month.

Thus

net income for the sample was only 52% of gross income.
Tables XXXVI, XXXVII and XXXVIII contain gross income, net
income, and bonus data by household size and income class.

These

tables indicate that the Food stamp income determination formula
tends to result in proportionately larger deductions from gross income for upper income recipients.

Figure 5 plots data from Tables

XXXVI and XXXVII for all classes in which there are a minimum of
five observations.

Figure 5 reveals that the relationship between

gross and net income is not linear.
proportiona1~increases

As gross income increases,

in net income diminish at the upper end of

the income spectrum of survey households.

Figure 6 which plots data

from Tables XXXVI and XXXVIII indicates that the relationship between food stamp bonuses and, gross income is also non-linear as bonus values are an inverse function of net income.

As gross income
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TABLE XXXIV
CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUbLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: ASSETS, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 1974
Number of
Households

Cash on Hand

o
$1 - 49
$50 - 99
$100 - 149
$150 or more
TOTAL

Percent

194
257
23
13
11

39.0
51.6
4.6
2.6
2.2

498

100.0

259
113
24
35
12
8
24
12

52.0
22.7
4.8
7.0
2.4
1.6
2.2
4.8
2.4

498

100.0

237
235
26

47.6
47.2
5.2

498

100.0

Value of Other Assets
(stockS; bonds, bank accounts, etc.)

o
$1 - 49
$50 - 99
$100 - 199
$200 - 299
$300 - 399
$400 - 499
$500 - 999
$1000 - $1499

11

TOTAL
Car ownership
No Car
One Car
Two or more
TOTAL

1source: Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Multnomah
County, Oregon, December, 1974. See text for description.
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TABLE XXXV
CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS:
GROSS MONTHLY INCOME, NET MONTHLY INCOME, AND BONUS VALUE, BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 19741
Household
Size

Gross Monthly Income
Stand,. 'Dev.
Mean

~

Monthly Income
Stand. Dev.
Mean

Bonus
Mean Stflnd.Dev.

1 (N=208)

145

90

.. 70

61

33

13

2 (N=92)

230

153

103

83

58

21

3 (N=72)

331

186

156

124

79

33

4 (N=51)

387

180

210

132

100

54

5 (N=40)

390

242

216

174

117

51

6+ (N=35)

481

235

318

187

140

62

256

193

132

130

66

48

TOTAL SAMPLE
(N=498)

Median Gross Monthly Income = $202
Median Net Monthly Income = $121
1

Source: "Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Multnomah
County, Oregon, December, 1974. See text for description.

TABLE XXXVI

CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: GROSS MONTHLY INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE
AND INCOME CLASS, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 1974 1

Household
Size

Gross Monthly Income by Annual Income Class
$1000$2000$3000$4000$50002999
3999
1999
4999
5999

$60006999

$70007999

$8000
or more

0

$1999

Mean
N

0
29

55
20

135
73

203
71

284
12

382
2

0

0

603
1

0

Mean
N

0
13

65
4

140
14

209
23

294
19

371
9

460
4

532
4

631
2

0

Mean
N

0
7

0

128
9

218
8

285
10

374
13

448
10

534
8

616
6

756
1

Mean
N

0
2

0

132
3

214
5

318
9

371
15

473
7

540
4

638
2

770
4

Mean

0

N

!

0

138
2

223
5

276
9

373
5

464
2

556
3

635
3

764
7

6+ Mean

0
3

0

146
2

229
1

0

398
7

456
6

510
3

632
5

761
8

1

2

3

4

5

N

1source: Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Mu1tnomah County, Oregon, December, 1974.
See text for description.
I-'
-...J
W

TABLE XXXVII

CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: NET MONTHLY INCOME FOR FOOD STAMPS BY
HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND GROSS INCOME CLASS, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 1974 1

Mean Net Monthly Income for FQod Stamps by Annual Gross Income Class
$1000$2000$3000$4000$5000$6000$70002999
3999
1999
4999
5999
6999
7999

Household
Size

0

$1999

1

0

14

68

106

110

79

*

*

186

*

2

0

26

58

125

138

157

180

149

172

*

3

0

*

47

47

128

238

246

222

244

387

4

0

*

0

57

213

210·

208

385

338

410

5

0

*

46

67

155

151

194

34·~

420

473

6+

0

*

30

130

*

261

278

227

441

524

$8000or more

*No observations in this class.
1Source: Ranaom sample of NPA food stamp househo1ds~.Multnomah County, Oregon, December, 1974.
See text for description.
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TABLE XXXVIII

CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: MONTHLY FOOD rTAMP BONUS BY HOUSEHOLD
SIZE AND INCOME CLASS, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 1974

Mean Monthly Food Stamp Bonus by Annual Gross Income Class
$2000$4000$7000$1000$3000$5000$60001999
2999
4999
5999
6999
7999
3999

$8000or more

0

$1:.999

1

46

45

34

26

26

33

*

*

10

*

2

82

79

71

53

51

43

38

45

38

*

3

118

*

109

108

86

59

58

59

53

18

4

150

*

150

138

95

93

94

41

54

34

5

178

*

166

161

136

136

79

102

43

45

6+

/246

*

197

155

)1t

148

155

184

112

66

H~useho1dl

Sl.ze

*NO observations in this class.
lsource: Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Mu1tnomah County, Oregon, December, 1974.
See text for description.
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increases, bonuses decrease at a slower rate in the upper income
classes.
Table XXXIX contains the incidence of some major deductions
from gross income and the reported income sources of households in
the survey.

About 35% of the sample reported earnings as their

major income source.

Deductions for excess shelter payments were

permitted virtually every household with the average value of such
deductions equalling nearly $73 per month.

Thus shelter deductions

account for 58% of the $124 average monthly difference between net
and gross income.

While excess shelter deductions were large, the

average gross monthly rent paid by sample households was only $122.84.
The program formula permits the deduction of shelter expenditures in
excess of 30% of income net of all other deductions.

This results in

households with extremely modest housing expenditures receiving some
shelter deduction .. · The reward for shelter expenditures depends upon
the income and the size of the household.

A two person household with

net income of $103 per month -- the mean net income for this household size (Table XXXV)

receives a $21 per month additional bonus

if it has the $73 shelter deduction typical of the sample.

without

such a deduction, the household's net income would equal $176 and it
would be required to pay $44 for its stamps.

with the shelter

deduc~·

tion, it pays only $23 for its stamps (Table XXX).
Table XL contains the average shelter deductions by household
size and income class and Figure 7 plots these deductions against
gross monthly income (Table XXXVI).

Shelter deductions demonstrate a

tendency to increase slightly with increases in gross income.
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TABLE XXXIX

CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: DEDUCTIONS FROM GROSS INCOME AND REPORTED INCOME SOURCES, MULTNOMAH
COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 1974 1
Deductions from Gross Income Permitted Sample Households
Number of Households
Permitted Deduction

Type of Deduction

Medical
Child Care
Tuition
Excess Shelter Payments
(Mean Excess Shelter Payment=
$72.72 per month)
(Mean Gross Rent= $122.84 per
month)
Reported In~ Source 2

Number of Households

social Security or SSI
Pension
Earned Income 3
veterans Benefits
Unemployment Compensation
Child Support and/or Alimony
Educational Loans or Scholarships
Strike Benefits
No Reported Income
Unknown or other
TOTAL

*Does

238
24
70
493

114
9
173
26

36
22

19

(N=498)

Percent
47.8
.. 4.8
14.1
99.0

Percent
22.9
1.8

34.7
5.2
7.2
4.4
3.8

58
36

1.0
11.6
7.2

498

100.0*

5

not equal 100.0 due to rounding error.

lSource: Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Multnomah County, Oregon, December, 1974. See text for description.
2In cases where households had more than one income source,
the dominant source was recorded.
3Earned income includes wages and income from self-employment.
Many recipients, whose major income source was earned income, did
not work full time.

TABLE XL

CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: EXCESS SHELTER DEDUCTIONS BY HOUSEHOLD
SIZE AND INCOME CLASS, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 1974 1

I

Mean Monthly Excess Shelter Deduction by Annual Gross Income Class
$1000$2000$3000$4000$5000$7000$60001999
2999
3999
4999
7999
5999
6999

0

$1999

1

75

41

44

48

70

78

*

*

21

2

99

90

65

60

69

86

97

99

102

,~

3

123

*

70

127

90

74

83

101

106

145

4

102

*

92

124

59

100

94

35

86

55

5

146

*

84

153

94

112

6J

81

83

51

6+

173

*

148

98

*

104

101

73

85

53

Household
Size

$8000or more

*

*NO observations in this class.
Isource: Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Multnomah County, Oregon, December, 1974.
text for description.
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This partially explains why the rate of increase in net income was
lower for the higher income classes.

Other aspects of the Food

stamp income determination formula also tend to result in proportionate1y larger deductions from gross income for the upper income
eligible.

Earned income and work related expenditures are treated

far more generously than is income from transfers.

Families in the

higher income brackets are much more likely to have income from
earnings and are therefore likely to have a greater spread between
net and gross before shelter deductions.

Since shelter deductions

are the last to be calculated, the deductions allowed upper income
eligible households tend to be multiplicative.
Estimating the Number of Eligible
An effort to estimate the number of eligible, nation-wide, from

the Chilton survey data was made by Bickel and Mac Donald.

They used

the average .70 - .72 ratio between net and gross income that prevailed
in the Chilton survey to derive the maximum gross income limits implied
by the net income maximums mandated by the Food Stamp program.

These

implied gross income limits were fitted to the distribution of households by income and household size on a state by state basis to estimate the number eligible on income criteria.

Bickel and Mac Donald

concluder that about 33.5 million persons were eligible for Food
Stamps in 1974, with 292,441 eligible in Oregon.

Nationwide, Bickel

and Mac Donald estimated that 31-38% of the eligible receive Food
Stamps while Oregon participation was 39-47i of the eligible.

1S

l8Gary W. Bickel and Maurice Mac Donald, Ope cit., pp. 13, 29.
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The results of the NPA survey in Multnomah County suggest that
Bickel and Mac Donald seriously
households.

unde~estimate

the number of eligible

Sixty percent of the Chilton households were Public

Assistant recipients.

As discussed above, the treatment of income in

the Food Stamp program does not favor such households.

The .52 ratio

between net and gross income found in the county survey is probably
more accurate in describing the net/gross spread for those close to
the eligibility limits.

Figure 5 suggests that even the assumption

that net income is 52% of gross at the upper limits of the program is
too conservative.

While the average net/gross ratio in the county

survey was .52, the relationship between net and gross was not linear.
Figure 7 indicates that net is a smaller proportion of gross in the
upper brackets represented in the survey.

However, very few sample

households were anywhere near the eligibility maximums, thus it was
not possible to determine precisely what gross incomes were implied
by the Food Stamp program's net income limits.
Table XLI contains the 1973 Census Bureau low-income thresholds
and the Food Stamp net income maximums, by household size, for 1973.
The conservative average .52 net/gross income ratio that prevailed in
the county survey was used to derive the gross incomes implied by the
net income limits for 1973.

While the net limits are very close to

the poverty thresholds, the implied gross eligibility limits include
a large number of non-poor in the eligible population.

(The close

correspondence between the net income maximums and the poverty thresholds is not surprising since both are based on the USDA economy diet
plan).

Table XLII shows the result of fitting the implied gross
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TABLE XLI
LOW-INCOME THRESHOLDS FOR NONFARM HOUSEHOLDS AND FOOD STAMP ELIGIBILITY LIMITS, BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE, U.S., 1973

Low-Income
Thresho1d1

Maximum Net Annua1 Income for
Food stamps2

1

$2,247

$2,136

$4,108

2

2,895

2,796

5,377

3

3,548

3,684

7,085

4

4,540

4,476

8,608

5

5,358

5,280

10,154

6

6,028

6,084

11,700

Household
Size

Implied Maximum

::~a~o~r~~:m~~3

1

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series
P-60, No. 98, "Characteristics of the Low-Income Population: 1973",
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 162.
2

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service,
"Food Stanlp Program, Current as of July 1, 1972," mimeo., pp. 26-7~
3Estimated by using the average net income/gross income ratio
of .52 that prevailed in a random sample of 498 NPA food stamp households in Mu1tnomah County, Oregon in December, 1974.
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income limits in Table XLI to the county distribution of households
by size and income class in Table XX.

A total of 70,262 households

or 40% of the county population were estimated as eligible for Food
stamps.

Of those eligible, only about 15,500 or 20% were actually

participating in the program.
Bickel and Mac Donald warn of some major sources of error associated with estimate made in the above manner.
program has an

asset~

Since the Food Stamp

as well as an income test, it is possible that

those who qualify on the basis of income are unable to pass the assets
screen.

The only

d~tailed

households dates from 1962.

survey of the value of assets of low-income
On the basis of this survey, Bickel and

Mac Donald conclude that, at most, 21% of those eligible on the basis
of income, would be.eliminated by an assets test. 19
Bickel and Mac Donald indicate that a more serious source of bias
is the significant undercounting that results from using annual income
data to calculate eligibility for a program which determines eligibility on the basis of current monthly income.

In reviewing the work of

other researchers, they maintain that,
• • • the number of normally above-standard households that
will fall temporarily below the food stamp eligibility levels
in particular" months is substantially larger than the opposite
number of normally below standard households temporarily rising
in some months to above-maximum incomes. 20
Bickel and Mac Donald report that research suggests that undercounting
due to the "accounting period" bias is about 37% for urban households.
This undercounting estimate relates to the l2-month equivalent of the
19 Ibid .,·p.15.

20 Ibid ., p. 24.

188

number of households eligible in a given year, not to the number
of households ever eligible which would be much higher.
If the 21% overestimate due to the assets screen is subtracted
from the 37% "accounting period" underestimate, and the 16% difference
is applied to the results in Table XLII,

th~

estimated number of

county eligible jumps to 91,944 households or 46% of the population.
The number of eligible participating drops to 17 percent.
While these estimates are admittedly crude, the conclusion that
an extremely large number of households, including substantial numbers
of non-poor, are eligible for Food stamps, is inescapable.

While the

results of both the Chilton and county surveys indicate that very few
of the upper-income eligible are currently participating, the recent
legal decisions compelling more vigorous "outreach" activities and the
rapid expansion of the NPA share of the program suggest that more upper
income eligibles will be drawn in.

Willard Renkin, Food stamp Coordi-

nator, Multnomah County, Oregon, indicated that important barriers to
NPA

partic~pation,

in the past, were the characterization of Food

Stamps as a "welfare" program and an ignorance on the part of high
income eligibles that they could receive benefits.

2l

This ignorance

of eligibility is understandable in view of the complexity of the
income determination formula which results in a large difference
between net and gross income maximums.

Probably few households above

the poverty thresholds suspect that they are eligible because the
maximum incomes cited in program publicity are always the net income
limits.

As larger numbers of NPA households enter the program and as

2lWillard Renkin, op.cit.

TABLE XLII

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS ELIGIBLE FOR FOOD STAMPS, BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE
OREGON, FY 1973

Household
Size

~u

INCOME, MULTNOMAH COUNTY,

Number of Eligible Households by Gross Annual Income Class
Less than
$2000$3000$5000$7000$10,000$2000
2999
4999
6999
9999
14,999

Total

1

17,323

7,293

5,133

0

0

0

29,749

2

4,656

4,378

9,325

1,680

0

0

20,039

3

1,506

1,022

2,522

3,618

201

0

8,869

4

859

642

1,309

2,054

2:;955

0

7,819

5

383

305

718

969

3,557

167

6,099

6+

350

254

716

928

2,778

1~661

6,687

25,077

13,894

19,723

9,249

9,491

1,828

79,262

Total
1

Estimated by applying the Implied Maximum Gross Annual Income for Food Stamps in Table XLI
to the county income distribution in Table XX.
It was assumed that the households in a given income
class are evenly distributed across that class.

I-'
00
~
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more detailed program information becomes available, these barriers to
the participation of the upper-income eligible are likely to diminish.
Evaluating Food stamp Subsidies
Figures 8 and 9 contain applications of the model for evaluating
in-kind transfers presented in Chapter IV to the Food Stamp Program.
Figure 8 demonstrates the effects of the program in Multnomah County
in FY 1973 for a two-person NPA household with annual gross income
of $2500.

This household is near the average size and income of the

households in the county survey (Table XXXV).

The results of the coun--

ty survey indicate that this household would have a net monthly income
of $125 after deductions permitted by the program (Tables XXXVI and
XXXVII).

This net income required a recipient payment, AB in Figure

8, of $29 for stamps with a face or market value of $64, AD in
Figure 8 (payment schedule is in Table XXIX).

The difference between

the market value and the recipient's payment of $35 is the bonus value
of the stamps of the monthly in-kind income provided by the program, BD.
On an annual basis, this in-kind

tra~sfer

is worth $420.

Table XXXII

contains expected food expenditures by household size and income class.
The $420 in-kind income is insufficient to move the household with
annual income of $2500 to the next income class.
food

e~enditures

Thus the expected

for the household, AC' in Figure 8, equal $92.

Since

the expected expenditures for fodd, if the household's income were
entirely in cash, exceed the market value of the food stamps by 44%,
there are no substitution effects.

CD is equal to 0 as the program

does not compel alterations in the consumption pattern preferred by the
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A

Gross Monthly Income = $208
Net Monthly Income = $125
AB

= $29 = Recipient Payment

BC

= BD = $35 = Cash Value of

20
Transfer to Recipient =
In-Kind Income

B

40

AC = AD = $64 = Private Benefits=
Market Value of Food Stamps

60

c,n

AC' = $92 = Expected Food Expenditure if Income were in Cash
CD =

E

80

o = Substitution Effects

DE = $9.71

= Administrative Costs

I

I

I

BE = $44.71 = Total Public Costs

:

AE

1__________1 c'

= $73.71 = Total Public and
Private Costs

Figure 8. Impact of food stamps on two-person household;
annual cash income of $2,500.
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recipients.

The monthly administrative costs per household, DE, of

$9.71 were obtained by dividing the annual administrative costs per
household

in Table XXVIII by 12.

It was assumed that administrative

costs are independent of household size as no additional paper work
or processing is required for larger households.

BE or the total

public costs of the program are $44.71 of which 78% os paid out as
bonus and 22% is allocated to administration.

AE, the total public

and private cost of the transfer is $73.71.
Figure 9 contains the same data for a four person NPA household with annual gross income of $4500.

This gross income was asso-

ciated with a net monthly income of $210 in the county survey (Table
XXXVI and XXXVII).

At this income level, the required recipient

payment, AB, is $59 for coupons worth $112, AD (Table XXIX).

The

difference between AD and AB of $53 is the cash value of the in-kind
transfer, BD.

On an annual basis, the transfer is worth $636 --

enough to push the household into the $5000-5999 income bracket in
terms of Table XXXII.

At this income level, the household would be

expected to expend $176 per month on food, AC', if its income were
entirely in cash.
allotment of $112.
CD

= O.

This is an amount 57% greater than its food stamp
Therefore, there are no substitution effects and

As in Figure 8, DE or administrative expenditures equal $9.71.

Administration receives 15% of the total public costs of $62.71, BE,
while bonus payments to the recipients account for the remaining 85%.
AE, the total public and private cost of the transfer is $121.71.
Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate that, unlike housing subsidies,
food stamps do not succeed in inducing changes in consumption patterns.

A

Gross Monthly Income = $375
Net Monthly Income = $210

20

AB = $59
BC

40

B

60

= BD = $53 = Cash

Value of
Transfer to Recipient =
In-Kind Income

= Expected

Food Expenditure if Income were in
Cash

80

C,D
120

I

Payment

AC = AD = $112 = Private Benefits = Market Value of
Food stamps
AC'

100

= Recipient

CD

=

0

= Substitution

DE

=

$9.71

BE

=

$62.71 = Total Public Costs

AE

=

$121. 71 = Total Public andPrivate Costs

=

Effects

Administrative Costs

E

I
I
I

140

1

I
I

160

I

I
I
I

1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 1 C·

Figure 9. Impact of food stamps on four-person household,
annual cash income of $4,500.
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As such, the indirect or social benefits of this transfer mode which
are related to the presence of substitution effects (Equation 2 in
Chapter IV) are zero.

As with housing benefits, the definition of

social benefits in Equation 2 is very narrow;
would yield other results.

other conceptualizations

Equation 1 in Chapter IV suggests that

the minimum social benefits, SBmin, required for an in-kind investment to pay-off, were equal to total costs, AE,minus private benefits,
AC.

In both Figures 8 and 9, SBmin

= $9.71

per household per month,

considerably less than the maximum social benefits demanded by housing
programs which induce substitution effects.
Summary
The data in this chapter indicate that the theoretical and
political arguments in favor of in-kind programs, which suggest that
changes in consumption patterns produce external benefits, are not
relevant to the Food Stamp Program as it currently operates.

Benefit

levels are not sufficiently large to induce substitution effects, thus
recipients treat their in-kind income as cash.

This tendency to view

food stamps as cash is further reinforced by the variable purchase
option which allows participating households to buy as little as onequarter of

~heir

monthly allotment.

With 20% of public program dollars

allocated to administration, the economic logic of giving in-kind
rather than in cash is suspect, when recipients are treating the
transfer as cash.

The data in this chapter also indicate that very

large numbers of American households are eligible for

food stamps,

including many of those not officially designated as poor.

While
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program

b~~efits

are currently concentrated heavily on the indigent,

the open-ended funding for the program and the rapid increase in
Non-Public Assistance participation, suggest continued program
expansion.

The budgetary impact of the program, already expected

to exceed $5 billion in FY 1975, could be much more substantial
in the future.

22

22"Food stamp Plan to Provide More,"
(April 9, 1975), p. 8.

The ~ York Times,

CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
The results of an empirical investigation of the low-income
housing and Food Stamp programs suggest that in-kind transfers are a
politically popular, but inefficient and inequitable method of redistributing income.

The hypotheses, proposed in Chapter IV, were

confirmed by the data presented in Chapters V and VI.
High Administration and Participation Costs
High administrative costs were associated with all of the programs examined in this research.

The Food Stamp Program in FY 1973

devoted one-fifth of its program dollars to administration.

Further-

more, the administrative share of the budget is likely to increase,
as a recent change in the cost-sharing -FormuL::. permits state aha local
governments to shift a greater percentage of the financial burden of
program administration to the Federal government.

with Washington

paying more of the bill, the understaffing characteristic of the
program is likely to diminish.

Under the conservative assumption

that administrative costs are still 20% of the Food Stamp budget,
about $1 billion will be spent on the administration of this single
program in FY 1975.

1

The administrative share of the low-income housing budget was
l"Food stamp to Provide More,"
1975), p. 8.

The ~ York Times, (April 9,
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even greater:

23-25% of public leased housing dollars were allocated

to administration, while administrative costs were 51-56% for units
owned by the housing authority.
unique to in-kind programs.

High administrative costs are not

AFDC, the major cash welfare program,

has also diverted a large proportion of program dollars to bureaucracy.

If it is assumed that all needs-tested transfer programs

allocate 20% of their budget to administration (a conservative estimate), then over $6 billion was spent in FY 1973 for the management
of welfare programs (Table II).
The major reasons for these high administrative costs, discussed
in detail in Chapter I, are program complexity, the diffusion of responsibility between and within levels of government, and the political
environment of income redistribution programs which places contradictory demands on policymakers.

In addition,the structure of incentives

in the public sector does not clearly reward efficient administration.
The fundamental disagreement in American society about who deserves
assistnace, under what conditions, and in what form, has stimUlated
a rash of rule-making.

Different rules are designed to appeal to dif-

ferent factions in an effort to create consensus for a program.

Most

programs seek to distinguish between the "worthy" and "unworthy" poor
on grounds other than income.

The greater the effort to make fine dis-

tinctions between the eligible and the ineligible, the greater the complexity and the greater are the administrative problems.

While

there are certainly many examples of bureaucratic blundering, the basic
structure of the welfare system demands high administrative costs from
even the most efficient of administrators.

In sum, while the nation
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is maJd-?g an important ef;f;ort to redistribute income tbrp.ugh large
public transfer programs, this ei:fort is bei?g undercut by the diversion of many pr.ogram dollars from the target population to administration.
While all programs require some administrative outlay, the results of the income maintenance experiments suggest that the bureaucratic share could be substantially lower than that associated with
current transfer programs.

David N. Kershaw, project director of

the New Jersey, Denver, and Seattle experiments,

estimates that a

national cash assistance program would cost less than $1 billion
annually to administer (about $150 per case) •

Kershaw's system

would include the verification of information at the time of application, periodic auditing of a random sample of all participants, and
"audits for cause" of those suspected of fraud.

2

Thus Kershaw claims

that administrative expenditures for a cash system would be roughly
comparable to the current cost of administering the Food Stamp Program
Income maintenance programs, by simplifying eligibility and

alone.

payment standards and procedures, appear to make possible substantial
reductions in the diversion of program dollars to bureaucracy.

How-

ever, there may be errors associated with projecting national costs from
small-scale experiments.

2

It is conceivable that political pressures

David N. Kershaw, "Administrative Issues in Establishing and operating a National Cash Assistance !;lrogram," in U.s. Congress, Joint
Econondc committee, S'llibcommittee.on Fiscal !;lolicy•. Studies in PUblic
. welfare, paper No ~ 5 (Part 3); Issues· in Welfare' Admi..,.,dstratidn: 'Im'plicationsof·thelnCdme·Maintenance Experiments, rwashington, D.C.:
U.S. Government printing Office, 1973).

199

for rule

prol~~erat~on

and that a lack of reward

also come to characteJ:ize. an mco..'lle lUamtenance

~or ef~~c~enc~

would

s~tem.

In addition to high admmistrative costs, the structure 6f the
American welfare system imposes high information and transaction costs
on its intended beneficiaries.

The low participation rates in the

open-ended Food stamp Program are evidence that there are significant
barriers to the involvement of the eligible.

The complicated in-

come determination formulas, characteristic of the Food Stamp Program
and most other welfare programs, make it difficult for potential
participants to assess their eligibility and/or probable benefits.

In

addition, program participation frequently demands long waits for
services, traveling to take advantage of benefits, aggressiveness
in applying for transfers, and/or services in a form which embarass

some of the eligible.

Potential recipients are confronted with a

confusing and inconvenient delivery system which leads many of the eligible to elect not to participate.
ticipa~ion

Ironically, the structure of par-

costs tends to discourage the least controversial subgroups

of the target population -- the elderly and disabled.
Substitution Effects
In-kind

trans~ers enjo~

cash transfers.

WhD.e

lUuch greater

d~ficul t

to

polit~cal

support than do

q.uant~¥, ~erican

public opmion,

as reflected in the political systere, has backed the transter of basic
commodities more strongly than it has the redistribution of cash mcome.
In the vocabulary of welfare theory, the data support the existence of
"goods-specific" utility interdependence.

Specific ills! like malnu-
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poyert¥~ ~eneralt

trition and slum housin9, rather than
as

imposin~

social costs on the communitY'-

are viewed

In part. specific de-

ficiencies become the focus of attention because they are more visible
and less abstract than poverty in general.

as crucial, in a

Perh~ps

culturally heterogeneous nation, transfers of the basic necessities
of life are less divisive than are transfers of cash.

Many taxpayers

suspect that cash transfers would be "wasted" by welfare recipients
who are perceived as having values and behavior patterns unlike those
of the American mainstream.

In-kind transfers are proposed as a means

of assisting the poor in a way which is expected to maximize the social
benefits of income redistribution.

The popular political logic insists

that the Food stamp Program is the preferred perscription for the malnourished while housing programs are most appropriate for the house
poor.

It is assumed that cash transfers would partially be diverted

from the expenditure categories of greatest concern to the donors.
In short,

in~kind

transfers are thought to generate

or to insure more socially

acce~table

s~sitution

effects

consumption patterns than would

the transfer of cash.
The results of an empirical evaluation of the Food Stamp and lowincome housing pr,oSJrams reveal that the popular conception of the impact of in-kind

pro~rams

is based on sQme erroneOllS assumptions.

key discovery was that in-ki;nd
tiQn effects.

l?r,o~raros

A

dq not alw.axs induce substitu-

A comparison .ofthe food expenditures Of rood stamp

households with the food consumption patterns of comparable low-income
households found that those purchasing their full monthly allo't:.ment of
food

sta.'l'nps

were not compelled by the program structure to increase
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consumption of food.

J:n addition, the adoJ;ltion of· the variable l?ur-

chase option permits participating households to determine their own
level of food consumption within wide lw.ts.

Households purchasing

as little as one-quarter of their monthly allotment are granted active status in the program.
In the Food stamp Program, the strategy has been to cut the
transfer pie into small pieces.

Relatively meager transfers are

provided to a very large number of participants.

A convoluted sys-

tem of script, with 20¢ of every $1 going to administration, has
been created under the illusion that the hungry are receiving more
food than they would be inclined to purchase for themselves, if provided with equivalent cash subsidies.

vfuile the Food stamp Program

undoubtedly permits participants to purchase more food than they would
in the absence of any subsidy, the evidence is that food stamp recipients use their script as they would increments in cash.

The high

administrative and participation costs associated with the Food Stamp
Program do not appear to be compensated for by social benefits different from those which could be obtained from cash transfers.
In contrast, the low-income housing programs were found to indu~e

the kinds of alterations in consumption patterns expected of in-

kind transfers.

The housing pie is cut into large pieces for a

much smaller number

o~

I?articipating households.

As a result, those

fortunate enough to. gain admission cans.ume considerably more housing
than they would if given a comparable cash s,ubsidy.

Since there are

so few pieces of pie, 95% of those eligible are unable to participate.

To the extent that external diseconomi.es are assQciated with the
housing consumption patterns 0;1; the enti.re elisihle l?ol?ulation, these
external diseconomies are only slightly diminished by programs which
leave the bulk of the target group untouched.

While housing programs

generate substitution effects, their price is high both in terms of
administrative costs and the inequitable exclusion of the eligible
from program benefits through the restriction of supply.
In sum, while the Food stamp and low-income housing programs
represent opposite strategies in terms of the benefits available per
household and the number of households permitted to participate,
all programs were found to be deficient in significantly altering
the consumption patterns of the eligible population as a whole.
kind programs do produce benefits.

In-

However, it is questionable whe-

ther these benefits are greater than those which would result from
equivalent cash subsidies or whether the benefits produced are greater
than their costs.
Equity
The current welfare system does not provide those with similar
socio-economic characteristics with similal':' benefits.
fers are available to only a small numbel; 0:1; eligible.

Housing transThe complex

income determination f;ormula employed in the ;E'ood Starop ;l?r.ogram results
in a considerable variation in the benefits paid to households of similar size and income.
all geographic locations.

Some program benefits are not available in
While the potential cumulative benefits
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available te l?eer househelds, under the maze .of,
very large, the actual distributien

e~

~elfare

pr,egra.ms, is

public transfers varies enerVery few households re-

meusly between equally needy households.

ceive all .of the benefits te which they are legally entitled.
The current distributien .of benefits in both the Feod stamp
and low-inceme heusing pre grams was feund te be heavily skewed toward
the peer.

However, .official definitiens .of eligibility were feund

te include many nen-peer.

In Multnomah County, Oregen, 37% .of the

households were eligible fer heusing assistance and 46% were eligible
fer feod stamps.

While the tight supply .of heusing transfers inhi-

bits participatien grewth, the petential fer expansien in the epenended Feed stamp Pregram is enermous.

By June of 1975, it is esti-

mated that 10% .of the American populatien will be receiving feed
stamps. 3

The wisdom .of a pelicy which weuld take middle-class tax

dellars and distribute them te lewer-middle class recipients in the
ferm .of script -- after allecating a sizable prepertion te administration -- is suspect.

Hewever, the greater the diffusien .of benefits

and the mere middle-class the recipients, the greater is the apparent
4

pelitical petency .of a program.
Non-Ecenemic rssues
While the econemic

l,e~ic

.of in-kind pr.egrams, is net compelling,

3"Feed stamp plan te Previde More, "~. ci,t.

~,

4David A. steckman, "The Social Pork Barrel," ~ public InteNe. 39, (Spring, 1975), pp. 3-30.
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the I?olitical l.oliJic behind such t:r;ans:i;ers re,mains. powerful.
policymake:r;s. attack in-kind proliJrarns, they tend to

fOCUS

When

on inade-

quate benefit or participation levels or on glaring administrative
malfunctions.

There appears to be very little interest in criti-

cally evaluating the transfer mode itself or in empirically validating the assumptions underlying the rhetoric promoting in-kind
programs.

Supporters of policies which redistribute income may

rationally fear that attacks on the basic structure of popular transfer programs would result in a reduction in the benefits available to
the poor rather than to the creation of superior programs.

The

pressure to enlarge the public welfare pie and to liberalize eligibility requirements has produced enormous program expansion.

This

expansion has occurred because the reward structure in the political
system encourages policymakers to respond to the pressures emanating
from the "publics" associated with established programs, rather than
to respond to the implications of academic analyses.
In this research, a theoretical framework which emphasizes the
economic impact of in-kind transfers has been employed.

However, con-

siderable attention has been devoted to the political environment.
The development

o~

omics permits the

the utility

interde~endence

in~eliJration o~

political and

paradigm in welfare econecono~ic

this. int.eliJration has. been s.tressed in this. work.
costs found to be associated with in-kind

variables and

Despite the high

trans~ers,

it is. possible

that public preferences; ;for this mode are so strong and the antipathy
to cash transfers so great that the total benefits associated with
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in-kind transfers may be worth their costs.

However, this. investi-

gation has revealed that the political rhetoric in

~avor

of in-kind

transfers is based upon illusions as to the effect of such transfers
on the target population.

To the extent that policymaking is a ra-

tional process, the actual impact of program operations ought to enter the public calculus.
The programs selected for::.analysis were evaluated solely in relationship to their adequacy as mechanisms for the redistribution of
income and their effectiveness in stimulating the consumption of designated goods.
other goals.

In-kind programs have not been analyzed in terms of
This narrow perspective omits some objectives which

have been important to program advocates.

rfuile the Food stamp Pro-

gram has not had explicit goals other than the transfer of income
and the encouragement of food consumption, housing programs have been
considerably broader

i.l

scope.

For example, the ability of public

ownership or management to upgrade neighborhoods when the structure of
incentives in the private sector inhibits the necessary cooperation
between private owners, has not been discussed.

The efficacy of

housing programs in facilitating the delivery of services to multiproblem families and the success of housing authorities in providing
unique accolllodations for the elderly and dis.abled has. not been assessed.

The contributions. of; housing programs. to int,ec;rration have also

been ,ignored.

In sum, all of

th~

c;roals of in-kind t;ransf;er programs

have not been considered and the conclusions regarding the effectiveness of in-kind transfers are relevant only to the specific goals em-
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phasized in the analytical

~ramework.

transfers are primarily intended to
consumption patterns of the target
be inefficient and inequitable.

To the extent that in-kind

redi~tribute

population~

income and alter the

they were found to
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